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answer these challenges by pointing interest to complexity, irrationality and humanity of changes. 
Management accounting research has developed accounting change models, presented future 
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Tämä tutkimus keskittyi rullaavan suunnittelun käyttöönottoon ja päivittäiseen käyttöön 
suomalaisessa vähittäiskauppayhtiössä. Budjetoinnin aihepiirissä rullaavan suunnittelun idea on 
ollut jo vuosikymmeniä kauppatieteilijöiden tietoisuudessa. Tästä huolimatta siihen on 
kohdistunut sangen vähäinen mielenkiinto johdon laskentatoimen tutkimuksessa. Vasta 
vuosituhannen vaihteen jälkeen käytännön ammatinharjoittajat ovat ottaneet menetelmän 
omakseen, minkä seurauksena voidaan perustellusti väittää, että case-tutkimukset rullaavasta 
suunnittelusta ovat tarpeellisia, jotta rullaavan suunnittelun mikrotason ymmärrys voi kasvaa. 
Johdon ohjausjärjestelmiä on tutkittu laajalti innovaatioiden diffuusiokirjallisuudessa monen eri 
näkökulman puolesta. Näitä tutkimuksia on kuitenkin vaivannut ennakkopositiivinen 
suhtautuminen innovaatioihin, loputtomiksi tulkitut resurssit, teknologiapainotteisuus ja 
ylirationaalisuus. Viimeaikainen tutkimus on pyrkinyt vastaamaan näihin haasteisiin 
kohdistamalla huomiota muutosten monimutkaisuuteen, irrationaalisuuteen ja inhimilliseen 
luonteeseen. Laskentatoimen tutkimus on kehittänyt laskentatoimen muutoksen malleja ja 
esittänyt tulevaisuuskuvia sekä havainnut muutoksia laskentatoimen ammattilaisen työssä. 
Mitä tulee budjetointiin, sen monimutkaisuus ja ongelmat ovat olleet tiedossa jo pitkään. 
Erilaisia menetelmiä kuten nollapohjabudjetointi, tasapainotettu tuloskortti, toimintolaskenta ja 
beyond budgeting –malli on kehitetty, jotta voitaisiin vastata paremmin muun muassa 
informaatioaikakauden tuomiin turbulentin toimintaympäristön haasteisiin.  Rullaava suunnittelu 
yrittää tehdä tämän luomalla joustavan budjetointiprosessin, jossa määrätty aikaväli ennustetaan 
tulevaisuuteen ja jossa mielenkiinto kohdistuu pikemmin tulevaisuuteen kuin menneisyyteen. 
Tutkimus tähtäsi rullaavaan suunnittelun käsityksen monipuolistamiseen mittavan aineiston 
avulla, mikä sisälsi seitsemän litteroitua ja kuusi muistiinpanohaastattelua, case-yrityksen 
pitkäaikaisen talousdatan, epävirallisia keskusteluja, kyselyjä ja muuta yrityksen sisäistä 
materiaalia. Kontingenssiteorian, asioiden syy-seuraus riippuvuussuhteiden ja monipuolisuuksien 
takia tämä tutkimus pyrki etupäässä kuvaamaan, havainnollistamaan ja selittämään rullaavaa 
suunnittelua budjetoinnin ja johdon ohjausjärjestelmän välineenä. Tutkimuksen 
tutkimuskysymyksen voisi kiteyttää seuraavasti: ”Kuinka rullaava suunnittelu toimii?”  
Case-yrityksessä rullaava suunnittelu on muuttanut raportointia ja tiedonkulkua yhtiössä sekä 
aiheuttanut haasteita totuttujen palveluiden tuottamisen ja uuden prosessin luomisen osalta. 
Tämän lisäksi yhtiössä on vielä vuosien kuluttuakin havaittavissa, että rullaavan suunnittelun rooli 
on epäselvä ja itse prosessi sisältää systemaattisia virheitä.  
Tämä tutkimus esittää empiiristen havaintojen pohjalta tarvittavia lisäosia laskentatoimen 
muutosmalliin, jotta muutostilanteita voitaisiin hallita paremmin. Tämä malli korostaa laadun, 
nopeuden ja kustannusten välistä tasapainoa ja tiedostaa, että muutos voi johtaa myös arvoa 
tuhoavaan toimintaan. Tutkimus todensi myös monipuolisesti, että eri organisaatiotasoilla on 
erilaiset käsitykset ja näkökulmat liittyen siihen, kuinka rullaava suunnittelu toimii. 
Avainsanat  rullaava ennustaminen, rullaava budjetointi, rullaava suunnittelu, budjetointi, 
johdon ohjausjärjestelmien diffuusio, johdon laskentatoimen muutos 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Background of the study 
 
Business environments have been under a turbulent change during the last few decades. This is a 
consequence from the fact that the business world is coming closer due to a heavy globalization, 
more integrated legislation and an intensified investor perspective. Therefore also in the field of 
management accounting, companies have to adapt new ways of reacting to the above-mentioned 
challenges (Virtanen 2006). Supposedly this leads to a need for new management control systems to 
be introduced into organizations. For example traditional tools such as budgeting have taken new 
development paths like rolling forecasting. Thereby the diffusion of management control systems in 
organizations is the main focus of this thesis, which is specifically researched through the micro-
level diffusion of rolling forecasting in the Finnish Retail Ltd. (later FiRe Ltd.). 
 
The phenomenon of diffusion is of particular interest in the field of management accounting, which 
was slandered as a research field by such critics like Johnson and Kaplan (1987) in the mid 1980’s. 
These authors claimed that at that time the situation had become so acute that management 
accounting either needed to be abandoned as being inimical with modern management, or else 
required a radical overhaul and revision. Responsively, as we have seen, management accounting 
stepped up the challenge and is well-off having developed new modernized tools such as the 
balanced scorecard, rolling forecasting and the beyond budgeting model. In addition, the Chartered 
Institute of Management Accountants (CIMA), which is a noteworthy global membership body for 
management accountants, received its present name in the 1980’s and has ever since been a huge 
success story with its increasing membership basis (www.cimaglobal.com).  
 
In this thesis the environment for diffusion could briefly be described intensely budgeting related, 
which is why the peculiarities of budgeting in the 21st century are also taken into consideration. 
Earlier extensive research has concentrated mainly on budgeting’s role as a tool for performance 
evaluation (Jensen 2001; Hope et al. 1997, 2000, 2003) although the multiple uses of budgeting – 
e.g. operational planning, communication of goals and strategy formation – have also been 
recognized (Hansen et al. 2004; Horngren et al. 2003). In addition, already in the 1990’s and 
especially in the 21st century there has been a discussion amongst management accounting scholars 
on whether the annual budget is finally becoming an outdated tool or not (Ekholm et al. 2003; 
Bartram 2006; Schmidt 1992). As for rolling forecasting, it has been introduced as a remedy for 
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overcoming the disadvantages that the traditional budgeting methods possess (Myers 2001; Arterian 
1998). The leading interest will be pointed to Libby & Lindsay’s (2010) finding that there’s very 
little recent evidence regarding on whether and how firms are adapting their budgeting systems. 
 
Further developed the thesis digs deep with the topic of rolling forecasting, which will be 
surrounded by the subjects of diffusion and budgeting. For some reason, rolling forecasting has not 
attracted in-depth scholarly research so far. Rather, publications have been more often on 
managerial level journals which tend to be more like best practices or check lists (Clarke 2007; 
Clarke et al. 2007; Montgomery 2002). With respect to its appropriateness for being a management 
control system the research field clearly lacks a thorough examination: how this kind of a system is 
implemented and how it operates in real life?  Particularly, indicating how people perceive the shift 
from traditional budgeting methods to rolling forecasting remains an area of interest that needs 
more attention: a micro-like point-of-view from the practitioners of rolling forecasting might reveal 
more knowledge on how rolling forecasting functions and does it bring what it promises. These 
observations together with the above-mentioned diffusion and budgeting issues function as a 
foundation for the demand of this type of a thesis. 
 
For the sake of clarity the thesis setting could be best framed with the figure below, where the 
arrows point out the scarce combination of substances used for the phenomenon under interest, 
which in turn is bolded. Noteworthy is that management controlling systems (MCSs) as a broad 
starting point is not included in the thesis since the idea is to gather insights on three different 
levels: diffusion of MCSs (1) in the environment of budgeting (2) methods such as rolling 
forecasting (3). The Finnish Retail Ltd. (4) functions as a stepping stone for testing the theoretical 
world with the practitioners’ world. 
 
Management controlling systems (MCS) 
Diffusion of management controlling systems (1) 
Budgeting in the 21st century (2) 
Rolling forecasting (3) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Research composition 
Micro-Level Diffusion of Management Controlling Systems:  
Rolling Forecasting in the Finnish Retail Ltd. 
The Finnish Retail Ltd. 
(4) 
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1.2 Research question 
 
To maintain the academic honesty throughout this thesis the research problem is stated briefly 
below in one sentence, which is followed by more precise explanations about the phenomena under 
special interest. These explanations prove that the research question holds many sequential 
questions in it. It’s worth taking a careful look at almost word-by-word interpretations since they 
make the initial research question an easier one to approach. 
 
Research question: “How does rolling forecasting function in everyday operations, how does it 
bring the aimed results,and how are the results viewed in different levels of an organization?” 
 
Here by “how does rolling forecasting function” the thesis solves the essence and core of rolling 
forecasting. What is actually meant by rolling forecasting or rolling budgeting? Perhaps the basic 
idea and goal of rolling forecasting might be obvious but is that actually the case also throughout 
the entire organization? How does it succeed in being a new invention or is it only disguised as 
something old done just a little bit differently with a new name? How much do the procedures 
related to rolling forecasting differ in the comparison of the should-be-done and the is-done 
perspectives? How does it find its role and what kind of a position and authority has it achieved in 
an organization? What kind of specialties and similarities does rolling forecasting possess when 
compared to other budgeting methods and management controlling systems? As it can be seen, 
multiple questions arise with the concept itself. As mentioned in chapter 1.1 with very few 
academic level writings about rolling forecasting it’s about time this challenge gets tackled by 
examining a case, in which these how questions shall be answered. 
 
The word “everyday” should actually not be interpreted literally since it is used to emphasize the 
burden, i.e. resource craving or inputs, that rolling forecasting brings about. First of all it would be 
certainly interesting to know how rolling forecasting is perceived: a burden or a great tool which 
turns raw matter into gold. On a practical level this thesis gives attention to such questions as how 
long a process is rolling forecasting, how flexible is the time-table and is it an on-going or a discrete 
process? Moreover, how everything is organized in terms of turning separate financial figures into a 
competent business plan? 
 
Here by “operations” it is meant the work of employees that are in any touch with the concept of 
rolling forecasting. Naturally working consists of planning what needs to be done and by what 
  
 
 
 8 
means, processing figures with different information systems, communicating through mobile 
phones, emails, meetings and unofficial discussions. This point of view brings the micro-level 
diffusion to a closer examination, which is one of the particularities of this research. Like with the 
human disease, cancer, there are only a few cells that for reason or another start to mutate in a bad 
way. Likewise this way of thinking can be very fruitful in evaluating new management controlling 
systems since micro-level findings can explain the how level questions on rolling forecasting. 
 
The “aimed results” –part of the research problem is very intriguing because the logical and 
inevitable extension of that question is what the aimed results actually are. One thing is for certain: 
rolling forecasting exists because it has been equipped with such promises that financial directors 
(or boards or CEOs) have decided to implement it into their organizations. What have been the 
reasons behind such decisions? Is it only a bandwagon among others or does it require a proper 
foundation so that an organization could benefit from it. There are certainly many consultants 
selling rolling forecasting as an idea relating to information systems. How do they persuade 
managers to buy the idea of rolling forecasting and how do managers promote rolling forecasting in 
their own organization? Additionally, how are the results, whatever they might be, viewed, 
interpreted and benefitted from? Changing a controlling system to another has always its strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities and threats like the famous SWOT-analysis. A fascinating question is the 
following: how have the academic literature and the practitioners taken the SWOT-aspects into 
consideration? 
 
“In different levels of an organization” symbolizes the interfaces between hierarchies in the 
company. These borders are under a magnifying glass since in this way the macro-level ideas of 
rolling forecasting are linked with the micro-level understandings of the management controlling 
system. Peculiar to this part of the research question is that this subpart is interpreted through all the 
other parts of the research question. In other words the thesis does not only stick to managerial 
perceptions of rolling forecasting. Instead, it tries to open up the whole forecasting process by 
examining the interactions between these levels. In the real world every person develops his or her 
power in the organization by skills, job position, relationships etc. Here in this thesis, however, the 
power relations are split into three categories: 1) Management (CEO, board & CFO), 2) Middle-
Management (business controllers & team leaders) and 3) Subordinates (business people and 
controllers). How do these levels work regarding rolling forecasting and how do they see rolling 
forecasting as a whole in the end? 
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The following table depicts the research problem in parts: “How does rolling forecasting function in 
everyday operations, how does it bring the aimed results and how are the results viewed in different 
levels of an organization?”. This table is also presented in the final chapter of this thesis with the 
here blank boxes filled with findings and results of the study. 
 
 In different levels of an organization? (Macro- vs. micro-level) 
  
 Management Middle-management Subordinates 
 (CEO, board & CFO) (Business controllers, (Business people, 
  team leaders) controllers) 
 
 
How does rolling 
forecasting function? 
(basics of rolling 
forecasting) 
 
   
Work during one round 
(on average) 
 
Everyday?  
(time-span of rolling 
forecasting and resource 
burden) 
   
 
 
Operations?  
(micro-level work) 
 
 
   
 
Aimed results?  
(promised results, SWOT 
and their correspondence to 
the reality) 
 
   
Table 1: Research question posed in a table 
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While the main research question concentrates on the above stated sentence, it shall not be ignored 
that the findings should broaden our knowledge of nowadays’ budgeting concepts and ideas as well 
as the knowledge of diffusion of management controlling systems. No matter whether the study 
should be classified as illustrative, descriptive or explanatory, which shall be discussed in chapter 
six, this thesis tries to answer humbly how rolling forecasting might be used in a fairly big company 
in the 21st century, Anno Domini. 
 
1.3 Structure of the study 
 
The thesis proceeds in the following way. The next section brings forth the diffusion aspect of 
management controlling systems. It opens up briefly the basic theory of diffusion, its revisions and 
finally the connections to management accounting by introducing what management accounting 
scholars have found concerning management accounting change and implementation studies. 
 
A logical follow up is section three that introduces the thematic of budgeting in the 21st century. 
Despite the attempts to answer the fresh and timely dilemmas of the budgeting world the earlier 
developments are also illustrated because no culture or way of doing things was built in a day. Thus 
the historical aspect of budgeting is an important inclusion in the thesis. After the rather 
chronological introduction of budgeting’s development the role of budgeting has to be analyzed in 
the modern world. Undeniably the word budgeting has an old-fashioned connotation but still 
today’s corporations use it. The major shortcomings and challenges that today’s budgeting tools 
possess prepare the readers for section four that deals with rolling forecasting. 
 
In section four rolling forecasting (also rolling budgeting) is divided into three parts: the basics, the 
implementation phase and continuous usage phase including taking improving measurements. The 
first part with the rolling forecasting’s basics is not only for introducing the foundation that it relies 
on: it is particularly designed for bringing some solutions to the “hoped for results that it promises” 
part of the research question. The partition to implementation phase and continuous usage welcome 
different angles in trying to answer the “how rolling forecasting functions” part of the research 
question. All in all, the academicians and consultants are given their say about rolling forecasting, 
which is steadily managerially weighted due to the short supply of academic writings.  
  
In section five a conclusion for theory parts of the thesis are given an emphasis. All findings are 
combined together to represent a tentative theoretical framework, through which the findings of the 
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empirical part of the study will be reflected and analyzed, in order to see the theoretical synthesis’ 
explanatory level for rolling forecasting in later chapters. 
 
Once the theoretical discussion concerning diffusion, budgeting, rolling forecasting and the 
following theory framework has been dealt with, section six takes a step closer to the so-called real 
world and discusses the chosen research methodology, method and data and analyses their pros and 
cons. The timeline of the study, the researcher’s relationship to the case company as well as other 
particularities of the study are also clarified. 
 
In section seven the practical context begins with the preparatory part of the Finnish Retail market 
and the case company, the Finnish Retail Ltd., and finishes with an exact depiction of the shift from 
a traditional budgeting system to a new system that contains rolling forecasting. From there on the 
focus will shift to rolling forecasting’s present state and the improvement paths the company has 
chosen or has considered. Thereby the research question parts “everyday” and “operations” are of 
particular interest even though the employees may likewise have fruitful comments to every aspect 
of rolling forecasting. 
 
Section eight eventually links this chapter’s research question to the theoretical discussion, 
framework and practical findings. Also an integrated view of the management controlling systems, 
budgeting thematic and rolling forecasting is reviewed. The discussion part of the thesis introduces 
a proposed accounting change model and related process that could be derived from the finding 
between the tentative theoretical framework and the case study.  The conclusions of the study both 
refer to the research question framework for answers that were wanted beforehand and also point 
out side findings among the research journey. Finally opening up some interesting research paths 
for the future throws the ball to other scholars, who hopefully gather more knowledge and test the 
findings of this thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 12 
2. Diffusion of Management Controlling Systems in organizations 
 
The theory of diffusion has been used in many sciences but most notably in economics (Wenisch 
2004). Out of this observation two comments are necessary. Firstly, theory of diffusion fits this 
thesis perfectly since it lays a proper ground for the coming chapters of the timely budgeting 
discussion as one area of management controlling systems and rolling forecasting as one possible 
method in answering today’s business challenges. Secondly, although there are a lot of authors out 
there with economics related diffusion studies, building the basic picture of the diffusion theory and 
its renovations serves adequately the purpose of this study, the orientation of which is and should be 
heavily management accounting related.  
 
Before introducing closer the basic diffusion theory a short introduction to the complex nature of 
definitions is needed. Kimberly (1981) reminds in his writings about managerial innovations, which 
rolling forecasting undeniably is, about the disagreements between researchers as to definitions of 
innovations: firstly some regard innovation as a process while others determine it a discrete product 
or program, secondly some underline newness as the criterion of the innovation while others 
emphasize a case-by-case approach following adopting system’s perception. He also brings forth 
that managerial innovations differ from other types of innovations in their nature of involving 
decision making, i.e. managers who take actions and responsibility. Kimberly also comments that 
there is discrimination between diffusion and adoption: diffusion is determined to be a process 
whereby an innovation spreads in a population whereas adoption is a process which results in a 
decision by a potential adopter to invest resources in an innovation.  
 
The important bottom line for this thesis is the following: the major goal is not to deliver answers to 
disagreements between academic scholars but to answer to phenomenon of rolling forecasting. 
However, one can wear only one piece of sun-glasses at a time, i.e. definition paths with the theory 
are chosen but it will not be forgotten that there might be other “sunglasses” to wear as well. 
 
The contents of this chapter has the following order: it begins with a basic theory setting concerning 
diffusion, continues with the reforms of the basic theory and finishes with linking the phenomenon 
of diffusion to management accounting by discussing the concept of change and introducing some 
of management accounting’s key implementation studies. 
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2.1 Theory of Diffusion (Adoption) 
 
Rogers (2002) stated that there had been as much as 6200 completed diffusion studies by 2002. This 
works as evidence that one is not dealing with a phenomenon that is something new to the human 
kind. His book, the fifth edition of a book named Diffusion of Innovations (2003), synthesizes past 
four decades’ development in the theoretical field of diffusion of innovations model. Rogers is a 
much cited name among the research scholars and thus it can be stated that his views work as a 
proper foundation for the theory of diffusion. In this research, however, one cannot leave all weight 
on one man’s life work and therefore the findings of others as well as a view of the shortcomings 
with the dominant theory shall be brought into the light. 
 
A proper starting point for the theory of diffusion is understandably clarifying what is meant by 
diffusion. This thesis adopts the diffusion definition of Webster (1971): “Diffusion is the social 
process by which an innovation spreads through a social system over time”. In this study, rolling 
forecasting represents the innovation, which in turn Zaltman et al. (1973) as well as Bradford and 
Kent (1977) define something new for the adopter. As for social systems, this thesis takes a broad 
approach with not bounding it to any special form of social relations: i.e. international cooperation, 
societies, organizations and working teams are all social systems. In other words, rolling forecasting 
is the innovation under interest and its diffusion and characteristics will be examined carefully in 
social systems not only on broad macro levels like international popularity and societies’ use of 
rolling forecasting but also on micro levels like the case company (the Finnish Retail Ltd.). 
 
As for the definition of diffusion, Webster (1971) continues by pinpointing some of the key 
elements, each of them followed by comments that relate them to rolling forecasting. 
 
1) Decision maker or an adopter 
There are some defined units that make the decision of adopting an innovation, in this case 
rolling forecasting. Thus decision making is somehow the term involved in the diffusion 
process of rolling forecasting. An individual might decide to reject rolling forecasting to the 
bitter end and end up being positioned elsewhere in the company or plainly fired. Vice versa, 
there might be such individuals who promote rolling forecasting because they are ordered to 
or because they have their own interests involved. The company itself is a decision maker 
but power relations inside the firm decide who and how many there are to make the 
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decisions for the company. One might imagine that at worst rolling forecasting could be 
introduced into a company just by the prejudiced decision of a stubborn leader. 
 
2) Degree of risk 
First time adoption of an innovation, e.g. rolling forecasting, requires change and thus 
there’s risk (alongside possibilities) involved in the process. Here the advantages and 
benefits of diffusing an innovation are weighed against alternative courses of actions like 
sticking to the choices of status quo or other innovations. Individuals, for instance, have 
risks of not being able to learn rolling forecasting, thus losing their relative know-how 
position inside the company and suffering from the stress stemming from the new way of 
doing things or simply being forced to abandon their formerly highly developed way of 
working. On the company level, there might be risks like a total implementation failure that 
causes a lost or diminished control of the business, employees’ lost confidence towards the 
management, change oppositions causing major conflicts or too excessive dependency on 
the supplier of rolling forecasting’s information system or idea. In the capital investment 
world risk and reward go hand in hand: what might be the case with rolling forecasting? Is it 
a win-win situation and a must have solution or a major risk taking situation? Could the 
company operate successfully without rolling forecasting in nowadays’ business world? 
 
3) Rate of diffusion 
This rate means the percentage rate by which an innovation is adopted among all possible 
adopters. Webster specifies different categories of adopters in the following way: innovators 
(first 2½ % to adopt), early adopters (the next 13½ %), early majority (the next 34%), late 
majority (the next 34%) and the laggards (the last 16%). Company-level interpretation 
points out how early the company was in adopting rolling forecasting compared to other 
companies. Inside the firm the rate of diffusion could denote the subparts of the company or 
adopting rate measuring individual workers inside a firm, cost unit or working team. 
 
The rate of diffusion is explained by a careful glance at a figure of the well-known S-curve of 
Rogers (2003) who illustrates the diffusion process in a businesslike fashion. A figure speaks 
sometimes more than one thousand words which is why Rogers’ figure is of great use at this point. 
It shows the proportion of adopters in the Y-axis and the time on the X-axis. Innovations I, II and 
III, for one, vary in how fast the innovation is adopted among the possible adopters. The “Take-
Off” area depicts the phase when the innovation really starts to accelerate as for its popularity. 
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Figure 2: S-curve of the diffusion process (Rogers, 2003) 
 
Rogers (2003) finds five different characteristics of an innovation that help one determine how fast 
the innovation will be adopted. These are introduced below since they represent useful tools in 
analyzing rolling forecasting (in parenthesis there is a rolling forecasting related interpretation of 
Rogers’ finding that is followed either by a plus that means the more the faster the adoption or a 
minus that means the more the slower the adoption):  
 
- relative advantage  
(How much better is rolling forecasting compared to the other budgeting method, +) 
- compatibility 
(How compatible is rolling forecasting with the existing culture of doing things, +) 
- complexity  
(How difficult rolling forecasting is to understand and use, -) 
- trialability  
(How possible it is to test rolling forecasting beforehand, +) 
- observability  
(How visible are the results of rolling forecasting, +) 
 
These define the characteristics of the nature of the innovation that is about to be diffused. So they 
are used for explaining the innovation itself in terms of the easiness of diffusing that particular 
innovation. In addition, organizations can also obviously pursue different strategies in order to 
speed up or slow down the pace of the diffusion process. Then one is dealing with the question of 
“what can one do to affect the diffusion pace of the innovation”. For example Rogers (2002) brings 
forth the following five strategies for speeding up the diffusion process of preventive innovations, 
which represent a difficult type of an innovation since the rewards of such an innovation are 
difficult to measure because they only prevent something unwanted from happening (in parenthesis 
a comment about the possible relation to rolling forecasting as the innovation): 
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1. Change the perceived attributes of preventive innovations 
(With rolling forecasting are there a lot of options to be adjusted to make the diffusion?) 
 
2. Utilize champions to promote preventive innovations 
(The appreciated, skilled and liked workers may sell the idea of rolling forecasting to the work 
community, is there a risk that the champion might turn into an anti-champion in the company?) 
 
3. Change the norms of the system regarding preventive innovations through peer support 
(Nourishing the change by supporting a new way of thinking budgeting through rolling forecasting 
and giving support to peers (or giving them the sack or replacing them to other positions) who find 
it difficult to adapt to the new budgeting culture of rolling forecasting) 
 
4. Use entertainment – education to promote preventive innovations 
(Relating rolling forecasting to positive things through investing in work wellbeing and education 
along the serious and hard business side of rolling forecasting  giving the workers a little bit slack 
in order to demand results with rolling forecasting in return) 
 
5. Activate peer networks to diffuse preventive innovations  
(Activating talk, both official and unofficial, among workers might help people solve their present 
problems with rolling forecasting and devoting work-time in general might prove to be fruitful)   
 
Could rolling forecasting then be described as a preventive innovation? Definitely yes because it is 
designed to help keep the company on the right track and thus prevent the company from crashing 
into business, financial, logistical, strategic (with its communication to long-term planning) etc. 
problems. The basic concept of rolling forecasting is a topic that takes more profound attention in 
chapter four. For now it has to be stated that these relationships to rolling forecasting from 
Webster’s (1971) three basic diffusion elements, Rogers’ (2003) five diffusion characteristics that 
affect the pace of diffusion and Rogers’ five strategies for speeding up the diffusion are not be 
ignored when rolling forecasting finally meets the spotlight in the latter parts of this thesis. These 
academicians’ findings are highly usable for example in the interviews and data analysis for the 
empirical part of this thesis. 
 
An important addition to Rogers’ and Webster’s S-curve interpretation of the diffusion process is 
that it takes for granted the particular shape of the curve. This thinking can easily be challenged by 
questioning the automatic expansion of an innovation. What happens with those innovations that at 
first seem to gain acceptance but later on turn out to be deserted ones? Best (2006) answers this 
question by his discrimination of innovations and fads. As figure below points out, the central 
difference between diffusion and fad is that the former achieves a permanent state as to its 
popularity (the upper curve in the figure) whereas fads fade out after they have reached their peak in 
popularity (the lower curve in the figure). As for rolling forecasting, which is the precise tool under 
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examination in this thesis, it is yet unclear whether it turns out to be a real diffusion in the modern 
business life or if it’s going to end up being a fad. During the research period of six years (2008-
2014) the author of this thesis, however, did not run into any kind of research papers or any 
practitioners’ observations about companies abandoning rolling forecasting, only indirectly by 
abandoning budgeting as a whole.   
 
Figure 3: Comparing the dynamics of Diffusion and Fads (Best, 2006) 
 
Moreover, an important comment by Webster states that “diffusion reflects a series of adoption 
decisions by individual units (persons, farms, households, firms, etc.)”. This comment is vital for 
the perception of diffusion since adoption can indeed occur between very different kinds of units. In 
the previous chapter the micro-level interest in rolling forecasting’s various features was stated 
which implies that it is the persons that are of special interest in assessing the diffusion rate not only 
inside the company but also the degree of risk different employees (persons) undergo in their 
particular positions and also who are the actual decisions makers in the organization when it comes 
to choosing to adopt or reject an innovation. Although the micro-level is of special interest the 
macro-level is not forgotten in the later-on empirical part: what ignited the company to adopt rolling 
forecasting and what were the broader grounds for that decision? Gallivan (2001) wraps up the 
same discussion of macro- and micro-level diffusion by introducing the ideas of primary and 
secondary adoption: the former stands for the organization level decision to accept an innovation, 
which happens first and can be achieved very swiftly, and the latter signifies the acceptance 
decisions by individual users inside the organization, which happens second and can last a long time. 
Gallivan emphasizes that the secondary phase often causes the most problems for organizations.  
 
In other words, the concept of diffusion is ultimately closely related to knowledge management and 
learning. Hope & Hope (1997) point out two different schools of thought with knowledge 
management: the information school and the behavioral school. They represent very different ends 
of the knowledge management continuum: information school being at the technical end and 
  
 
 
 18 
behavioral school being at the humane end. Of course, there are researchers like prof. Baumard 
(Hope & Hope, 1997), who have brought these schools closer to each other. 
 
The information school believes that information is a resource which needs to be processed in a 
reasonable manner in order to achieve competitive advantage. The starting points are the 
information systems and artificial intelligence. The key thing is information using and sharing, 
which creates value – contrary to the use of such a material resource like timber – and it actually 
accumulates value the more information is shared inside a company. People learn from each other 
and tell actively their information to third parties. This school, nonetheless, acknowledges that in 
real life people are often unwilling to share their knowledge. This stems from several reasons: e.g. 
from the fear of sharing such information that diminishes other people’s perception of one’s 
professionalism, from disrespect of other guilds and from cultural information sharing differences –
e.g. in the US the middle management is said to be a heavy burden as for information sharing 
whereas in Japan information sharing is an intact part of organizational culture.  
 
The behavioral school sees knowledge management as a dynamic development path, where skills 
and know-how change constantly. The starting point is the human being itself and understanding its 
behavior. Sociology, anthropology, psychology are the faculties that are heavily linked with the 
behaviorists’ thoughts about knowledge management. The behavioral school divides into three 
subparts according to how people perceive the world and what are their values; the operator culture 
believes in people’s power and in their collaboration, the engineering culture sees people as 
problems that prevent organizations from achieving innovative solutions and the executive culture 
take people for costs that need to be minimized in order to get good financial solutions. For a 
layman this all seems very understandable since people are unique in their behavior. Also the theory 
of McGregor about X and Y generations, which is common knowledge, is another way of 
categorizing people into active and questioning Y people and passive and obeying X people.  
 
The inclusion of these two schools is essential in this thesis since it emphasizes that rolling 
forecasting is not researched only through technical observations, i.e. through organization charts, 
manuals, statistics etc. Rolling forecasting is processed through people so it is only logical that also 
more humane interpretations are not to be put aside in this context. Information is a very important 
concept and how it is perceived socially is brought up into discussion in this thesis since it is 
obvious that rolling forecasting or budgeting is a matter of knowledge management and it has a lot 
to do with how rolling forecasting diffuses within a social system.  
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The knowledge of the above-mentioned information and learning theories build the understanding 
that constantly one is dealing with organization cultures as well as cultures, i.e. values and beliefs, 
of individuals inside a firm. In this thesis both schools’ approaches have to be taken into account 
since supposedly they both exist in an organization involving many individuals. One could open the 
discussion of learning organizations and social systems in a much more profound way but the 
emphasized point here is that this thesis takes into account not only the technical features or choices 
of rolling forecasting but also social environments like power relations and cultures.  
 
Now that the basic definitions, concepts and information school literature connections behind 
innovations and diffusion have been introduced, it is a proper clarify the basic diffusion theory, 
more precisely where research has roughly ended up in the late 20th century in a straightforward 
manner before chapter 2.2 discusses shortcomings and resolutions and what researchers might still 
have as additions to our understanding of the basic elements of the diffusion theory?  
 
In year 1981, John Kimberly, published a writing “Managerial Innovation” in Nyström & 
Starbuck’s book “Handbook of organizational design”. In that writing, Kimberly grounds the 
development of that time’s diffusion theory, how it has been studied and what kind of researches 
are to be awaited in the future. At that time, he crystallized the understanding of managerial 
innovations in to the following sentence, originally expressed by Mao Tsê-tung. 
 
“External causes are the condition of change and internal causes are the basis of change,… 
external causes become operative through internal causes. In a suitable temperature an egg 
changes into a chicken, but no temperature can change a stone into a chicken,  
because each has a different basis” 
Source: Kimberly (1981) 
 
In addition to the vast discussion and many definitions of what managerial innovations are actually, 
Kimberly (1981) notes that a lot of scholars have concentrated on innovations from the perspective 
where it has a natural positive connotation and where attention is given to how adoption and 
implementation can be facilitated and how resistance can be minimized. In his inspection of Kelly’s 
and Kranzberg’s studies (1978), where over 4000 items on literature on technological innovation 
Kimberly saw that there is a preoccupation of innovation meaning something good and worth 
striving for. Another observation was that the research field had awakened in the late 1970’s and 
early 1980’s to the myth of unlimited resources, which had enjoyed from ascendancy so far. 
Kimberly also discussed that managerial innovations should provide an appealing topic for 
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researches because it has been generally acknowledged that the need for spreading new skills, 
techniques and approaches in management is evident. Despite of that all, it has been the studies on 
technological innovations that have attracted much more research than the managerial innovations. 
That may be due to the fact that technological innovations have a track-record of profitability 
measurements whereas managerial innovations suffer much severely from the difficulty of 
measuring performance rates. 
 
Kimberly brings (1981) a remarkable topic to discussion when he’s considering different outcomes 
of what happens to innovations once they’re adopted.  The innovation itself can be narrowly or 
widely used and it can survive well or die soon and young. Much more research has been pointed 
out to the adoption itself: originally managerial innovations are adopted by organizations even 
though causalities have difficulties in being found because subunits and certain individuals are 
needed before adoption. Thus the latter, people, cannot be overlooked when researching managerial 
innovations. This is exactly what makes managerial innovations tough ones to grasp. Generally and 
traditionally, according to Kimberly, researchers have focused on three things as independent 
variables in their studies: characteristics of administrators and other organizational members, 
attributes of organizational structures and patterns of interorganizational relations. Conceptually 
there’s also a fourth one: environmental constraints, which has been acknowledged but not so much 
empirically studied. 
 
As for personal characteristics of administrators and other members, wide research has shown that it 
cannot be ignored. Things, such as professionalism, leadership style and cosmopolitanism played a 
positive effect in innovation adoptions the more they were present (Kaplan 1967 and Mytinger 
1968). Other studies Kimberly highlighted, were Becker’s (1970) finding that types of innovations 
that were adopted related to the characteristics of administrators, Kaluzny et al.’s (1970) results that 
the more cosmopolitan the administrator was, the more high-risk innovations were adopted, Hage 
and Dewar’s (1973) findings of elite values better predicting innovations than structural 
characteristics of organizations and Kazlow’s (1977) finding that committed administrators make a 
difference and that organizational stature rather than personality is a key factor. Kimberly reminds 
that organizational size most probably plays a major role when drawing conclusions about 
administrator’s characteristics and their effects in adoptions of managerial innovations. 
 
Things such as centralization, formalization, size, organizational slack, visibility of consequences, 
and information seeking behavior, i.e. organizational structures have been studied with inconsistent 
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findings. Some studies have found out that formalization and centralization reduce the probability 
of adoption of the innovation, whereas the situation is vice versa on organic form of organization, 
stocked with minimum procedural specification, minimum routinization of behavior and 
widespread internal communication (Aiken and Hage, 1971; Burns and Stalker, 1961; Crozier, 
1964; Gordon et al., 1974; Hage and Aiken, 1967; Palumbo, 1969; Rosner, 1968). Other studies 
(Corwin, 1972; Evan and Black, 1967; Wilson, 1966) found totally different findings where 
formalization and centralization would foster adoptions. Inconsistency vaporizes if one encounters 
the issue through contingency theorists’ goggles (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967): 
whenever the environment is stable and predictable, the formalization and centralization should 
facilitate the adoption while in unstable and unpredictable situations these characteristics impede 
the adoption. Regarding size, findings have been quite ambiguous, which has been commented by 
Kimberly (1976b) that it might be due to problems of measurement. If size is measured by 
organizational resources, then size accelerated adoptions (Carroll, 1967; Kaluzny et al., 1974; 
Mytinger, 1968). Many researchers found out, however, that size played no role in adoption speeds 
(Mohr, 1969; Utterback, 1974). Kimberly himself (1978), observed that large organizations with 
prior resource commitment in the operational area for which a particular innovation is relevant had 
enhanced rates of adoption whereas no such commitment existed the large size downplayed the 
probability of adoption. Hage and Dewar (1973) pinpointed that it could be more the growth pace 
than the size that explained adoptions. All in all, effects of size are very difficult to interpret, 
whereas visibility of consequences seems to give more profound results with positive correlations 
over adoptions of innovations (Rosner, 1968; Gordon et al., 1974, 1975). Information thirsty 
organizations are naturally more eagerly adopting innovations (Kimberly 1978) and there might be 
tools for managers to design such information channels that open the possibility to see many 
options which could be picked as suitable for the organization. 
 
Patterns of interorganizational relations have been proven to exist (Van de Ven, 1976; Aiken and 
Hage, 1968; Milo, 1971; Caplow, 1964; Levine and White, 1961) as to adoption of innovations. In 
situations where organizations had interorganizational relations, e.g. attended joint programs, had 
competition on scarce resources and were ordered to prestige hierarchies adoptions seemed to more 
probable than in situations where competition was sluggish, monopolistic or oligopolistic. As for 
the studies of organizational environments there is not much to be underlined since that concept has 
been under a lot of discussion about how it should be taken into account.  
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Kimberly presents also studies that have been done concerning what happens to innovations once 
they have been implemented. Successful innovations have often been boosted by users participation 
of designing (Ackoff, 1967), by the actual innovation itself meeting the needs of managers (Gorry 
and Morton, 1971) and by new roles that arise for innovation’s integration’s sake (Quinn,1973), by 
assuring that the new position keepers have a background that is compatible with the existing staff 
(Hebden, 1971). For failures, it is naturally easier to find causes, e.g. Frank and Hackman (1975) 
reported that lack of theoretical guidelines, inadequate diagnosis of the entire system, absence of 
contingency plans for spin-off problems and insufficient flexibility in implementation were the 
factors that explained failures.  
 
Particularly for this thesis, there was an interesting comment of Kimberly (1981). He pointed out 
that relatively little research has been done on the spread of innovation inside organizations, e.g. 
Walton (1975) found out that managerial innovations that were successful in organization’s subunit 
tended to encapsulate and not spread very easily. In addition, if a fiat is used, then there might 
easily be resistance (Thorsrud, 1976) and if a subunit can independently decide how to best utilize 
an innovation in it environment then there is a more fertile ground for the innovation’s 
implementation to succeed (Walton, 1977). The utilization of an innovation could be highly 
dependable on one individual; old ways of doing work might easily return once the individual has 
changed position or employer (Pressman and Wildawsky, 1973). The effect of the latter could be 
also the other way round: an individual might be transferred in order to spread an innovation (Allen 
and Cohen, 1976; Galbraith and Edström, 1976).  
 
To wrap up the basic diffusion theory of adoption of innovations, Kimberly reminds that most of 
the studies have been done as case studies, which implies that generalizations are hard to make. The 
methodology part of this thesis, however, chapter six, suggests that it is not necessarily so difficult 
to draw generalizations from case studies. At least these case studies can show what kind of 
causalities can be possible. Kimberly also concludes his overview of managerial innovations in 
Nyström & Starbuck’s book “Handbook of organizational design” (1981) by commenting that there 
is often a considerable gap between the rhetoric and the reality, which means various organizations 
have brokerage roles and that they have stakes in many situations. He exemplifies his point by 
pointing out “organization development” in the 1960’s, which was a two-word term that spread 
wildly among consultants, business life, managers and business life and picks a funny finding of 
Weisbord (1974) about the whole hype: ”What is organization development anyway? The longer I 
do it, and the more I read about it, the less I understand it”. That wants to say that it pays off for 
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buyers of innovations to be sensitive to the difference between rhetoric and reality, i.e. to develop a 
skill of noticing the distinction between cheaters with uncovered cheques and real innovations. 
2.2 Major shortcomings of the basic theory and its replenishments 
 
Shortcomings of the dominant diffusion theory 
 
On a theoretical note the academic field provides often an extremely rational view on the research 
subject. That is a very stiff way of depicting the reality, which yet has a very flexible and complex 
nature. Fortunately, others have also observed this kind of imperfection. For example Abrahamson 
(1991) brings forth that traditionally within the diffusion theory it is taken for granted that rational 
adopters make independent and technically efficient choices. Without dispute this sounds naïve, 
which is why Abrahamson supposedly develops his own typology which includes four different 
theoretical perspectives for explaining the diffusion and rejection of administrative technologies. 
His typology provides a wider ground for the theory of diffusion, raises a lot of useful questions and 
therefore it is next brought under the spotlight. 
 
Abrahamson’s (1991) starting point argues that it is also possible for organizations to diffuse 
technically inefficient innovations or quite on the contrary reject technically efficient innovations. A 
good practical example is provided by Mitroff and Mohrman (1987) who analyzed the US and its 
lost competency in the world economy in the 1970’s and 1980’s: according to them the American 
business world refused to recognize how the world economy changed and they either stuck to old 
ways of doing business or adopted keep-it-simple ways of turning things around. Simply put, 
Mitroff and Mohrman state that “simple formulas cannot cope with complexity” and that 
“complexity is what today’s world is all about”.  
 
Abrahamson (1991) addresses that the dominant thinking of the efficient-choice perspective points 
out that the diffusion theory deserts these opportunities of “doing wrong choices” and plainly 
expects organizations to benefit from innovations when they’re diffused. Similarly, innovations 
should disappear if they don’t benefit the organization. Kimberly (1981) defines such thinking as 
proinnovation biases, which mean the presumptions that innovations benefit organizations. Among 
the innovation scholars there is a unanimous understanding that these proinnovation biases do exist 
(e.g. Downs & Mohr, 1976; Rogers & Schoemaker, 1971; Van de Ven, 1986). There’s no need for 
proving these cons of the dominant diffusion theory. In order to understand better the subsequent 
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typology of Abrahamson it is useful at this point to take a peek at the ideas of March (1978), who 
sorts out the assumptions that are included in the efficient-choice perspective. 
 
Assumptions in the efficient-choice perspective: 
a) Organizations within a group can freely and independently choose to adopt an 
administrative technology 
b) Organizations are relatively certain about their goals and their assessments of how efficient 
technologies will be in attaining these goals 
Source: March, 1978 
 
On the way to developing other approaches than that of the efficient-choice perspective 
Abrahamson neglects these two above-mentioned assumptions. Naturally then one has to find out 
environments, where one or both of these assumptions can be rejected. Thus Abrahamson’s counter 
assumption for assumption a) states that organizations outside a group influence the choices made 
by organizations within the original group. According to him this outside group’s role could 
practically be played by regulatory bodies or consultant companies. The point of bringing this 
matter forth here is that the phenomenon of outsourcing company’s different functions cannot be 
ignored. This is because nowadays outsourcing influences not only the manufacturing companies, 
which is common knowledge, but also increasingly change management (Caldwell, 1998).  
 
A logical consequence has been the exploding growth of the Finnish juridicial and consulting 
services branch. According to Statistics Finland, from 1995 to 2012 this branch has almost 
quadrupled whereas for comparison the GDP has roughly doubled and the consumer price index has 
grown only 34%. What remains important after these notations is definitely not that the consulting 
branch has had an obvious and blooming success but the support for the reader’s ability to raise 
questions out of this background that corporations do not function as closed entities when it comes 
to diffusing new innovations. It can be claimed that freedom and independency rates can be pointed 
out anywhere along a continuum since it’s not a matter of the extremes, i.e. that there exists only 
freedom or not and similarly independency or not.  
 
For March’s assumption b) the counter assumption is naturally that organizations have unclear 
goals and high uncertainty about the technical efficiency of administrative technologies. It is clear 
that in those circumstances the choosing of efficient methods is really difficult because the 
destination is unknown. Proverbial, it would be clearly impossible to steer a ship to its destination 
even for a top captain who knows all the controlling levers and their functions in the cabin, if the 
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destination is missing. Here once again it’s good to notice how the continuum question steps up as a 
company, more precisely the group within the organization, can clearly have an inaccurate picture 
of its goals and assessment characteristics of different technical innovations but still it might have 
some kind of a picture of what should be the right direction. This interpretation lies also between 
the extremes of having clear or unclear goals. 
 
The observation of freedom and independency rates as well as goal clearness and technology 
assessment rates in choosing administrative technologies proves to be productive when analyzing 
Abrahamson’s typology since it opens up thinking for the “what does the typology does not take 
into account” question. This is actually analogical with Abrahamson’s conclusions: although his 
typology explains situations where the underlying assumptions match closely the explanations there 
are surely situations where the assumptions could not be met, because of the above-mentioned 
continuums. For instance an outside group might have only a moderate impact on the choosing 
decision of innovations and its influence may vary at different stages of the diffusion process. 
All in all, now that the obvious shortcomings with the assumptions of the dominant diffusion theory 
have been presented and how the typology of Abrahamson lacks thorough explanations of the real 
world, it’s logical to step forward and introduce the referred diffusion typology of Abrahamson. 
 
Abrahamson’s typology for the diffusion and rejection of innovations 
 
Abrahamson presents four different perspectives for the diffusion and rejection of innovations, 
namely the efficient-choice perspective, the forced-selection perspective, the fashion perspective 
and the fad perspective. All of these are introduced briefly in the above-mentioned order. Before 
that it is profitable to take a look at figure four which categorizes all perspectives and shows their 
relations to the outside-influence and imitation-focus dimensions. 
        Imitation-Focus Dimension 
 Imitation Processes Do Not 
Impel the Diffusion or Rejection 
Imitation Processes Impel the 
Diffusion or Rejection 
Outside- 
Influence 
Dimension 
Organizations Within a Group 
Determine the Diffusion and 
Rejection Within This Group 
Efficient-Choice Perspective Fad Perspective 
Organizations Outside a Group 
Determine the Diffusion and 
Rejection Within This Group 
Forced-Selection Perspective Fashion Perspective 
Figure 4: Theoretical Perspectives Explaining the Diffusion and Rejection of Administrative 
Technologies (Abrahamson, 1991) 
  
 
 
 26 
 The efficient-choice perspective 
 
The efficient-choice perspective takes for granted that organizations, often top-management teams, 
know where they’re heading to and that innovations are rather easily measurable with inputs and 
outputs. It is possible to react in a very rational manner, choosing or rejecting innovations just on 
the basis of efficiency. This perspective or theoretical orientation has the ability to explain diffusion 
processes very precisely. The performance gap in the organization as for what goals should be 
achievable and what goals are achievable should be closed down by adopting suitable innovations. 
 
Within the efficient-choice perspective there are two types of theorists: the demand-pull ones who 
claim that the world changes and that way performance gaps are created and the supply-push ones 
who argue that innovations for instance from the academic world reveal the existing performance 
gaps. Simply put: organizations that encounter such performance gaps adopt efficient technologies 
and organizations without such gaps do not adopt any kind of technologies because there aren’t any 
rational-based reasons. In vice versa situations, old technologies are abandoned because of changes 
in the business environment or because of new and more efficient technologies are born.  
  
The forced-selection perspective 
 
In some circumstances powerful outside organizations could prevent efficient technologies from 
being adopted or, quite on the contrary, force the diffusion of inefficient technologies. Naturally for 
such an outsider there has to be an incentive to guide the destinies of administrative technologies. A 
fact worth emphasizing with this perspective is that the diffusion or rejection of administrative 
technologies has an adverse direction compared to organizations’ own will.  
 
Abrahamson (1991) exemplifies those kinds of organizations with denoting labor unions, war-labor 
boards and associations of managers in his research. Practically, he likes to bring forth with other 
theorists (e.g. Carroll et al., 1988; DiMaggio, 1987) the political aspects of societies in business 
environments. This supports the preceding interpretation that companies do not function as closed 
entities and they have to interact with the surrounding world. Particularly interesting examples 
include situations, where powerful organizations have conflicting interests, like Cole (1985) 
discovered with the American labor unions and national associations of managers during the 1960’s 
and 1970’s when the diverging views by these organizations caused an imminent drop in the 
popularity of participative management technologies. 
 
  
 
 
 27 
The fashion perspective 
 
The fashion perspective’s starting point is dealing with the problem of rather choosing an 
organization to follow and not a technology to follow. The outside influence of “fashion setting 
organizations”, as Hirsch (1972) puts it, is remarkable and they indeed have their own interest in 
selling their ideas since that’s their business. This imitation effect tends to turn on when 
organizations lack clear goals and can’t find proper technologies on their own.  
 
What fashion setting organizations are there actually? Abrahamson (1991) answers this by denoting 
consulting companies, business schools, business mass media and publishers of business books. The 
two former have the expertise power and the two latter have large audiences backing up their 
influence. How straightforwardly the different technologies are then adopted: definitely not in a 
direct manner. The fashion setting organizations pick the most suitable technologies from many 
choices. Then they need to be actively modified, developed and adjusted to the requirements of the 
user companies. Fashion setting is not based on coercive power like with the forced-selection 
perspective. Instead, the fashion setters rely on their capacity to inspire organizations. 
 
The major observation with the fashion perspective is that it illustrates the humane aspects of 
diffusion processes with respect to outside fashion organizations. A company that sticks to old 
technologies, even if they were efficient, may suffer from severe boredom inside the company and a 
great image loss occurred in not showing any innovativeness. Abrahamson (1991) mentions the 
symbolic and emotional effectiveness of fashionable administrative technologies and hints that it’s 
only normal that companies change their technologies in order to keep the running fresh. 
 
 The fad perspective 
 
The humane aspects of diffusion processes expand as Abrahamson (1991) pays attention to the fad 
perspective. The main difference between the fad perspective and the fashion perspective lies with 
the outside-influence dimension. This time the impelling power of imitation stems rather from 
inside: organizations or companies reason themselves that they have to do what others have done.  
 
There are different paths for following these fads. Communication channels may provide 
information that a technology has proved to be successful in other companies or competitors. This 
in turn may ignite the decision to diffuse or reject the particular technology because the risk level 
with the innovation in question diminishes. Social interactions, for one, may be one reason for 
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accepting or rejecting an innovation since in that way an organization can actively seek social 
legitimacy in its environment. Economic interest sounds like a category that should belong to the 
efficient-choice perspective but here the relative competition position is what matters: a company 
might adopt even a technology that has a negative expectation value only because it knows that the 
competitor might hit the jackpot if it remains to be the only one that diffused the technology. 
  
 All the perspectives put together  
 
Are all of the perspectives mutually exclusive? Most definitely not, as Abrahamson (1991) presents 
numerous propositions, which show how there are numerous phenomena that can be approached 
through multiple perspectives. He underlines two different resolutions to the multiperspective 
problem. Firstly, the contingency resolution deals with various diffusion contexts and innovations 
and points out a perspective that has significantly more explanatory power on the diffusion of 
innovation over the other perspectives. The stumbling stone of this resolution is the complexity of 
the world: there are often moderate levels of uncertainty with the assumptions of the innovation’s 
technical efficiency. Therefore there will be situations where the perspectives only partly fit the 
examined diffusion processes.  
 
Secondly, the paradox resolution tackles this problem of complexity by exploiting paradoxes 
between different perspectives. In other words, raising interesting tensions, oppositions, and 
contradictions between theories by a) clarifying levels of analysis, b) taking time into account and 
c) introducing new terms proves to be fruitful. This resolution is of a flexible kind since it does not 
assume that different perspectives simply apply to certain innovations and not to others. Instead it is 
based on the idea that each perspective covers some aspect of every innovation and diffusion 
context. An important inclusion for this thesis is to emphasize Abrahamson’s finding that the 
paradox resolution is also suitable for studying non-administrative innovations, such as production 
technologies, strategic actions, R&D projects etc. in different diffusion contexts like in not-for-
profit companies or for-profit companies, in different branches, in different countries and in 
different world economy situations.   
 
In order to bring practicality into the picture this section brings forth some examples by 
Abrahamson (1991) and some post-questions concerning the main research interest in this thesis, 
rolling forecasting. For example during the war time and depressions the contingency theory’s 
straightforward answers could prove to be useful as for making conclusions about the forced-
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selection perspective because of strict and obliged-to-obey rules. During this research (2008-2014) 
the world encountered the financial crisis so it will be interesting to see what kind of alleged effects 
it had on rolling forecasting.  
 
Both Baron, Dobbin and Jennings (1986) and Carroll, Delacroix and Goodstein (1988) have found 
proof that the forced-selection perspective, namely the government, does indeed explain the 
diffusion of innovations occurring during crises. How about then consultants’ and academicians’ 
power as an outsider group to influence the decisions made by organizations? Abrahamson (1991) 
discusses that they may influence fashions used by organizations when the organizations under 
interest simply afford services offered to them. Also during good times companies famously spend 
more resources to hiring fresh talents from business schools and universities. Hybrid situations, e.g. 
where it is irrational to adopt an innovation (efficient-choice perspective) but at the same time 
where political costs (forced-selection) of not obeying some innovation seem too high because of 
possible legal proceedings, play a remarkable role in real life according to Abrahamson (1991). He 
pinpoints another example of conflicting perspectives by bringing forth a situation where fashion 
setting organizations deem it economically fruitful to promote faddish diffusion of innovations.  
 
As for rolling forecasting it would be interesting to analyze whether rolling forecasting related 
consulting firms or system providers have actively promoted the diffusion of this innovation in 
order to push their own agenda forwards. How about imitation skills that are very important when 
closing the gap to competitors when they achieve some competitive edge in the business? Imitation 
is, according to Abrahamson (1991), more likely to occur in an environment that is uncertain, e.g. 
with administrative technologies (vs. production technologies) and with not-for-profit sectors (vs. 
for-profit). However, it is not a binary variant since uncertainty can occur to some extent. For 
example inside a for-profit there are many stakeholders inside the organization: employees, labor 
union, employer, owners, outsourced functions, each of which consists of individuals who think 
their own minds with different personal goals. Abrahamson clarifies the complexity by presenting 
the studies of Rumelt (1974), Chandler (1962), Tolbert and Zucker (1984), Baron, Dobbin and 
Jennings (1986), Meyer, Stevenson and Webster (1985), where it can be found out that extent of 
diffusion, company structures, city size, percentage of foreign-born population and period of years 
played a role in explaining the imitation-perspective dimension. 
 
In the last couple paragraphs it has become evident that researchers need to be cautious before 
making any straightforward conclusions. One important and ultimately a very decisive inclusion to 
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diffusion theory is the willingness of companies to fail at times in order to finally succeed at some 
point of time. Analogical with the investment theory, innovations build up an entire portfolio of 
projects, which balances out the risk level of being left behind by competitors and finds as good 
pareto optimality level for profits as possible. Abrahamson (1991) puts it: “the cost of adopting and 
rejecting multiple fads or fashions in order to find a technically efficient innovation may be much 
lower than the returns from using this innovation.” 
2.3 Diffusion in Management Accounting 
 
Laitinen (2001) pinpoints many new management tools such as just-in-time (JIT), flexible 
manufacturing systems (FMS), computer-integrated manufacture (CIM), total quality management 
(TQM), time-based management (TBM) and business process re-engineering (BPR) to keep in 
mind the change environment we’re living in. According to him management accounting (MA) 
systems are followingly also under pressures to change, which has led to the rise of activity-based 
cost management (ABCM), life-cycle accounting (LCA) and balanced scorecard (BC). In an ever-
changing and complex world the role of a management accountant has to bend to the environment. 
 
In this chapter some of the key studies done within the field of management accounting change will 
be presented. Concentration is given to balanced scorecard and activity-based costing since those 
are the two topics that seem to have gathered most of the attention when considering newer MA 
innovations. Alongside other discussion that is generally dealing with management accounting 
change will also be considered. 
 
Balanced Scorecard (BSC) studies 
 
At the turn of the millennium, Kasurinen studied management accounting change in the balanced 
scorecard context. He published three different papers: first concentrating on the context of change 
(2002), second on the process of implementation (2001) and third on the process of implementation 
in a more detailed manner and how a new rule is encoded within the change context (2002). 
 
On the context of change Kasurinen (2002) points out that in theory strategies and management 
accounting projects are consciously formulated and step-by-step accomplishments. However, in 
reality many kinds of contradictions emerge, which has led to an evolution of management 
accounting change model, originating from Innes and Mitchell’s (1990) division of change factors 
into motivators, catalysts and facilitators. Motivators, e.g. a competitive market, have to do with the 
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change in general manner whereas catalysts, poor financial performance for example, can be 
directly associated with the change. Facilitators such as accounting staff and systems, in turn, play a 
hygienic and not an executor role in management accounting changes. 
 
Cobb et al. (1995) developed the accounting change model further with bringing in leaders, who 
had a role as individuals in change situations, momentum as the state of expectation for continuing 
change and barriers that hinder the change as additional factors. Kasurinen synthesized studies 
accomplished in the 1990’s and concentrated on change studies’ findings regarding barriers of 
change, among which cultural, organizational, power distribution, internal commitment, perspective, 
education and sponsorship related problems existed. Therefore, in his longitudinal case study he 
categorized these barriers as confusers, frustrators and delayers, which can be seen in figure five. 
 
Kasurinen’s revised change model (2002) 
 
Figure 5: Revised accounting change model (Kasurinen, 2002) 
 
As stated, the Kasurinen’s model originated through a longitudinal case study in a strategic business 
unit of a multinational Finnish based metals group. Even though Kasurinen examined carefully the 
theory of accounting change and managed fruitfully to deepen Cobb et al.’s model from barriers’ 
point of view, the results of that study should be interpreted with caution since it can be claimed 
that the approximately 100 hours spent on interviewing, discussing, and attending meetings in the 
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case organization during the empirical study is far too little an amount of time to be convinced of 
the study’s empirical depth. 100 hours is practically less than three working weeks. 
 
Specific findings concerning the barriers of the BSC project Kasurinen found were the following. 
Firstly as confusers the researcher pin-pointed the complexity of the project environment and an 
uncertain role of the balanced scorecard project. Secondly as frustrators there were things such as 
the significance of engineering culture and a financially sound situation both of which were 
directing the goals of the business unit managers. Thirdly as delayers there was a finding of 
difficulty in specifying the business unit strategy. For a layman this categorization of barriers of 
change seems a bit shallow: why was the financially sound situation categorized as a frustrator and 
not as a delayer and why was the difficulty in specifying the business unit strategy defined as a 
delayer and not as a confuser?  
 
The analysis of the advancing forces uncovered that there were mismatches in the alignments of the 
case goals and advancing forces. Furthermore, the originals goals of the division management and 
the goals of business unit management perpetuated the management accounting change process. 
Again, a layman might think that the advancing forces had in effect turned into barriers of change. 
In nowadays’ hectic business environments one might think why such a categorization is needed at 
all since accounting innovations might have multidimensional goals, directors operate with different 
backgrounds and personal goals, key personnel might be either barriers or advancing forces 
depending on how they’re treated, IT system change might be a huge frustrator and a barrier but in 
the right hands a powerful tool for accomplishing things. Wouldn’t a much more hands-on approach 
suffice with humane, technical, cultural, environmental et cetera aspects taken into account?  
 
In Kasurinen’ s case study of Balanced Scorecard, he found out that balanced scorecard building 
process by Kaplan and Norton (1996) did not pay enough attention to the context of change 
implementation. Another interesting finding is that accounting changes might be unsuccessful no 
matter how well they’re managed (see Malmi 1997 and Anderson & Young 1999 in Kasurinen 
2003). The revised accounting change model provides a framework that can be used when 
analyzing potential barriers that might hinder the change, which in itself, would be interesting to 
study further in other management accounting change situations, especially because of the 
inadequacy of the empirical part plaguing Kasurinen’ s study. In addition, some advancing forces of 
the change might, according to Kasurinen (2003), work towards undesired directions, particularly in 
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situations where there are many different organizational levels involved. Therefore it should be 
decided early, what is really desired as for the role of innovations such as the balanced scorecard. 
 
The second paper of Kasurinen (2001) concentrated on the process of implementation of balanced 
scorecard in three business units of a Finnish marketing and logistics company. The framework of 
process institutionalization by Burns and Scapens (2000) was used as a basis for the study, which 
means there were four sub-processes that depicted the institutionalization: namely encoding, 
enacting, reproducing and institutionalizing. Particular interest in Kasurinen’s study was given to 
the change process, in which a new rule is introduced and a new routine is established in an 
organization. With this study, only 40 hours were spent interviewing, discussing and attending 
meetings in the case organization. 
 
Kasurinen (2001) found out that the introduction of the balanced scorecard led only to a 
modification of the existing system rather than fundamentally change the way the organization was 
managed. The encoding phase revealed that the business unit managers were much more action 
oriented than strategy or deep business knowledge oriented in their way of working. Followingly 
the enactment process did not support fully the common idea of balanced scorecard and 
reproduction process focused on changing the planning system and not the management system. It 
seems that the study’s conclusions were drafted somewhat hastily: it is a little bit naïve to think that 
a new management accounting system would change the deep thinking of existing management in 
such a short time, i.e. during the active research period from September 1999 to October 2000.  
 
It can be argued that a management system can be planted as a seed and it starts growing, which 
lasts many years until the yield can be continuously harvested. Along the journey there might be 
managers who reject with the new system, managers who benefit from it, managers who use it in 
order to blow their relative power in the organization sky-high and managers who understand the 
developing process of big organizations to be a matter of many years. Kasurinen (2001), however, 
takes this into account by reminding us about evolution is likely in these kind of processes and that 
only the particular characteristics of new management accounting tools which suit the organization, 
will be implemented. This leads to a situation where a new management accounting idea does not 
reach its original goals and modifies the existing system instead. 
 
The third paper of Kasurinen (2002) aimed at conceptualizing the encoding process related to 
institutionalization in organizations. In this research Kasurinen made a comeback to the second 
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paper’s organization and its balanced scorecard implementation with a longitudinal case study. The 
active part of the empirical research lasted from May 2001 to January 2002 and this time Kasurinen 
really tackled the earlier two papers’ shortcomings of too little empirical evidence; a further 125 
hours were spent interviewing, discussing and attending meetings in the case organization in 
addition to training sessions and study of written material. 
 
The encoding process was decomposed into four sub-processes: situational analysis, 
internationalization process, change realization phase and organizational memory. Practically 
situational analysis means pointing out routines needing a change, internationalization pointing out 
the factors influencing the change, change realization phase pointing out the causalities in the form 
of a strategy map and organizational memory documenting the tacit knowledge into explicit form. 
The bottom line of the third paper of Kasurinen implicates that it is worth trying to influence the 
institutionalization process in organizations already in the beginning within the encoding process.  
 
Deeper observations found out that situational analysis could already include the initial intention of 
guiding the change process into desired direction, internationalization phase could be either speeded 
up with emphasizing tight connections between analysis and actual change or built upon a good 
level of commitment by using a more general approach. In addition, using too strong structures 
might hinder the provoking of tacit knowledge and management control should be strongest in the 
realization phase, which should lead to increased commitment and ensured alignment of the new 
rule with the management’s views. Organizational learning was the key element found out be linked 
with the whole encoding process.  
 
After the three articles of Kasurinen (2001-2002), he comments interestingly on the advantages and 
disadvantages of piloting and total implementation in the following way: piloting in one business 
unit may be analyzed originally in a more thorough way and later on the idea may be an easier one 
to sell further. Also the costs caused by mistakes are less costly and resources allocated to the 
project might be targeted in an efficient way. The cons of having a pilot include a situation where 
the piloting project has to compete with other projects and sometimes having too many ongoing 
projects might destroy the motivation and focus needed for successful implementation. Kasurinen 
also talks about the “net” of projects and connections between projects and emphasizes the 
knowledge concerning the entirety of projects, which might be more difficult in a piloting situation. 
Speaking for the total implementation is the idea of “being in the same boat”, which boosts the 
motivation level. Moreover, sometimes abandoning the old systems with a sudden strike possesses 
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the greatest savings potential and earnings scenario for the organization. The total implementation is 
usually led by some central unit which diminishes business units’ devotion to the new system. Also 
the drafting of all units’ relationships might be too difficult which leads to a situation where the 
whole change bypass the target severely. 
 
Wrapping up Kasurinen’s extensive research, it can be said that the management accounting change 
model of Cobb et al. (1995) was further developed by extending the focus on barriers of change, 
which was followed by the usefulness of analyzing the institutionalization process especially during 
the early phase of management accounting change, i.e. during the encoding process. Lastly the 
organizational learning elements were highlighted within the encoding process. All in all, one has a 
conceptualized way of encountering management change process situations, which might be 
criticized or acknowledged like every model.  
 
Any way it may be, one thing is for sure: understanding change processes from many different 
perspectives and at many different points of time will definitely be fruitful. The ultimate remarks of 
Kasurinen (2002), however, leave the reader bewildered. For example, Kasurinen states that 
“organizational structures and the competitive sphere seem to be in the continuous process of 
change, employees are moving in, out and within organizations, and timely information is seldom 
available.” He continues:”Accordingly, in the future it may not anymore be appropriate to 
investigate management accounting change in terms of projects. Instead, accounting practices could 
be considered to be in a continuous state of change. In this process, new tools will emerge and be 
dropped out in a way, hopefully, best supporting other organizational purposes.” Finally, Kasurinen 
pinpoints that “the learning process taking place during the change will often become at least 
equally important as the outcome” and that “borderline between management accounting and other 
organizational systems will probably vanish. In addition to changing the role of management 
accounting in organizations, these developments will undoubtedly open up new and interesting 
avenues for future management accounting researchers”. Clearly the ideology of the “rolling stone 
gathers no moss” has been put a lot of value in itself.  
 
Many organisms in the world, from human body to team sport tactics, need pauses in order to 
achieve developments. A layman could ask Kasurinen: “Isn’t that the case with organizations as 
well? Do they not need to stop the stone every now and then and look for the direction where to 
throw the stone in the next suitable moment?” The point of this thesis’ researcher is not to question 
the wise points, conceptualizations and factors Kasurinen has brought into light. The point is the 
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possibility of such a factor being present that plays the role of a value destroyer, who destroys value 
by either implementing new changes too hastily or disturbing ongoing changes with new 
overlapping changes. In other words, there is a black hole when it comes down to the discussion of 
organizations finding the right pace for management accounting changes. Isn’t the brake pedal as 
important as the gas pedal in an organization and wouldn’t it be optimal to find the shift pedal as 
well in order to optimally react to slow, quick, long-lasting or brief turns of the road? 
 
Teemu Malmi (2002) has also studied the balanced scorecard, which belongs, just like rolling 
forecasting, to the portfolio of management accounting innovations. In his article “Balanced 
Scorecard – Mieti mitä haluat” (2002) (translated “Balanced Scorecard – Think what you want”) he 
emphasizes the way of thinking that gives weight to the future in determining business indicators or 
measurements – not only gazing at what has happened in the history. Economical measurements 
show usually only the past, which means that use of only historical indicators lead to weakened 
decision making and management of the business. According to Malmi, it is really important 
already at the early stage of adoption of new systems to determine precisely what the desired end 
products the system produces are. He crystallizes his ideas for implementing balanced scorecard 
through the idea that instead of aiming attention to measurement problems first priority should be 
carrying out the strategy and making sure achieving those goals is always the starting point. 
 
“What do we want” has a profound node also to rolling forecasting and its implementation: the top 
management has to clarify, what rolling forecasting brings to the company and how the system 
ultimately supports strategic targets. Toivanen (2002) conducted a survey amongst 500 biggest 
corporations in Finland about their balanced scorecard projects. The results proved that the top 
management commitment to the project was the most important factor for succession. Specific 
results can be seen in figure six below. As for rolling forecasting, a big trap might be indeed in the 
early stages of implementation, if it is interpreted only as a technical advancement of budgeting. It 
might seem as a not-so-huge leap into producing the budget in another way. In that case a new way 
of thinking might not be achieved and the new budgeting system might not serve the firm’s strategy 
any better. 
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Average
1. Top management commitment 4,86
2. Indicators connection to strategy 4,61
3. Clarity of the indicators 4,60
4. Both financial and non-financial indicators 4,41
5. Realistic and challenging goals 4,31
6. Personnel commitment to the project 4,20
7. Training and informing 4,20
8. Both proactive and following indicators 4,16
9. Rewarding 3,92
10. Project team line-up 3,89
11. Wide participation in the organization 3,74
12. Linking to team work 3,39
13. Speedy accomplishment of the project 3,31
14. IT-based reporting and support system 3,30
*     (n = 143). (1 = no influence, 2 = less important,
       3 = somewhat important, 4 = important, 5 = really important).  
Figure 6: Balanced Scorecard – Rakenna ja sovella tehokkaasti (Malmi, Peltola, Toivanen, 2002), 
table revised and translated from Finnish into English 
 
Regarding the balanced scorecard, Malmi et al. (2002) name one of its biggest advantages as the 
possibility of lightening or giving up budgeting. Interestingly, they compare BSC and budgeting in 
that way, that the balanced scorecard can replace budgeting’s traditional tasks of goal setting and 
follow-up, but it cannot substitute operative planning and resource distribution within an 
organization. They pinpoint also two phases of the balanced scorecard project: first part is 
determining the role of the system inside the organization. Here the researchers denote two areas, 
namely the diagnostic part, which is supporting decision making, and the interactive part, which is 
supporting the operational actions. Ultimately they underline that top management might have 
many simultaneous and overlapping tools such as Shareholder Value –thinking, activity based 
costing, quality and environmental systems as well as process management. Different issues need a 
proper tool and it is not profitable to rely on one specific tool is what Malmi et al. found out. This 
discussion relates to rolling forecasting’s fundamental role in the organization. Is it used for 
operational, goal-setting, decision making or other purposes? 
 
Olve et al. (2003) found out that SAS tried an experimental phase before shifting into real 
implementation phase of BSC. They bring into light the idea that when people get encouraged to 
play with ideas and experiment things; the implementation phase gets softer and easier. As for 
rolling forecasting’s implementation, one surely is wise to recognize there is a huge amount of tacit 
knowledge among those who have done budgeting. This leads to a very important question of what 
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is actually the optimal pace for such a change and how big a composition of people should be 
involved; a factor Kasurinen did not give great emphasis in his studies. 
 
Olve et al. (2004) also commented on six topics that were dealt with when considering the 
successful balanced scorecard projects they had encountered. First starting point was giving the 
balanced scorecard an appropriate strategy map. Successful practitioners emphasized the map being 
a snapshot of strategy and that success cannot be measured only through financial reports. 
Visualizing the company’s strategy and underlining those views that were easily agreed by 
employees were suggestible over a perspective in which surveillance and monitoring play major 
roles. Secondly the dialogue used inside a company has to be in line with the balanced scorecard 
concept; i.e. what issues are those that are tackled with the scorecard and with what level of depth 
and frequency. Thirdly, as early as possible, the roles of departments and individuals in relation to 
balanced scorecards should be well thought through; which persons are KPI owners, which overall 
performance owners, which objective owners and which business initiatives owners. 
 
The fourth important point that Olve et al. (2004) focus on are the interfaces between the main 
scorecard and sub-scorecards, a context in which the understanding of relationships of those 
scorecards is much more important than performance indicators and financial outcomes being 
aggregated in an intact way. Moving on to the fifth point reveals the importance of personal 
incentives concerned with scorecard. People will not act towards desired directions if they do not 
understand what’s in it for them. Bonus systems, rewards, personal growth and career ladder are all 
important pieces in this puzzle. The last, sixth point of the issues Olve et al. present is the IT 
solutions feasibility with balanced scorecard. At simplest, the data is retrieved into excel and from 
there on transformed into ready-to-read scorecards. The big notation here is that whatever the 
system is, it should serve the needs of balanced scorecard and not be thought as something that most 
definitely needs significant investment amounts in order to enable scorecard usage.  
 
Activity-Based Costing studies 
 
Malmi (1997) describes an example case project of a Finnish company that successfully 
implemented activity based costing in the early 1990’s. After a ten months’ project the company 
finished an ABC-model that did not cause any changes in the business operations: new and more 
precise cost information proved some of the products to be more profitable or unprofitable. Malmi 
discusses a major ideology here: does the success rate of a new accounting system depend on direct 
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influences on decision making or some other way? The case company deemed the project as a 
success because it diluted the uncertainty of the old system and pointed out that decisions made 
earlier were right. Respectively with rolling forecasting, it should not be taken for granted that 
rolling forecasting brings wonderful results and new business opportunities. Risk and uncertainty 
controlling are things worth mentioning when examining what results it is actually producing. In the 
society we have the police so do we measure its work only by how many burglars they caught? 
 
Another case, this time an unsuccessful ABC-project, brings also things into consideration for 
rolling forecasting. Malmi discovered that one big company failed in ABC-project due to parallel 
project’s burden and a personnel change, where the father of ABC-model left the company. 
Through this we have another issue to think about: what is the perfect timing for bringing in rolling 
forecasting into the company and how it should be resourced without spending too much? 
 
Conclusion of other management accounting implementation studies 
 
Laitinen (2001) studied the future of management accounting through a systematic approach in 
which he stated 48 different propositions under 12 different topics and conducted a survey among 
four different groups: Finnish polytechnic accounting students, Finnish university staff, Finnish 
managers, business controllers and consultants and foreign university staff. The agreement rates of 
these groups were measured on the 5-point Likert scale (1=totally agree, 5=totally disagree). 
 
The most agreeing and highest level of consensus was achieved with the proposition “Need for 
employment development and education (learning) will remarkably rise”. Other employee related 
propositions that marked high degree of agreeing were “employees will become the most important 
production factor” and “requirements of many-sided (versatile) know-how set for employees will 
increase”. Other results that showed results below 1,5 were one strategy proposition, which stated 
“flexibility and rapidity will become primary objects for accounting measurement”, and one value 
chain proposition, which stated “supplier performance and customer satisfaction ( ) become more 
important in performance measurement (Supplier and Customer Accounting, SCA)”. The lowest 
levels of agreement were related to change management. Laitinen (2001) constructed the following 
brief description of the future company according to most agreed fifteen propositions: 
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“Uncertainty in the environment of the company will increase and rapid changes will emerge all 
the time. Products and technologies will go rapidly out of date. Competition will continuously 
increase. Flexibility and rapidity will become primary objects for accounting measurement. The 
timespan for strategic planning will significantly shorten. Systematic investment on research and 
development activities (R&D) will significantly increase in all industries. Need for accounting 
methods associated with R&D will remarkably increase.Employees will become the most important 
production factor.Need for employment development and education (learning) will remarkably 
increase. Requirements of many-sided (versatile) know-how set for employees will increase. The 
role of team work will become larger all the time.Need for new accounting methods to measure 
and improve wide-ranging business performance will significantly increase.Wide-ranging activity 
and process cost management will become significantly more important as a management 
tool.Supplier performance and customer satisfaction (quality) become more important in 
performance measurement.Networking of companies will become more and more popular.” 
Source: Laitinen (2001) 
 
Some differences between the research groups arose; students disagreed that annual budgeting will 
be replaced with rolling and iterative planning whereas Finnish university staff clearly disagreed on 
propositions that promoted more weight in the future for networking and project type of 
management. Practitioners’ group of managers, business controllers and consultants mainly agreed 
with the propositions more often than other groups, especially and interestingly with annual 
budgeting being replaced by rolling and iterative planning and project type of management, which 
is a controversial result to Finnish students’ and university staff’s opinions. The group of foreign 
university staff disagreed more often with many topics, the strongest objection pointed to a target 
proposition which suggested that “cost minimization through innovations will become the primary 
target”. Yet, they approved more than others, that “wide ranging continuous improvement and 
associated benchmarking will become more and more popular”. 
 
As a conclusion of other MA studies one has many interesting questions at hand: What kind of 
features affect the decisions made when one is facing structural shift to a new kind of budgeting 
system? Of special interest to the researcher are questions like how political a decision making 
process is, how the change process is managed and monitored, what is done with the old control 
system, how much time is needed, how the older professionals in management accounting perceive 
the new systems and how capable they are to these changes. 
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3. Thematic of Budgetary Control in the 21st Century 
 
In section three the modern budgetary control is discussed from a theoretical point of view. The 
idea naturally, though, is not to present the very basics of budgeting. However, in order to 
understand what today’s budgeting is all about we need to comprehend two major things before 
digging deeper: firstly, the complexity of budgeting and secondly what kind of systems precede the 
cutting-edge systems and how they have succeeded. Roughly said, the general idea is that budgeting 
is a topic that needs to be understood further than just putting financial figures into a business plan, 
from which the interpretations of rolling forecasting will benefit in the later part of this thesis. This 
section will also provide support to the main research problem and painstakingly evaluate what kind 
of business world’s problems budgeting is trying to tackle. Prior to these topics some traditional 
beliefs about budgeting have to be straightened out. 
3.1 Complexity of Budgeting 
 
Two major things about budgeting shall not be forgotten: (a) ultimately it is not an easy concept, not 
least because of its complex nature, and (b) it possesses so many weaknesses for nowadays’ 
business use that many practitioners have looked and are constantly looking for other options in 
planning their businesses (Jyrkkiö and Riistama, 1996) . The first part (a) has more to do with the 
nature of inputs, which can take more forms than one might thing, and the latter part (b) with the 
problematic world of outputs in budgeting. One might call the a-part as an explanation for why 
budgeting can be so difficult and the b-part for what undesired results do we get with budgeting. 
 
a) Budgeting is not an easy concept, not least because of its complex nature 
 
In the first place financial figures and mechanical calculation rules occur to one’s mind when it 
comes to budgeting. At this point of the thesis this narrow picture of budgeting needs to be 
addressed and broadened a little bit. E.g. Jyrkkiö and Riistama (1996) emphasize the humane nature 
of budgeting. They remind that budgeting works as a means for setting goals and ultimately for 
planning the actions that would lead to achieving these goals. They particularly point out that the 
attitudes of the people that are under the influence of the budget are the utmost important factors in 
developing successful budgeting methods. Secondly they state that budgeting doesn’t exist only for 
cost control, it is also a tool for monitoring profits and costs and comparing them to the set goals. 
Jyrkkiö and Riistama (1996) are surely not the only ones who express their findings about 
budgeting’s complex nature. Also Hansen and Van der Stede (2004) exemplify budgeting’s 
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multiformity with regard to its purposes in their article in Management Accounting Research. In 
their research they concentrated on four different roles – or facets as they say it – of budgeting: the 
short-term weighted operational planning and performance evaluation and the long-term oriented 
communication of goals and strategy formation. According to them, prior research has most often 
isolated these reasons and thus has not taken into account their coexistent use (there are exceptions, 
see e.g. Fisher et al. 2002). They also bring up the antecedents, i.e. different factors in the budgeting 
environment that generate the demand for budgeting, and used regression analysis to draw 
conclusions about their relations to these four reasons for budgeting. Same kind of an approach was 
used for measuring the performance of budget for various reasons. In between data was also 
gathered on several budget characteristics. In short, their study can be put in to a frame with figure 7. 
Antecedents
Budgeting 
characteristics
 
Figure 7: Hansen & Van der Stede’s research “Multiple facets of budgeting: an exploratory 
analysis” (2004) 
 
As it can be seen, Hansen and Van der Stede (2004) build up a continuum of several regression 
analysis (2SLS method) with the following findings and relationships between the antecedents, 
reasons to budget, budget characteristics and budgeting performance: Firstly, there is statistically 
significant coexistent use of several reasons to budget, only the operational planning and the 
communication of goals did not correlate (measured with Pearson correlation) adequately to draw 
that kind of a conclusion about their simultaneous use. Also all of these reasons were unique 
enough (i.e. the opposite for too identical) to support findings about each reason on its own.  
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Secondly, the perceived importance for four budgeting reasons have interestingly quite different 
antecedents: operational planning is more likely to be supported by the job shop production type 
whereas a very tough competition leads to an improved importance in budgeting’s use for 
communication of goals and the diminished importance of performance evaluation, which in turn is 
supported by an environment where resources are more easily traceable. Interdependent operating 
environments and job shop production type also promote the need for communication of goals 
through budgeting. Strategy formation is supported in those organizations which are divisionalized, 
that pursue a differentiation strategy and that operate in competitive and job shop type environments.  
 
Thirdly, the importance levels of these four budgeting reasons all have a positive effect on the 
performance of budgeting (budgeting satisfaction and organizational unit performance). I.e. the 
higher the perceived importance level was the higher the performance level was. As for operational 
planning, the performance increases with the use of rolling budgets and decreases through 
numerous budget iterations. Performance evaluation’s budgeting performance tends to rise with 
participative target setting and with a big emphasis on meeting the budget. Logically rolling 
budgeting and numerous budget iterations decrease the performance of this reason for budgeting; 
rolling forecasting builds up uncertainty among managers. The performance increases for both 
communication of goals and strategy formation through a tightly link between budgeting and 
strategy and with an emphasis on meeting the budgets. The opposite effect can be found with 
budget target difficulty which is not surprising.  
 
Finally, Hansen and Van der Stede (2004) discover that an improved performance on all of the 
reasons for budgeting increase budgeting satisfaction while an improved performance on almost all 
(except for communication of goals) reasons have a positive effect on organizational performance.  
 
There is more to it by Lukka (1988), who stated already in the 1980’s how budgetary biasing is 
indeed an important part of organizational life. In order to get a full picture of variations between 
budgets and actual results he reminds of the three different kinds of budgeting errors: 1) Estimation 
error, 2) Budgetary bias and 3) Real inefficiency and ineffectiveness. The first and last error types 
are normal since no one of us knows the future and no one of us is perfect. The second error type, 
budgetary bias, is very interesting because it adds a very humane feature to budgeting: budgeting 
figures are intentionally twisted to serve other needs than predicting the realistic outcomes in the 
future. Lukka’s paper’s clarifies budgeting’s complex and humane nature in the following figures. 
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Figure 8: Intentions and determinants of budgetary biasing (Lukka, 1988) 
 
The complexity of budgeting can be broadened a little wider through a research report by Neely et 
al. (2001). According to them budgeting and planning support shareholder value in three ways: 1) 
improved management, 2) improved market perceptions managing and 3) improved company 
performance. The major point here is that even this kind of a straightforward board game type 
theoretical setting with its starting point (budgeting and planning) and finish line (shareholder 
value) there are many intermediate stopping points that have influences on each other, which is 
depicted in figure 9. How might rolling forecasting actually fit into this picture? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Theoretical link for planning and budgeting and shareholder value (Neely et al. 2001) 
 
How might rolling forecasting behave in terms of these peculiar humane characteristics of 
budgeting, is an enticing question, to which the empirical part of this research provides an answer. 
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b) Budgeting possesses so many weaknesses for nowadays’ business use that many 
practitioners have looked and are constantly looking for other options in planning 
their businesses 
 
Bourne et al. (2002) emphasize the dramatic downfall of traditional budgeting as a concept through 
a presentation of a survey by the Economist Intelligence Unit: as much as 80 percent of companies 
are dissatisfied with their planning and budgeting processes. Similar findings are not few: e.g. 
Hansen et al. (2003) pinpoint Comshare's survey in 2000 with 154 financial executives, out of 
which as much as 130 identified 332 frustrations with their organizations' budgeting processes. Also 
flaming quotes that depict the dissatisfaction with the present budgeting methods have been said: 
the former CEO of General Electric, Jack Welch, condemns budgeting as "the bane of corporate 
America" while the former CEO of German discount chain Aldi North, Dieter Brandes, finds 
budgeting completely superfluous (Rickards, 2006). 
 
Not only the practitioners but also many researchers have called into question if budgets are needed 
at all in today’s business life. For example Wallander (1999) suggests an outright abandonment of 
the traditional annual budgeting, which he condemns staggeringly expensive and still living only 
because of “the budget bureaucratic system”, which means all those people who are afraid of losing 
their power and weakening their positions if budgeting is abolished. Hope and Fraser (1999) call 
budgeting a severe handicap in circumstances where customer loyalty is fickle, product life cycles 
are shortening, competitors can spring from anywhere at any time, and the best people are attracted 
to organizations that promote managerial freedom and responsibility. Further interesting remarks 
from Hope and Fraser state that for large corporations budgeting is a barrier both to change and 
innovations and that several big companies such as Volvo Cars, IKEA, Borealis and Handelsbanken 
are all managing successfully without budgeting. These critics are not few: Schmidt (1992), Newing 
(1994), Gurton (1999), Vuorinen (1998) all bring in the same major message about budgeting just 
like Arterian (1998) does; budgeting is inefficient, ineffective and incomprehensible. 
 
Not every researcher, however, has attacked present budgeting methods in such a straightforward 
manner like Wallander (1999) or Hope and Fraser (1999). For example Ekholm and Wallin (2000) 
adopt a milder approach to budgeting in their article “Is the annual budget really dead?”. They 
suppose that part of the vast criticism towards traditional budgeting could be classified as a 
hyperbola because of the interest that management accounting consultants possess in this setting. 
Still, as they also note, something concrete, more than just talk, has happened in the real business 
life for this phenomenon to be condemned only consultant hype. Accordingly, they also bring forth 
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some Swedish companies just like Hope and Fraser (1999) did. Their survey with large Finnish 
companies implies that budgeting in its traditional form is far from becoming extinct since few 
companies are planning to abandon it. Still they find that a lot of criticism has a very firm ground 
even in those firms that are likely to stick to budgeting. 
 
Now that the boiling dissatisfaction of traditional budgeting methods has been unveiled, it is 
suitable to list more precisely the hard work of both practitioners and researchers. Here by 
traditional it is meant all the budgeting systems that organizations have used for some time; i.e. they 
can be newer or older methods as long as they are or have been an intact part of the organizations 
budgeting system. The following list presents a compilation of many authors’ findings (Durfee 
2006, Rickards 2008, Neely et al. 2003, Hope & Fraser 1999, Libby & Lindsay 2007 and 2010). 
 
- Budgets are unrealistic and lack trust. 
- Budgeting is political. 
- Budgets are out-of-date when they finally got approval.  
- Budgets add little value.  
- Budgets emphasize costs, not value creation.  
- Budgets have a weak link to strategy.  
- Budgeting misguides managers.  
- Budgeting encourages managers to budget gaming.  
- Budgeting is time-consuming and thus costly.  
- Budgeting is processed in a too detailed manner.  
- Budgets support hierarchy and strict control relationships.  
- Budgets make people feel undervalued. 
- Budgeting is a barrier to change. 
 
All of these accusations will be mirrored to rolling forecasting in the empirical part of this study. 
Stemming from this discussion for this thesis it would be very useful to gather some information 
about whether rolling forecasting should be introduced as a stand-alone solution or would it be 
better off if it’s strongly linked to the traditional way of budgeting in an organization. Should it 
even be called budgeting or something else?  
 
Be that as it may, all of the above evidence taken into account, it is no wonder that companies are 
either trying to improve their budgeting processes or totally striving for the option of abandoning 
budgeting totally. After this section it is only rightful and logical that one's interest turns to the 
evolution of the budgeting process. Surely improvements are always welcome but what has already 
been done and with what success? The following chapters provide answers to these questions.  
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3.2 Evolutionary steps to present State 
 
In this chapter the short history – one can say so with human kind living less than one hundred 
years with the concept being really used all around – of budgeting is introduced analogically with 
how the business environment has changed during the last century. Later emphasis will be given on 
individual budgeting tools and what the research field and practitioners have found about them. 
 
For the sake of this thesis it is not so important to find the foundation year of budgeting or exact 
dates in the history for different tools since this is not an accounting history thesis. Broadly one can 
say that the first budgets were crafted during the time when human being majorly concentrated on 
agricultural matters as a key driver for economic and population growth. Hope and Hope (1997) 
present the history of budgeting with a glimpse of an eye in figure 10 below. 
 
 
Figure 10: History of budgeting (Hope and Hope, 1997) 
 
As it can be seen, budgeting has converged to its annual type of form in corporation type of setting 
somewhere during the industrial revolution from the late part of the 19th century to first half of the 
20th century. It was around the 1960’s, at the dawn of the information age, when the traditional type 
of budgeting had achieved a central role in companies’ accounting activities and thus a role in how 
organizations were managed. Various tries to improve the budgeting process, like zero-base 
budgeting and activity-based budgeting, have taken place, without success or offering answers only 
to some sub parts of the total picture according to some scholars (Hope et al. 1999). 
3.3 Attempts to answer the Information Wave’s Needs 
 
In the next subsections the study brings forth different starting points of organizing a company’s 
budgeting process, giving further answers to the evolutionary steps. Where do all these and why 
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many of them have been labeled nowadays as inefficient in facing the today’s business challenges? 
To understand the concept of rolling forecasting utterly, this background needs to be examined so 
that special characteristics of rolling forecasting can be discussed later on in section four. 
 
1) Zero-base Budgeting (ZBB) 
 
The basic idea of zero-base budgeting is budgeting from the ground up, as if the budget was being 
prepared for the first time and that no expenditure escapes the careful examination. Of course that 
kind of an idea has been invented much earlier (Bastable, 1892; Higgs, 1914; Young, 1915) than 
what figure 10 proposed for evolution for budgeting but it was during the latter half of the 20th 
century, during the information wave, when scholars increasingly nominated this kind of budgeting 
behavior as “zero-base” (Pyhrr, 1973; Wildawsky and Hammond, 1962; Anthony and Reece 1989).  
 
According to Burrows and Syme (2000) the ZBB can be distinguished between a strong form and a 
weak form of the concept; the strong form starts from base zero and involves some mechanism for 
assessing costs and benefits whereas weak form involves critical approach to earlier expenditure 
levels combined with some review process. They underline that the weaker form of ZBB has taken 
the dominant position of what nowadays’ is understood with zero base budgeting.  
 
Peter A. Pyhrr (1973) can be nominated as the modern age father for ZBB. Even though a 
budgeting system has to be implemented in a case-by-case manner, Pyhrr identifies that these basic 
steps are always included in the process: 1) identifying decision units, 2) describing each decision 
unit as a decision package, 3) evaluating and ranking all these packages by cost/benefit analysis to 
develop a budget request and profit and loss account and 4) allocating resources accordingly. 
According to Pyhrr, decision packages are either mutually exclusive or incremental. How a decision 
package, a key factor of ZBB, can then be practically formulized? This can be seen in Pyhrr’s 
(1970) figure 11 below. The decision packages are specific activities that have goals, plans for 
realizing these goals, tie the unit to certain costs and have some consequences if not realized. Suver 
and Brown (1977) point out a budget director at Southern California Edison who defined decision 
packages followingly: ”Called a “decision package”, this summary (operational plan) usually 
includes a statement of the expected business result or purpose of the activity, its costs, personnel 
required, measures of performance, alternative courses of action, and an evaluation from a corporate 
or organization-wide perspective of the benefits of performance and consequences of 
nonperformance”.  
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Figure 11: Formulation of decision packages (Pyhrr, 1970) 
 
In actual life how widely used and with what pros and cons ZBB is packed with? In the research 
field there have been quite mixed results of how well ZBB manages in its task of handling 
organizations’ budgeting processes. Jimmy Carter, once governor of the state of Georgia and 
president of the US, was an early adopter of ZBB and said: “Zero-base budgeting requires every 
agency in state government to identify each function it performs and the personnel and cost to 
taxpayers for performing that function”. The father of ZBB, Pyhrr, claimed there were 100 users of 
ZBB. Also other writers pointed out at least tens of users and that many articles, books and parts of 
books had been published. The major advantages can be summarized from what was found out in 
the survey of state of Georgia’s usage of ZBB: 1) Establishment of financial planning phase prior to 
budget preparation, 2) improvement in the quality of management information and 3) increase in 
budget involvement of personnel at the activity level. Similarly, the major disadvantages were the 
next: 1) increase in time and effort required for budget preparation, 2) contention that the new 
system had not significantly affected the allocation of funds and 3) ineffectiveness of the decision-
package ranking approach to meet changes in the level of funding. (Suver and Brown, 1977) 
 
The usefulness of ZBB might be debatable since at the time of this thesis, in the 2010’s, no recent 
discussion is going on as to ZBB and so far the working life of this thesis’ researcher and 
discussions with colleagues and peer network have not had a slightest sign of ZBB. The hype phase 
of ZBB has been passed but surely it has not disappeared totally since many school and university 
books are having dedicated ZBB sections. Dean and Cowen (1979) concluded that in some 
situations corporations are using ZBB selectively when there is a special need for cost stabilization 
or budgeting process problems, however the tremendous resource craving and the skills needed 
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from top management set the bar very high since in nowadays’ organizations training budgets and 
number of personnel in support functions are squeezed towards minimum levels. Suver and Brown 
(1977) emphasize that it is up to each organization to analyze whether it has adequately top 
management support, talent, resources and suitable operational environment for ZBB program. 
 
2) Balanced Scorecard (BSC) 
 
A more concrete step towards Kasurinen’s comment discussed already in chapter 2.3, which stated 
that “borderline between management accounting and other organizational systems will probably 
vanish”, was taken by Kaplan and Norton already at the beginning of the 1990’s. They introduced 
the balanced scorecard, the key idea of which is linking financial targets to operational targets, 
which consist of customer and internal business process point of views. Learning and growth are 
behind achieving these operational targets so this management accounting tool seems quite humane 
in its nature. The metrics, therefore, used in this tool are both financial and non-financial and they 
should consist of only limited number of measurements that are considered vital. At the center of 
this, of course, are the company’s strategy and vision. Kaplan and Norton state that “the balanced 
scorecard is well suited to the kind of organization many companies are trying to become. The 
scorecard puts strategy and vision, not control, at the center.” (Kaplan and Norton, 1992) 
 
The fathers of BSC developed their scorecard during the 1990’s to make the concept more 
graspable. In 1996 they published the following figure in their book “The Balanced Scorecard”.  
 
Figure 12: The Balanced Scorecard as a strategic framework for action (Kaplan and Norton, 1996) 
 
The early problem of BSC was related to the fact that BSC was understood to be a tool that rather 
explains the company’s strategy and vision and throws a glimpse of what is needed and is really 
missing out on the managing aspects of the company’s day-to-day living and giving practical 
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guidance in implementing the tool successfully. The connections between strategy, operations and 
the yearly budget and short-term measurements seemed to be on a quite fickle level. In order to 
alleviate this issue the authors (Kaplan and Norton, 2001) introduced a step-down procedure for 
ensuring linking strategy to budgets. Figure 13 below clarifies this procedure with four action points. 
 
Figure 13: Linking strategy to budgets in a step-down procedure (Kaplan and Norton, 2001) 
 
Kasurinen (2001 and 2002) criticized that the BSC implementation process can be dampened by 
difficulties in defining business unit strategies or by business people being too much action oriented 
rather than strategy oriented. Of course Kaplan and Norton should recuse themselves from 
testifying how their model works but it can be stated that they agree with the claim of BSC 
functioning best and most often in organizations that are driving the process of organizational 
change due to unprofitable and unsuccessful status of current situation. 
 
3) Activity-Based Budgeting (ABB) 
 
Activity-based budgeting, like the name suggests, concentrates on linking real causalities between 
organization’s outputs, activities and resources. According to Cooper et al. (1998) ABB is activity-
based costing in reverse. In activity-based costing the organization recognizes firstly resources and 
resource drivers, then what activities are performed with the resources that were used and lastly 
activity cost drivers allocate the activity costs to outputs, e.g. products, product lines, customers, 
chains or projects. In ABB the outputs are the beginning point and costs are traced through 
activities all the way to resources, i.e. how much resources are needed to produce the needed 
activities which ensure certain output level. Links between strategy, planning and control and 
budgeting process’ more precise nature can be seen in Brimson and Fraser’s (1991) depiction below. 
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Figure 14: the Activity-Based Budgeting process (Brimson and Fraser, 1991) 
 
At the turn of the millennium a refined model, the so-called Closed-Loop model, of ABB has been 
provided by the Consortium for Advanced Manufacturing International (CAM-I). This model has a 
better matching with operational and financial planning, which are staged into two steps in the 
budgeting process. Organization’s strategy is the beginning point, which determines some levels of 
demand, some activities that are used in order to be able to answer that demand and lastly some 
resources are used in order to keep the activities running. That is called operational balance. 
(Sandison et al., 2004) 
 
In the latter stage, achieving the financial balance, the needed resources are attached with some cost 
levels, non-activity related costs are taken into account and finally some formal budget is created 
with all the knowledge combined. There are five different levers the organization can adjust when 
needed: 1) demand quantities, 2) activity and resource consumption, 3) resource capacity, 4) 
resource cost unit and 5) product/service prices. (Sandison et al., 2004) Here opens the possibility 
for doing some ceteris-paribus analysis as for these five levers, which in itself is very valuable to an 
organization. Hansen et al. (2003) demonstrates this followingly in figure 15.  
 
Again, like with many models, in theory they sound more than reasonable and that is the case with 
ABB also: who would not be interested in understanding causalities between resources, activities 
and thus profitability of certain areas of interest? Avoiding infeasible plans and pointing resources 
to more effective uses might be lucrative promises of ABB as well as promoting departments’ 
cooperation through the horizontal weight of the process.  
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Figure 15: Implementing the CAM-I Activity Based Budgeting Closed-Loop Model  
(Hansen et al., 2003) 
 
There are danger zones in achieving all these upsides of ABB: driver information availability might 
be insufficient or false and real causalities might be of debatable nature or very cumbersome to 
achieve. Also situation where the organization does not have an existing activity cost accounting 
system does not provide a very firm ground for ABB. With scarce staff resources the company 
might end up calculating superficial information for activities and drivers. The end-result is 
something the business people nor accounting people really do not assimilate, especially when top 
management falls short in supporting ABB as a planning and budgeting process. 
 
4) Beyond Budgeting 
 
At the turn of the millennium, all of those downfalls and the problematic nature of nowadays’ 
existing budgeting methods, those that were partly introduced in earlier part of this chapter, 
functioned as a breeding ground for something new: the beyond budgeting model. This model has 
its backgrounds from such authors as Hope and Fraser (1999), who, through the CAM-I 
(Consortium for Advanced Management, International) Europe, initiated the Beyond Budgeting 
Round Table research project. The project studied organizations that had abandoned budgeting, 
developed and refined the model for managing without budgets and prepared a list of lessons 
learned for understanding the vital points of implementation. In comparison to traditional budgeting, 
Hope and Fraser (2000) present the following figure that clarifies the major differences. 
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         The Traditional Budgeting          The Beyond Budgeting Model 
 
        Culture: “Contract, compliance, control” Culture: “Responsibility, enterprise, learning” 
Figure 16: The Traditional Budgeting Model versus the Beyond Budgeting Model  
(Hope and Fraser, 2000) 
 
Key starting points for the beyond budgeting model are based on some assumptions: 1) budgeting is 
still relied on as a managing method since it really has not been challenged, 2) shareholder value is 
best driven by future cash flows which are strongly reliable on company’s intangible assets which 
in turn are best taken care of by most talented and capable managers and 3) that budgets are 
reinforcing command and control which focus on short-term financial numbers and thus totally miss 
the point of boosting the most important drivers for shareholder value. In addition and quite 
sensationally, Hope and Fraser (1999) denote budgets are “the biggest roadblock (both systemic and 
mental) to the future”. They bring into light many successful examples such as Svenska 
Handelsbanken, Volvo, IKEA, SKF, Borealis, Schlumberger and Boots as companies that have 
abandoned budgeting and diverted successfully into managing without them. In summary of the 
lessons learned within these companies’ management models in the information age Hope and 
Fraser state in the beginning of 1999 the following six points. 
 
1. Budgets are barriers: Budgeting is a barrier to competitive success in the information age. 
Abandoning it is entirely feasible, the alternatives are better, and it is not particularly 
difficult to achieve. 
2. Ten principles and practices: Just dismantling the budgeting system will not be effective 
unless the changes in management principles and practices are seen as an integrated 
approach with as much emphasis on the “soft” cultural issues (such as empowerment) as on 
the “hard” process issues (such as management reporting). 
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3. New steering mechanisms: Alternative steering mechanisms can be used to manage the 
business more effectively. For example, management information and control is improved 
with better anticipatory techniques (such as rolling forecasts) leading to more effective 
control and better decisions. 
4. Organizational levels: The management model can vary according to the needs and 
complexity of a business and between different levels within an organization (e.g. group 
head office, business units, and responsibility centres). 
5. Building the new model: The organization, culture and values are important. They take 
time to develop and should be appropriate to the competitive pressures of the business. E.g. 
decentralization, process-teams, and knowledge management systems need to be considered. 
6. Implementation: Careful thought needs to be given to implementation. This issue will 
occupy much of our attention in 1999. 
 
The above statements may sound like piece of cake since academic scholars and practitioners are 
surely aware of budgeting’s disadvantages. One might easily ask, what should be done if budgeting 
is to be abandoned. In short, the authors Hope and Fraser (1999) list ten very practical principles 
and practices followingly: 1) Target setting should maximize long-term value and beat the 
competition, not the budget. 2) Strategy shall be devolved to the front line and made a continuous 
and open process, not a top-down annual event. 3) Growth and improvement should be aimed by 
challenging people to think radically and not incrementally. 4) Resources ought to be managed from 
the lifetime of an investment perspective rather than on the basis of short-term (budget) allocation. 
5) Coordination would be best organized by emphasizing managing of cause-and-effect 
relationships across business units and not by concentrating on departmental budgets. 6) Cost levels 
are better challenged based on whether they add value or not, not whether existing levels should be 
increased or decreased compared to last year. 7) Rolling forecasting can be useful in managing 
strategy and making decisions, not only to keep things on track. 8) Measurements and controls 
should concentrate on a few leading and lagging indicators, not on a mass of detailed (historical) 
reports. 9) Rewards are better tied with company and unit-level competitive performance, not 
personal financial targets. 10) Lastly managers should have more responsibility and freedom to act, 
instead of the option of micro-managing them. 
 
In order to give a turn of speech to those holdouts out there and to avoid one-eyed perspective, it’s 
good to bear in mind that some researchers have been quite critical on the courageous abandoning 
of the budget. For example Libby and Lindsay (2007) found out that even though the interviewed 
practitioners were suffering from many deficiencies of budgeting, they were majorly reluctant to 
deem it as dispensable. Their study’s starting point was to examine budgeting against those claims 
made by Hope and Fraser with their beyond budgeting model. For example beyond budgeting 
model suggests that budgets are used in a rigid way.  This accusation did not get support from this 
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Libby and Lindsay’s study. The bottom line of their study was that beyond budgeting slashes 
budgeting too harshly and that budgeting is a process which can be used either in a productive or 
unproductive way and for many the golden path will lay in improving that process since it is totally 
unrealistic, according to interviewed practitioners’ survey answers, to assume such an intact part of 
nowadays’ businesses will be waved goodbye with the snap of the fingers. 
 
Other steps towards understanding beyond budgeting as a management model can be taken by 
viewing what other scholars or practitioners have stated. For instance, Robert S. Kaplan introduces 
(Bogsnes, 2009) Bjarte Bogsnes as one of the best individuals in shaping finance departments from 
the controlling and beancounting office to the company’s value-creating office. Bogsnes himself 
describes Beyond Budgeting as a revolution, the purpose of which is liberation from dictatorship, 
micromanagement, number worshipping, calendar periods, hierarchies, secrecy, sticks and carrots, 
and all the other management myths about what is the best for achieving great performance in teams 
and organizations. The following sentence by Bogsnes (2009) describes finely beyond budgeting’s 
core essence and what the model is trying to achieve in another way than Hope and Fraser did. 
“A philosophy concerned more with leadership than with actual budgeting, 
Beyond Budgeting is about releasing capable people from the chains 
of the top-down performance contract and enabling them to use the knowledge 
resources of the organization to consistently beat the competition. 
With intellectual assets accounting for 80 to 90% of shareholder value today, 
people really are every organization’s most valuable asset.” 
 
Bogsnes (2009): Implementing Beyond Budgeting. Unlocking the Performance Potential 
 
In chapter two McGregor’s theory X and theory Y people was introduced. The link with Beyond 
Budgeting, according to Bogsnes, is that theory X, where people generally dislike their jobs and 
responsibilities, have low ambitions, and prefer to be directed and controlled, is still much alive in 
nowadays’ world. Beyond Budgeting is designed to kill the theory X in practice. It longs for 
leadership, i.e. designing environments which are suitable for success through transparency and 
trust, and claims it is the myths and beliefs of traditional managements that need to be tackled. 
Many titles in the finance department are Control accessorized like “Financial Controller”, 
“Controller”, “Business Controller”, “Group Controller” et cetera. Does control bring performance, 
is the question Bogsnes (2009) is asking us and discriminates control into three different categories. 
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Control the right picture of the 
present state of the business 
Control over what people shall 
do and what they shall not do 
Control of the future 
Quality Accounting 
Quality Reporting 
Effective Processes 
Understanding of causalities 
Detailed Budgets 
Tight Mandates 
Detailed Job Descriptions 
Rigid Organizational Structures 
Bonus Schemes 
Plans and Forecasts with numbers 
 
Table 2: Control in three different categories (Bogsnes, 2009) 
 
Bogsnes emphasizes the first type of control is always desired through quality accounting and 
reporting, whereas controlling what people shall do and shall not do and controlling the perceived 
picture of the future with management methods of today are those to be abandoned. So actually 
we’ve come down to the conclusion that it is important to determine what to control and by what 
means, in order to maximize shareholder value. The major argument here with the beyond 
budgeting model is that there are in many places outdated methods and they need to be replaced by 
more appropriate management systems. Since the beyond budgeting model is clearly more about 
philosophy and company culture than specific tools, it’s clearly worth pinpointing a couple of case 
examples of how things can be organized, in order to comprehend the entirety all the way from 
broad principles to exemplified details. 
 
Bogsnes introduces that in Handelsbanken, international Swedish banking industry company, 
management model was completely changed in the early 1970’s: Jan Wallander established a 
strongly decentralized model, in which budgets, centralization, secrecy and individual rewards were 
thrown into the garbage bin. He organized the bank branches with great authority, launched a flat 
organization structure with a few layers only, put customers on the focus instead of products, 
established a collective profit-sharing system, nourished value-based culture and abolished budgets. 
Since those decisions, Handelsbanken’s financial performance has been staggering with low costs 
providing great profitability, in comparison to other bank companies. It started driving performance 
through commonly understood measurements, i.e. return on capital and cost-income ratio and their 
comparison between bank branches in a transparent way. Bogsnes verified that the company story 
was intact through many observations and discussions and amazingly the success recipe stated 
above was openly discussed and available for copy-cats. This change occurred during only a couple 
of years, not of course with a snap of fingers, and it has lasted up until today as a commonly agreed 
success factor in the bank’s history. 
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Another case, Borealis, a leading petrochemical manufacturer nowadays, was established in 1994 
with Neste and Statoil each holding 50% shares. The new company had to develop new 
management practices and on the other hand had the opportunity to do so. One of the core values 
stated was “one company – new, different and better”. That may be one reason that escalated the 
criticism for budgeting’s existence in the company. In the beginning stages of the company, a 
couple of budgeting rounds were spent doing hard work and planning financial forecasts for 1994 
and 1995, two budgets that finally totally missed the actual figures. Thus more integration related 
merger synergies were needed and a program called “management effectiveness” was launched 
with CEO’s encouraging words, that he expected the unexpected. During those two budgeting 
rounds a Norwegian controller was fed up and suggested: “what if we don’t budget at all?”. That 
was a comment that ignited the later revision of the management model. The program team started 
finding out if it would be possible as part of enabling more efficient management. 
 
The initial question was why the company should abolish budgeting. After examining the matter, 
the company found out that it wanted to improve financial management and performance 
measurement, decentralize authority and decisions and simplify the process and reduce time spent 
budgeting. During the change process, as Borealis learnt that Volvo had dropped budgeting and 
recalled that Jack Welch had stated budgets were the bane of corporate America,the inspiration rose.  
The budget was used for: We achieve the same through: 
High-level financial and tax planning Quarterly rolling financial forecasts 
Target setting Targets on the balanced scorecard 
Controlling fixed costs Trend reporting 
Cost targets where and when needed 
Activity approach 
Prioritizing and allocating  
investment/project resources 
Small projects – trend reporting 
Medium projects – varying hurdle rates 
Major strategic projects – case by case, the budget 
was never a tool 
Delegation of authority Use existing mandates/authority schedules 
Table 3: The Budget Alternatives (Bogsnes, 2009) 
 
Weaknesses listed of traditional budgeting resembled those stated in chapter 3.1 but no alternative 
tool for it was in sight until the program team succeeded in asking themselves the ground-breaking 
question: “why do we budget?”. This is what led for further development in understanding that 
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instead of all-in-one comprehensive tool the company needed a set of tools that would replace what 
budgeting had always tried to achieve. The following table captures this. 
 
Along the journey, the realization of new tools brought much more than just what traditional 
budgeting had produced. Figure 17 clarifies how budgeting’s outputs were replaced with new tools. 
 
Figure 17: More for less (Bogsnes, 1995) 
 
The rolling forecasts were designed through the mindset “roughly right” instead of a lot of details 
since the purpose was not cost control but high-level financial and tax planning which should be 
achievable very quickly and by simple calculations. It’s worth noticing that the beyond budgeting 
model is not the same as rolling forecasts, which is the most common misunderstanding of beyond 
budgeting, according to Bogsnes. As for target setting, balanced scorecard financial KPIs were the 
ones that replaced budgeting. The company adapted a measure called “the relative ROCE”, which 
accounted for the historical relationship between market conditions and return on capital employed. 
This turned the eyes of business units to those operations that they could really affect; investments, 
divestments, working capital, fixed and variable costs, margin rates and volumes. There were no 
excuses anymore and decision making was strongly decentralized to business units whereas 
common processes and support functions were strongly centralized. In the same time, 
benchmarking across production plants proved to be a very powerful means of motivating all units 
performances: those that were on top did not want to lose their position and those that were low in 
rankings tried everything they could to avoid being looked down on. Also trend reporting was one 
intact part of the entire reporting. Activity based costing was established in order to understand 
  
 
 
 60 
costs better and to some extent Borealis succeeded in that even though there were system related 
problems in that project. Regarding investment management, Borealis categorized investments into 
three categories according to their size and dealt with them differently: small projects were 
considered in the same way of operating costs, medium projects were decided case by case and 
pictured through the forecasts and major strategic projects were managed totally separately and did 
not have any linkages to short or medium-term management tools. Rewarding and bonus systems 
were linked to those targets mentioned in the scorecards. Coming all the way with these new tools, 
Borealis had made the jump into the unknown: living without traditional budgeting. 
 
During the process, Bogsnes states, the following lessons have been learnt as for making this kind 
of change happen in a company. 
 
- The vision could have been stated in a more profound way. 
- HR function should have been involved from day one and not later on due to the change 
being much more than a finance department exercise. 
- Too much weight on KPIs could do harm to the strategic objectives. 
- Borealis made the change almost totally without any supporting software and it managed in 
doing so because the concept was very strongly anchored. In their experience, systems such 
as SAP could only restrict the outcome. 
- Designing too much does not follow beyond budgeting’s core essence. Issues should be 
solved once they appear. 
- Controlling costs through budgets might in fact increase the costs and once released from 
the chains of budgeting, a company is more capable of lowering the costs. 
- It takes many forecasting rounds for business units to understand that in beyond budgeting 
forecasting is just forecasting and not proposals and funding. 
- Abolishing budgeting can boost the image of finance function as business partner instead of 
being the control freak department. 
 
Having become acquainted with beyond budgeting’s ideas, it is clear the academic field would need 
more research about the performance those companies are having that have implemented beyond 
budgeting. Similar studies to that by Hansen (2011), in which rolling forecasting, beyond budgeting 
and activity-based budgeting were found profit increasing alternative methods to traditional 
budgeting, are needed in addition to such case studies provided by Bogsnes (1995). Many 
companies do see value in it since they are adopting it.  What will be rolling forecasting’s role? Will 
there be a budgeting evolution or total management revolution? After winning the first round of 
criticism in the 1980’s by Johnson and Kaplan (1987), is it so that we’re experiencing the Second 
World War for management accountants who should fight for their existence? 
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4. Rolling Forecasting 
 
As mentioned earlier in this thesis, rolling forecasting hasn’t attracted management accounting 
researchers’ attention to a great extent, like with activity based costing or the balanced scorecard. 
Beyond dispute this is a consequence from the fact that rolling forecasting is still quite a recent 
phenomenon; in Finland strategic consultants denote it as a trend (e.g. Nivaro, 2001). Yet, not all of 
the management accounting scholars has been obedient in following their broadcasting silence. 
Rolling forecasting has been the topic of some master’s theses in the 21st century (Forsell, 2003 and 
Kuisma, 2002), in which the development of the planning and controlling systems of the case 
companies have been the research setting. Furthermore, some studies and numerous articles and 
seminars have brought the topic of rolling forecasting forth in the 3rd millennium (e.g. Öhrnberg, 
2008; Lynn and Madison, 2004; Myers, 2001; Hansen and Van der Stede, 2004).  
 
Possibly the misunderstandings that regard rolling forecasting as ordinary budgeting, which is only 
carried out more frequently than the old-fashioned yearly budgeting, have damaged the scholars’ 
interest in this topic. In the other extreme, which was learned in chapter 3.3, some see rolling 
forecasting as the same as beyond budgeting, which is also incorrect. Another explanation would be 
that rolling forecasting should be tailored so precisely to meet a company’s exact needs that 
creating generalizations wouldn’t be necessary. The latter is not a good argument since research is 
not always striving for generalizations as we see in chapter six, where the methodology of this 
thesis is examined. Like stated in the introductory part of this thesis, the aim is to answer this 
shortage of studies regarding rolling forecasting. 
 
Nevertheless, it was “the speed of change in today’s economy” as Montgomery (2002) put it and 
thus the emerging demand for answering this speed as well as the practitioners eagerness to sell 
ideas, growingly in the 1990s, that ignited the extensive movement to make the most of rolling 
forecasting (e.g. the beyond budgeting round table by Hope and Fraser, 2003). The researcher 
presumes this goes hand in hand with the revolution of the information systems and improved skills 
of users of those systems. 
 
4.1 Basic Concept 
 
Since rolling forecasting does not have a broad backup from the academic field a rather managerial 
approach is taken and a consultant-based how-to-do-rolling-forecasting is brought forth. The idea of 
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this structure is to have the opportunity later on to mirror the empirical findings bilaterally both to 
the theory of diffusion and to practice-based consultant-type instructions. Although a complete 
theoretical perception of rolling forecasting is missing, the basic concept of rolling forecasting can 
still be laid out. 
 
Rolling forecasting is not as a new phenomenon as one would think at first thought. The basic idea 
has been there already in the 1950s (Clarke 2007), which is to construct a budgeting process, where 
at certain predestined intervals, for example every month or every fourth month, new financial 
figures are integrated into the business of the organization. A budget or a financial plan is the output 
of rolling forecasting and the planning horizon is often determined to be longer than one year. The 
use of rolling forecasting does not exclude the use of the traditional yearly budget; a company might 
use both in a parallel fashion (Ekholm & Wallin, 2001). The key idea of rolling forecasting is to 
turn the glance from the past to the future. This is done by integrating as real-time figures as 
possible into the budgeting system and accordingly adapting the business to the changed situation. 
Usually the near future plans contain more accurate figures and the far future only rough estimates. 
(E.g. Jyrkkiö and Riistama 2000; Bergstrand 1997; Drury 2004)  
 
The fundamental idea of rolling forecasting is to construct a budgeting process, where at certain 
suitable intervals, e.g. quarterly or monthly, company aligns the budget to meet the newest business 
figures. The forecasting period can be for example from 12 to 18 months. Rolling forecasting, 
however, does not exclude the use of annual budgeting, as one first might think. Pivotal is bringing 
more real-time information into the budgeting system and in that way developing a good structural 
custom of reacting to the new figures. The near future of the forecasting horizon is normally 
planned in as detailed a manner as possible and the end of the forecasting horizon is viewed quite 
broadmindedly. (Jyrkkiö & Riistama 2000; Bergstrand 1997; Drury 2004)  
 
Jeremy Hope (2006) presents a typical five-quarter rolling forecasting timetable in the following 
way in figure 18 below. As end of quarter one is approaching, other already planned quarters need 
an updated view and an additional quarter needs to be added so that the view ahead matches always 
five quarters. More weight will be put in the near quarters than to last forecastable quarters. 
Additionally, Hope underlines that adaptive organizations use forecasts to support strategy reviews, 
rather than simply check where they are against the annual plan. 
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Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
1st review
2nd review
3rd review
4th review
Forecast Actuals
Year x Year x+1
 
Figure 18: A five-quarterly rolling forecast (Hope, 2006) 
 
Lately a lot of discussion has been devoted to the changed role management accounting experts 
possess in companies (Pierce B. 2001; Granlund and Malmi 2002; Burns, Ezzamel and Scapens 
1999). Although this paper does not concentrate on the new role of management accountant but 
rolling forecasting, it is good to bear it in mind when treating new budgeting practices like rolling 
forecasting. Here the study discriminates some of the change to have a technical, like high-end data 
systems, and some a humane, like new ways of thinking, nature. 
 
It is obvious that the above-mentioned basic idea of rolling forecasting cannot be separated from the 
revolution of information systems. With these thoughts of planning more frequently with a real 
understanding of business realities it is evident that new advanced information tools play a central 
hygiene factor role in delivering what rolling forecasting promises to be. The major point here is 
that the basic idea of rolling forecasting is that it changes the way how the CFO, management 
accountants and their subordinates work. In theory the information system tools should bring the 
figures as comfortable as possible so that the rest of the time could be used in concentrating on 
learning the business and bringing the best possible view of the future. Change, like everyone 
knows, isn’t always easy. The examination of these technical (information systems) and humane 
(the employees) capabilities in realizing rolling forecasting into action is too captivating a subject to 
be skipped in the coming empirical part of this thesis. Therefore in this thesis, interest is being 
forwarded towards whether rolling forecasting more of a technical or a humane change in the 
company’s budgeting process? 
 
A strategic consultant, Nivaro (2001), provides a good example of how consultants sell the idea of 
rolling forecasting. He claims that the central idea of rolling forecasting is that decision making can 
take a rather normative form and that looking forward becomes preferred over examining the past. 
A fixed budget guides the management to look too intensely at the financial goals, like turnover, 
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that were set earlier for the financial year. In that case the return for the investments in the company 
can fall because of sub optimization. Department managers may accelerate or press brake regarding 
their turnover with unreasonable selling campaigns or by slowing down the delivering of products 
to serve their own interests, i.e. rewarding plans. The rolling budget guarantees that the goals are set 
many times and in that way prevents irrational decision making and creates a better understanding 
of the business’s causalities. (Nivaro 2001) What is interesting at this point is that practically this 
view of goal setting is quite on the contrary to what beyond budgeting suggests in chapter 3.3. 
 
A brief look into what managerial publications have promised about rolling forecasting may give us 
a look at the question, why so many companies have adopted rolling forecasting. The main goals of 
rolling forecasting are mentioned to be rational decision making, concentrating on the future rather 
than on the past and creating a better understanding of the company’s causal business relationships. 
In addition, rolling forecast is said to prevent the company from sub-optimizing actions by updating 
the goals many times during the fiscal year. In other words, rolling forecast should function as a 
safety check for the company to ensure that it is moving in the right direction. (Clarke 2007; Nivaro 
2001) All these promises sound very nice indeed but in the meanwhile they raise a lot of valid 
questions that not only bother but also interest the researcher. Firstly, is there a particular reason for 
rolling forecasting that stands out as a remedy for improving the business above other reasons? 
Secondly, how people perceive these goals of rolling forecasting? Do they concretely see them or 
do they evaluate them as consultant jargon? 
 
One other interesting reason for rolling forecasting could stem from the corporate governance 
recommendations that have blossomed after a world widely increased interest in taking care of the 
company’s investor relations. In Finland for listed companies for instance, the corporate governance 
recommendation from 2003 says word-by-word the following: “The good corporate governance of 
a listed company requires a reliable, up-to-date disclosure practice. This supports well-founded 
price development of securities subject to public trade and promotes trust in the securities markets. 
The information published by the company permits shareholders to evaluate the functioning of the 
corporate governance of the company and make reasoned decisions concerning their holdings.” 
What interests the researcher a great deal is linking this issue with rolling forecasting’s role the 
company. Therefore it is justifiable to ask, how big a role does rolling forecasting play in dealing 
with investors’ longing for information. 
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From a stock exchange listed company’s point of view rolling forecasting could be perceived as a 
tool for building a matter-of-fact investor communications and gaining image related targets. 
Helsinki Stock Exchange’s recommendation for listed companies’ corporate and governance, as of 
December 2003, underlines in instructions point 12: “Listed company’s good governance requires 
reliable and up-to-date information sharing. This supports correctly done price setting and promotes 
trust in the stock market.” As one interprets these sentences, it becomes clear and evident what kind 
of weakness the yearly budgeting process possesses: steering the business and meeting the 
information needs may become impossible if the business environment takes an unexpected path. 
As companies try to keep the core business strengths alive and change and react dynamically in 
correct places the question on the tip of our tongues is obviously: “Does rolling forecasting fit only 
into changing environments or also into traditional and static industries?” 
 
Commenting on the above recommendations, in practice investors are really interest in the outlook 
of capital expenditure. Going back to chapter 3.3, which introduced the case of Borealis and beyond 
budgeting which included rolling forecasting as one of the tools chosen for managing the company, 
capital expenditure intentions of managers initially rocketed sky high once rolling forecasting was 
implemented. This was because managers believed it would influence their approval ratings. That 
did not happen and investment decisions were taken over by a quarterly review committee, which 
made sure the managers calmed down and gradually adjusted their forecasts to reflect a more 
realistic view, which in turn is more suitable for the investor communication purpose. 
 
As for the advantages of rolling forecasting, Ekholm and Wallin (2001) state that it does not have 
the mandatory and stifling image as the annual budget since it is flexible and does not rely on 
obsolete figures, which should lead to more timely allocation of resources. As for the cons, they 
denote creating a feeling of uncertainty among managers because of ever-changing outlook and 
difficulty in designing a fair system for bonuses. 
 
In order to further disentangle the basic concept of rolling forecasting some more practical 
viewpoints of organizing such a system, firstly during transformation and implementation of rolling 
forecasting and secondly during continuous usage of the system, are next elucidated. 
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4.2 Transformation and implementation  
 
Glader et al. (1996) surveyed Swedish listed companies and got results that 40% of the companies 
indicated that changes to the budgeting process are under way. The main change in their results was 
that rolling forecasts will play a bigger role in the future. Similar results were found by Ekholm and 
Wallin (2001), who studied conservative companies’ and radical companies’ opinions on several 
statements concerning rolling forecasting, although the researchers remind that willingness to 
change an existing system in reality is different from willingness to express favorable comments 
about the change in a questionnaire. It’s worth noticing that those percentages in the table below are 
representing those answerers who replied 4 or 5 on the scale and that the rates were quite high 
except for the claim that rolling forecasting conveys a feeling of uncertainty. 
 
Table 4: Replies to statements about rolling forecasting (Ekholm and Wallin, 2001) 
 
Now that it has been clarified that the ground is suitable for rolling forecasting to take steps into 
organizations, as has already happened in many places, it is rightful to ask, in what kind of 
environments it would be most suitable. Nivaro (2001), is considering this matter, whether rolling 
forecasting is more feasible for turbulent or static operational environments, and reminds that 
competitive advantage is born by reacting quicker than competitors within the same market. A 
couple of logical deductions point out that rolling forecasting could be beneficial also in those 
environments where future is more foreseeable. Firstly, it is difficult to estimate, when traditionally 
stable businesses turn into a more volatile mode, e.g. through law changes, company acquisitions or 
IT revolution. Secondly, doesn’t a company in stable environment still want to ease its budgeting 
process and notice even small changes in the market better than competitors do? Association for 
rolling forecasting that comes to the researcher’s mind, is a modern baby diaper which shows a 
visible signal when it’s time to change. Rolling forecasting should function in the same way: it 
should tell the company’s management when it’s time to change direction. 
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Management is indeed the beginning point of changing existing budgeting methods into something 
new and what kind of message is sent from management’s desires to employees. Nivaro (2001) 
remarks that the key issue, along with the decision on how management wants to follow critical 
topics, is how people are motivated and rewarded for actions that push the company towards 
realization of strategy alignments. Instructing, follow-up and reporting are vital parts of 
implementing rolling forecasting according to Nivaro, but rewarding system cannot be totally left 
out of this change because otherwise employees might continue working as they did before. It is not 
an easy task, since the beyond budgeting model introduced in chapter 3.3 does not recommend 
linking rewarding or bonus systems with rolling forecasting and due to the finding of Hansen and 
Van der Stede (2004) that use of rolling forecasting decreases budgeting performance for 
performance evaluation. 
 
Myers (2001) arguments in his article ”Budgets on a Roll” that fundamental changes are not 
necessarily needed when implementing rolling forecasting. He reminds that there’s a certain 
momentum for other budgeting process improvements for the company once it launches rolling 
forecasting. According to him, it is a good time to question many existing procedures and in the 
same time equip rolling forecasting with a promise that the budgeting process will become lighter. 
However, there needs to be a good balance with number of changes and work burden; the changes 
should ease the workload in the long-term since rolling forecasting never should be the same as 
budgeting but with four rounds a year! Herein lies one of the major points to be understood 
concerning rolling forecasting implementation: most of all, it is a cultural change and a change in 
the way of thinking. Each organization is different so careful and sensitive analysis of the optimal 
change speed should be analyzed: sometimes incremental changes work the best, sometimes it 
benefits the company to completely overhaul the existing budgeting process with one explosion. 
 
Even though we’re dealing with culture and mindset of accounting and other professionals, of 
course the existing IT system infrastructure needs to be taken into account. However, Lynn and 
Madison (2004) state it is vital to understand that software in itself never replaces the analyzing 
need for data and need for professional leadership. Budgeting or rolling forecasting needs to be seen 
as a part of all-embracing and comprehensive management system, in which rolling forecasting 
related software works only as a supporting tool, according to the researchers. Helsinki School of 
Economics professor Ikäheimo stated in his lecture on 20.3.2006 that companies often regard IT 
investments and costs as unavoidable. As for rolling forecasting, already in the beginning phase it is 
worth assimilating that additional personnel and IT resources are needed and that there’s a risk of a 
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prisoner-warden relationship being present if the company orders such software that needs frequent 
updates and consultation services from the external partner. 
 
Clarke (2007) suggests several key principles that should be taken care of in order to improve the 
possibility for a successful transformation and implementation process of rolling forecasting. He 
issues the following list of dos and don’ts.   
 
- Keep it free from the influence of personal contracts and incentives. Of course, there may he 
sales targets or goals for cost reduction, but don't assume they will be achieved. However, if 
there are events planned which will help achieve those goals - the effect of those should be 
included. 
- Information from outside the organization is essential. Without it the forecast is simply a 
recast of what is already known and therefore provides little benefit for those involved. Also, 
it is difficult to forecast out to a meaningful horizon without using indicators of demand 
from outside the organization. 
- Forecasting is a core activity and should be resourced accordingly. 
- The forecast should have an owner - and those maintaining the forecast should also be its 
users. 
- Always test the forecast to see whether it is influencing behavior as intended and whether 
better decisions are being made. 
 
4.3 Continuous Usage 
 
Neilimo and Uusi-Rauva (2005) criticize rolling forecasting regarding its craving for resources and 
time. Continued question to that comment could be that of course properly designed management 
systems take time but the more accurate and fruitful comment would be whose time rolling 
forecasting should take? It is quite obvious that forecasting cannot be something that is dealt only 
with accounting personnel and management. At the most optimal situation those that are the best 
ones to forecast would also benefit from the effort put into forecasting by being more on the track of 
their business areas. Abramson (2002) states in his article “The Perfect Forecast In The Eyes of a 
Rep” that the best interest group for sales forecasting are the sales managers. He does not suggest 
putting forecasting work on the shoulders of actual salesmen or –women because that would 
endanger a critical process, the sales process, in the company. Rolling forecasting is embedded with 
this kind of threat where also other critical processes like production, logistics, customer service, 
purchasing, financial statements, strategy process and IT consider the requirements of rolling 
forecasting rather offending than helpful. As for the continuous usage of rolling forecasting, this is 
one of the biggest turning points for whether the company will be successful of unsuccessful. No 
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matter what is decided to do with rolling forecasting, it should help your life instead of being a 
repetitive burden. 
 
What comes to accounting people’s suitability to rolling forecasting, there’s a wide and common 
discussion in the professional field that in the future accounting professionals are not needed to the 
same extent as before in areas such as financial controlling, accounts payables or receivables, tax 
accounting or bookkeeping. This is due to more efficient shared service centers and more automatic 
accounting IT software. The area that needs more accounting professionals in the future, is business 
controlling. This is due to the value-adding human analysis which cannot be copied by computers 
and due to the vast amount of data available for analysis.  Myers (2001) brings up Cisco Systems’ 
vice president Jonathan Chadwick’s comment that eventually everything is based on the demand for 
the company’s products or services and that cannot be forecasted accurately with any kind of 
systems or methods. In that kind of setting accounting professionals that can stand uncertainty and 
see it actually as a possibility, will rise in demand.  
 
It is the combination of these two factors, determining those who should forecast and accounting 
people that shouldn’t be bean counters but dynamic business minded controllers, which will 
eventually lead to battles won and not lost in the journey of establishing rolling forecasting as a 
management tool. On the one hand, forecasting should be done in the right places and by dynamic 
people who learn their parts. Let’s say there’s only 10% reduction of input needed every time 
forecast rounds double, which leads to a situation in which only 65,6% of work is needed at the 16th 
round of forecasting. If four rounds are done every year, this efficiency rate is achieved only in four 
years. On the other hand, the saved 34,4% of working time can only be utilized if the employee is 
eager to deal with new challenges and to learn about new areas and issues. Traditional bean counter 
would end up tweaking the forecast to the last decimal, and the value-adding possibility is vanished 
in the same second. 
 
Additional spice to the forecasting discussion is given by Abramson (2002) who states that during 
his over 35 years career dealing with sales he has not seen any changes in the methods used for 
forecasting. According to him salespeople only know one form of forecasting, which is the sales 
force composite, where in a bottom-up fashion sales are aggregated from all sales nodes. In the 
following table below Abramson presents that there surely is no lack of methods that could be used.  
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1. Analogous forecasting
2. Assumption base model
3. Atar model
4. Box-Jenkins models
5. Customer/market research
6. Decision trees
7. Delphi method
8. Diffusion models
9. Experience curves
10. Expert systems
11. Exponential smoothing
12. Jury of executive opinion
13. Linear regression
14. Moving average
15. Neural networks
16. Nonlinear regression
17. Pre-cursor method
18. Scenarion analysis
19. Simulation
20. Trend line analysis
 
Table 5: Alternative techniques (Abramson, 2002) 
 
In addition to determining the most suitable forecasting techniques, continuous usage of rolling 
forecasting requires many assumptions, timetables, instructions, templates and report formats in 
order to enhance the performance of budgets for operational planning, an outcome Hansen and Van 
der Stede (2004) found out about rolling forecasting’s effects on companies. Another affair to be 
decided is the rolling time horizon, which according to Hansen and Van der Stede’s US located 
survey proved to be most often three months. 
 
What other things do we know about research concerning the effects rolling forecasts have had or 
should have on organizations that have implemented it? Hansen (2011) found out that rolling 
budgets should lead to an increase in the volatility of the firm’s output, an increase in the firm’s 
total expected output and to an increase in pay-for-performance sensitivity. Hansen’s paper also 
indicates that rolling forecasting generates a set of complex interactions which yarns for empirical 
work that could solve more issues between functions. Neely et al. (2001) promise that rolling 
budgets and forecasts will result in more accurate forecasts and Rappeport (2008) reminds that 
rolling forecasting is the remedy for CFOs who do not like surprises through faulty forecasts since 
they might end up being fired. Nevertheless, this leads to a problem that performance predicted by 
the original budget tends to evaporate in the updated forecast rounds, which endangers managers’ 
commitments to the originally launched expected performance levels, as Hansen et al. (2003) put it. 
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5. Summary of the theory part 
 
Due to the ever increasing speed and dynamism in the business world there is a clear need both in 
the academic field as well as among the practitioners to gather knowledge on how management 
controlling system innovations spread on micro-levels within organizations and among its members. 
This thesis concentrates on such an innovation by examining the diffusion of rolling forecasting in 
the Finnish Retail Ltd with the research question “how does rolling forecasting function in everyday 
operations, how does it bring the aimed results and how are the results viewed in different levels of 
an organization?”. Before moving on to the case study, wrapping up the theory parts of diffusion, 
budgetary control and rolling forecasting is more than welcome. 
 
As stated in chapter two, diffusion is the social process by which an innovation spreads through a 
social system over time. During that process one is dealing with elements such as decision making, 
risk taking and rate of diffusion, both on organizational as well as on individual level. As for the 
innovation itself, relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, trialability and observability 
determine how fast the innovation could diffuse. Those are the characteristics of the innovation. As 
for what could be done in order to affect the pace of adoption, different boosting strategies might be 
implemented. Changing the perceived attributes, utilizing champions, changing the norms through 
peer support, using entertainment and activating peer networks are examples that could have an 
effect on the adoption process.  
 
The emphasized point here is the bridge between organizations and individuals. In case something 
is decided only on the highest level of the organization, without understanding the above-mentioned 
attributes of the innovation and bypassing some change strategy, the innovation might end up being 
a fad instead of a true diffused innovation. Like stated in chapter two, it is most often the secondary 
phase of adoption, adoption by individuals, which causes the most problems for organizations. For 
the big picture to be full enough, it is also important to understand that one is dealing with 
knowledge management: i.e. different schools such as the information school and the behavioral 
school. That means there are also individuals in the top management that might perceive personnel 
and learning through different values and beliefs, in different cultural environments and adapt their 
initial angle of approach accordingly. 
 
Kimberly synthesized vast amount of diffusion studies until the 1980’s and noticed that there is a 
lack of managerial innovation studies due to difficulty in measuring their performance. He found 
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out that studying personal characteristics of administrators and other members provided consistent 
results whereas studying the attributes of organizational structures did not lead to other than 
ambiguous findings as for diffusion of innovations, that is, without the contingency theorists’ 
goggles. That is also what Abrahamson brought to the table in chapter 2.2 in his writings about 
major shortcomings of the basic theory of diffusion. He reminded about the downfall of the US 
economy in the 1970’s and 1980’s, a period in which business world unsuccessfully adapted 
sticking to old ways of doing or leaning to keep-it-simple ways of turning things around. 
Complexity is what needs to be answered and that cannot be done with simple formulas. 
 
Abrahamson tackles the basic theory of diffusion accordingly by underlining that organizations 
cannot always freely and independently choose to adopt innovations or that they surely sometimes 
are not relatively certain about their goals. Abrahamson goes deeper by widening our traditional 
efficient-choice perspective for the diffusion and rejection of innovations: in the forced-selection 
perspective nothing is imitated but the adoption of an innovation is coming from outside, in the 
fashion perspective the organization imitates innovations presented by outsiders who aggressively 
promote the innovation whereas in the fad perspective the organization imitates actively what others 
have done, through self-reasoning. The inextricable tangle is finished when considering that the 
perspectives can be parallel, contingent matters may always have their influences and that 
sometimes failings are needed in innovation project portfolios in order to learn and get something 
useful successfully through. This all underlines that the single-case company needs to be examined 
thoroughly in order to understand history, people, structure, culture and thus causalities concerning 
the innovation under interest.  
 
In order to grasp with this complexity, management accounting scholars have studied diffusion of 
management accounting innovations, majorly concerning the balanced scorecard and the activity 
based costing. Management accounting change model, in which change had motivators, catalysts 
and facilitators, by Innes and Mitchell (1990) was developed further by Cobb et al. (1995), who 
introduced the leaders, potential for change and barriers of change into the model. After the turn of 
the millennium, the model was refined by Kasurinen who categorized the barriers of change into 
confusers, frustrators and delayers. Kasurinen also discussed management accounting change 
through Burns and Scapens’ process institutionalization framework, in which the change process 
begins with the encoding sub-process and continues with the enactment, reproduction and 
institutionalization sub-processes. The organizational learning elements were highlighted within the 
encoding process that was split into further sub-parts of situational analysis, internationalization 
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process, change realization phase and organizational memory. Ultimately, Kasurinen emphasized 
that competitive and dynamic environment might lead to a situation in which learning process will 
have value in itself and that ongoing change will narrow the gap between management accounting 
and other organizational systems. Malmi emphasized that before problem solving careful analysis 
of what is really wanted from the management accounting system is needed. Laitinen, in turn, found 
out that top management support is the most important single matter that is needed in order to 
achieve successful adoptions of innovations, which are likely to become more frequent in times of 
increasing uncertainty, flexibility and all in all more dynamic operating environment.   
 
This thesis does not deny the need for new and more adaptable ways of encountering changes and 
system implementation situations. However it claims boldly, that valuing change in itself, in other 
words giving the idea of “rolling stone gathers no moss” a positive connotation, will create a totally 
new dangerous position in nowadays’ business world: the value destroyer. Kimberly already stated 
that innovation has had a positive meaning in scholars’ and practitioners’ mouths. This thesis argues 
the same has happened for management accounting change and we already have value destroyers 
amongst us; destroyers who drive change through with bad quality, no reasoning, insufficient 
resources, inadequate analysis and with no personal risk embedded in the change process. 
Provocatively said, the value destroyer is a person who prefers reading the latest daily operational 
reports from his or her tablet, phone or phablet while taking a sip of coffee and who is putting value 
on accomplishing minor things or any kind of changes at this very second instead of thinking bigger 
issues or possibilities. The value destroyer is finding it hard to do real brain work for example by 
listening to important messages from the field or by taking the necessary time to think about tactical 
or strategic relationship of the matter. 
 
The thematic of budgeting was discussed in chapter three. Budgeting was found to be a much more 
complex system than just financial figures put into income statement and balance sheet. It is a much 
more humane process than one might initially think; budgetary bias is always present because of 
very natural needs of individuals for safety, esteem, power et cetera. Budgeting can possess many 
types of roles: short-term weighted operational planning and performance evaluation and the long-
term oriented communication of goals and strategy formation. All of these roles have different 
antecedent factors as background factors such as organization structure and strategy as well as 
operating and external environments. Additionally, budgeting has also different characteristics such 
as use of rolling budgets, budget iterations, strategy linkage, participation level, target difficulty and 
budget emphasis. Ultimately, budgeting and planning is there to boost shareholder or stakeholder 
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value through improved management, well managed market perceptions and improved company 
performance. Nevertheless, there’s a mismatch with what budgeting tries to do and what it really 
achieves; it has been under vast criticism, long shortcomings lists are easily developed and some 
companies have even abandoned budgeting. In the big picture, majority of companies are not 
planning on abandoning budgeting and trying to improve the budgeting process instead. 
 
Different improvement steps for budgeting have been around for decades already: zero-based 
budgeting is thanked for its thoroughness but slammed for its burdensomeness, balanced scorecard 
is revolutionary as for its concept but it seems unfit from the managing point of view, activity-based 
budgeting catches the idea of matching resources with needed outputs but is dampened by lack of 
driver information and disagreements on causality-relationships in the value-chain. Lastly the 
newest development effort for budgeting is stemming from the beyond budgeting model, which is 
more of a leadership philosophy than an actual budgeting method, that is aiming for putting people 
as the most valuable asset to the forefront and enabling their value-creation activities through 
liberation from dictatorship, micromanagement, number worshipping, calendar periods, hierarchies, 
secrecy, sticks and carrots, and all the other management myths about what is the best for achieving 
great performance in teams and organizations.  
 
Rolling forecasting, the major topic of this thesis is not a new idea but practitioners have only 
recently, increasingly in the new millennium, started adopting it into their organizations. The key 
challenge and possibility of rolling forecasting is that it is much more concerned with future-
oriented and strategic mind-set and not with technically diverting the budgeting process into some 
new format.  
 
It seems that rolling forecasting can be implemented to low extent or great extent, depending on the 
goals attached to it. Rolling forecasting can help the company with investor communication, 
operational efficiency, getting rid of budgeting, strategy realization and staying on the right track. It 
requires good leadership, accounting professionals equipped with the right value-adding mentality 
and sufficient IT systems. At worst rolling forecasting does not really change anything for better 
and it is only yearly budgeting repeated four times a year with superficial information, no 
understanding of business causalities, bored accounting professionals and business people that are 
far from accounting function’s reach and who want to stay that way. 
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6. Methodology 
 
This research was a bold jump into the unknown, like Vaivio (2008) put it in describing qualitative 
research in management accounting. The researcher had not touched rolling forecasting in his 
university studies or work history more than on the surface and also the single-case organization, 
the Finnish Retail Ltd. had not done rolling forecasting before its implementation in 2005. The 
research always possessed a risk of finding nothing special even though single-case or field case 
studies of rolling forecasting had not been done to this extent earlier. That was a major pre-
advantage for the study alongside the journey of schooling for the researcher himself. 
 
In this section the intertwinement of the chosen methodology and research methods are discussed, 
which is followed by a concrete depiction of the data that was used in the research. Researcher’s 
relations to the case company are clarified, which is followed by analysis of the weaknesses and 
strengths that were present in the study. A critical perspective is adopted as for pointing out the 
vulnerabilities of the validity and reliability of the research, matters that have been traditionally 
overlooked (McKinnon, 1988). 
6.1 Methodology and Research Methods 
 
Peculiar to this study was the lengthy period and extensive inspection of field research done in the 
company, all the way from 2006 to 2014 consisting of the HQ’s and two divisions’ operations. That 
enabled the researcher to use multiple angles of approach; he examined the case company through 
semi-structured interviews, working in different positions and divisions inside the company, 
unofficial discussions, internal material such as guidelines, survey results, internal reports of rolling 
forecasting and naturally records on financial plans throughout the years.  
 
Birner et al. (1990) studied the case of multiple methods in empirical management accounting 
research and found out that none of field, laboratory and survey research methods dominated the 
others on all criteria and therefore multiple methods should be used to investigate management 
accounting phenomena. This study falls most definitely strongest to the category of field research as 
most of the research methods and devoted time was spent on the “case” or “field”. One might claim, 
however, that the concentration and devotion spent to writing this study resembled a laboratory-like 
environment and that survey results on rolling forecasting realized on yearly basis inside the 
company satisfy the survey method to some extent.  
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Due to the long research period and using of multiple research methods, there was a more than a 
good possibility of achieving a high level for the so-called richness of the study. Ahrens and Dent 
(1998) highlighted in their research paper “Accounting and Organizations: Realizing the Richness 
of Field Research” that the dominant emphasis amongst management accounting field research 
studies had been rather on technical properties of new systems of calculation and their relevance to 
actual or theoretical classes of management actions than on social and organizational perspectives. 
A growing number of studies have put more weight on the organizational aspects, maybe due to 
management accounting experiencing some kind of a renaissance as a profession or as a research 
field. This rise has led to the birth of many research papers that discuss the methodological 
questions, followed by discussion on what is exactly a rich study. According to Ahrens and Dent 
(1998) rich, at its simplest, means “life-like”. In another way to depict it, they state that rich has to 
do with making understandable the actions and motivations of often very skillful people who 
routinely mobilize accounting in their daily work lives. 
 
Anyhow one puts it, the following sentence of Ahrens and Dent (1998) captures that management 
accounting research has a truly interesting development path in research field in narrowing the gap 
between accounting theories and practices. 
 
“We are impressed with the tensions and ambiguities that often characterize accounting in action, 
with the sometimes contradictory ways it is drawn upon by actors in organizations and how it can 
constitute organizational life differently in different settings. We believe capturing these 
ambiguities, tensions and contradictions to be a major opportunity offered by field research 
methods.” 
Source: Ahrens and Dent, 1998 
 
Ultimately, this thesis encounters a single organization which is facing a change in its budgeting 
process. It will be seen in latter chapters, if the study really grasps this opportunity to get rich! 
 
The richness touches upon the idea of Hopwood (1983), who claims organizational researchers and 
theorists can see accounting as both a dependent and an independent phenomenon. In this thesis the 
interdependency of accounting department, more precisely through rolling forecasting, is kept 
tightly on mind, even though the starting and leading point of this thesis is to examine rolling 
forecasting firstly from within different levels of accounting department and secondly make 
statements on the reality that is existing in the interfaces of accounting and other organizational 
settings. Intriguing comment by Hopwood (1983), is the statement where he argues “all too 
apparently accounting is a phenomenon which is what it isn’t and can become what it wasn’t”. 
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Basis for the study is accepting the traditional idea of the contingency theory, according to which 
there is no universally appropriate accounting system which applies equally to all organizations in 
all circumstances (Otley, 1980). The basic variables in the contingency theory are presented below. 
 
The effect of technology 
The distinction between types of production has been shown to have remarkable effects on how 
internal accounting systems are designed. Whether one is dealing with unit, batch, mass or process 
production there are different levels and kinds of data and costs available, which is allocated, 
apportioned or pointed to specific accounting targets. Equally other technology effects can be found 
also in examining the complexity of the task faced by an organization or task variety and knowledge. 
 
The effect of organization structure 
Organization structure has been one founding factor in the contingency theory, with which there’s 
been found evidence of variations in how accounting systems have been designed. Organizational 
performance has been found to be affected differently whether Budget-Constraint or Profit-
Conscious use of accounting information was present (e.g. Hopwood, 1972 vs. Otley 1978).  When 
such studies have been compared, there have been found, not only different, but importantly 
different situational differences, such as responsibility centers being independent to totally different 
extents.  
 
The effect of environment 
The use of accounting information may vary depending on the environment the organization is 
operating in. Things such as external competition intensity, type of competition (price, marketing or 
product) or varying internal competition situations have affected things such as sophistication of 
accounting and control systems and styles of budgeting. 
 
All of these contingency variables surely have interdependencies across themselves; company 
affects its environment and the company itself is affected by organization structure and technology 
choices. Times change politically and economically, companies enter using innovations at different 
instances, they have different positions in the markets, life-cycles and natures of products they’re 
selling might be quite different, strategy they’ve adopted might be totally different from their 
competitors. As for this research, the key observation here is that capturing some of the situations, 
ambiguities, tensions and contradictions accounting practices are encountering in reality might be 
worth taking a look at, if it is done with high quality and if the situations outside and inside the firm 
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are understood. In addition, observations on how the organization and the researcher possibly 
changed their attitudes or opinions on rolling forecasting, exposes or rewards the study to mixed 
conclusions.  
 
Due to these starting points of richness, interdependency and contingency, it is a conscious choice 
in the empirical part of the study that the case company as well as the competition environment are 
introduced in a more precise manner than generally.  
 
Classifications for the study 
 
In management accounting Scapens (1990) classifies case studies into the following categories. 
Descriptive The research objective of this kind study is often to 
provide a description of an accounting practice. These 
case studies describe accounting systems, techniques and 
practices. 
Illustrative These case studies provide an illustration of what has 
been achieved in practice concerning new and possibly 
innovative practices developed by particular companies. 
Experimental Newly developed accounting procedures can be examined 
through such studies. Benefits of new systems can be 
derived and difficulties in implementation can be 
examined. 
Exploratory Reasons for accounting practices are explored. Objective 
is to develop ideas and hypotheses that can be tested in 
further studies, which try to produce generalizations. 
Explanatory Firstly a theory is chosen, through which accounting 
practices are explained reasonably. Secondly, if existing 
theories are inadequate, modifications to theories are 
accomplished after which explanatory level will rise. 
Source: interpreted from Scapens, 1990 
 
As Scapens (1990) underlines, the distinction between these categories is not so clear-cut and it is 
up to the intention of the researcher to determine the appropriate classification. Statements in the 
beginning of this chapter of the novelty of rolling forecasting for the case company, added with 
Vaivio’s (2008) remark of management accounting change being shown to be smaller and less 
significant than is presumed within the consultancy view, support the distinction of this single-case 
and field study as an illustrative case study. One could, however, see the study as a descriptive one, 
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especially in the later empirical stages of the study where rolling forecasting belongs to the routines 
of the company. There are also some characteristics of an explanatory case study since the theory 
part of the study concludes with a theory framework that stems from diffusion, management 
accounting change and budgeting literature and papers.  
 
The study relies on the hermeneutic research approach: it’s not trying to achieve generalizing results 
in such a complex world. Instead the goal of this method is bringing in the answers for the research 
problem: the aforementioned special features and “how” questions concerning rolling forecasting. 
 
Generalizing the results of the study 
 
As for generalization of the study, at this point, no other strong statements are made, other than this: 
“the cause of generalization is not the ultimate goal of this thesis”. As a repetition, the humble goal 
of this study, is to get answers for what was stated in chapter one as the research problem:” How 
does rolling forecasting function in everyday operations, how does it bring the aimed results and 
how are the results viewed in different levels of an organization?”. The suitability of this study to 
the above mentioned explanatory category might be found in reflecting the findings against the 
theoretical summary that was presented in the chapter five. Lukka and Kasanen (1995) alleviate the 
problem of generalizing by their findings, in which they showed that statistical accounting studies 
have more problems with generalizations than thought and case studies have more potential for 
generalizations than one might think. 
 
It is worth bearing in mind that even if the thesis succeeds well in its inductions through deep 
knowledge, high quality, hard work and countless of hours spent in the field and in front of the 
screen and keyboard, finding answers for or against theories, there is no replication taking place in 
the big picture, which is a prerequisite for a study to be of generalizable nature. Even after 
replications could be realized, statistical problems with sample and population, statistical 
significance, wrong interpretations of causalities and correlation factors would still be persisting. 
This thesis, therefore, is an ode for keeping ears open, listening, trying to understand and 
interpreting a management accounting tool called rolling forecasting, in different levels of an 
organization. Thus more weight is put on to understanding the possibilities, threats and choices to 
be made with rolling forecasting.  
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Validity and Reliability of the study 
 
Ryan et al. (1992) divide the validity of a study to internal and external validity. Internal validity 
means the harmony of the study for drawing conclusions: that the researcher really succeeds in 
studying the topic that was intended for being studied, that the data used is sufficient enough and 
that it neutrally answers the research questions, that the researcher is able to make correct 
deductions of causalities between the data and factors under interest and that the conclusions can be 
found logically along this continuum. External validity, on the other hand means the suitability of 
the study for generalizations. 
 
As theory basis for matters endangering validity of a research, Ghauri and Grønhaug (2005) list four 
types of threats to validity: history, test effect, maturation and selection bias. In the history threat 
something is occurring in the same time as the subject of the research, in the test effect the study 
itself affects the results, in the maturation threat the test units have changes during the research 
period and in the selection bias threat is that the study objects cannot be chosen randomly. 
 
As for internal validity, professionals and practitioners that participated in the study all knew very 
well the topic and what it meant so the issues under interest was not difficult to determine. In 
addition, the research question “How does rolling forecasting function in everyday operations, how 
does it bring the aimed results, and how are the results viewed in different levels of an 
organization?” was explicitly formulated in a way that misunderstandings would be minimized. For 
the internal validity, it can be stated that the access to company data was quite substantial: 
interviews could be freely organized, company inside material that was built along the years was 
within reach as well as financial figures for actuals and plans and unofficial opinions could be freely 
distributed, maybe not least because of the Finnish culture and attitude.  
 
On the insufficient side, the implementation phase was studied only in one of the two divisions of 
FiRe Ltd. Moreover, it is quite obvious that the CFOs of both divisions would not reveal specific 
facts about the bonus system in place or specific behind-the-door aligned strategy alignments and 
their linkages to rolling forecasting. Triangulation was used in order to improve the validity and 
reliability of the study; using of interviews, part of which were recorded and transcribed, surveys, 
unofficial discussions, company inside material and financial figures concerning rolling forecasting 
were used to approach the topic from different viewpoints. As for the reliability of the data, the tone 
used in interviews was often quite official and not so critical compared to unofficial discussions, 
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maybe due to the interviews being recorded, even though two hours were reserved for each 
interview to make sure no hasty answering would occur. One interviewee did not allow recording 
and wanted to alter the written report about the interview afterwards, which is a warning sign for 
those results. According to McKinnon (1988), researcher’s presence is one threating factor for a 
study’s reliability and validity along with insufficient data and limitations set by the human thinking. 
 
Vaivio (2007) denotes that the longer the time spent researching the studied context, the less there 
are risks for the reliability and validity of the study. That implicates that the researcher in this study 
has better grounds for neutral, valid and reliable study results than usually. Nevertheless, according 
to him each coin has two sides and there is a risk of “going native” if the distance to research 
subject is not sufficient. Also McKinnon (1988) underlines that a lengthy research period boosts 
validity and reliability of the study through not being forced to rush with the research results, being 
able to genuinely encounter what the field has to offer and facing counterarguments to researcher’s 
own initial subconscious expectations. 
 
It is worth mentioning that the researcher has a relationship with the case company as an employee 
on a group level. This inflicts a problem with the objectiveness of the thesis, which is alleviated 
through the following facts. The assignments during the employment time didn’t have anything to 
do with the cooperating employees that concern this study. In addition, in order to remain as 
objective as possible the researcher chose as passive a role as possible in terms of retrieving the 
company’s inside material and doing semi-structured theme interviews. Intervention was only used 
as a means in filling the gaps in understanding, i.e. disentangling what was actually meant. 
 
In this type of study, the external validity, which means the suitability of the study for 
generalizations, will remain a question mark since the sample size of organizations was one. That is 
of course a chosen path and weakness for the quality of the study, which hopefully will be 
overcome by the richness of the single-case study accomplished in FiRe Ltd. It could have been 
possible to interview other organizations, send surveys and examine organization inside material 
but it would not have been possible to work in those organizations and gather valuable unofficial 
opinions or develop own thinking of what is really affecting what within those other organizations. 
On the company level, with altogether 13 interviews, 11 of which were accounting professionals, it 
can be stated that the generalizability of the results are good as for accounting professionals’ 
insights but fairly weak with views of other than accounting personnel. This is a deliberate choice 
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since accounting personnel are traditionally equipped with good education and with good analytical 
skills whereas the expectancy rate for volatility of business people’s opinions is high.  
 
The time validity, which means the extent to which the particular research results at one point in 
time may be generalized to other periods of time has major cons and pros. The interviews were 
carried out in the implementation phase, in 2006, and at a particular point of the phase of 
continuous usage, in 2010. This built up the validity. On the other hand, what dampened the validity 
was that people’s perceptions of rolling forecasting seemed to change as time passed by. That is 
also what happened to the researcher himself and it can be honestly admitted that the 
implementation phase would have been studied in a different fashion with more rich semi-
structured questions. The implementation phase could have been studied afterwards but then there 
would have been a risk of guiding the results unconsciously. All in all, the researcher had all the 
time to develop the understanding of rolling forecasting during the research years from 2006 to 
2010, during which the researcher worked only occasionally with rolling forecasting related issues. 
 
6.2 Data 
 
In order to familiarize the concreteness of this study, the data and particular methods used in the 
research are targets, which are examined more closely in this subchapter. It will be pointed out that 
this study had an ambiguous level of diversity and perspectives, which contributed to and stepped 
up the quality and depth of the paper. The subheadings below do not represent any kind of order of 
importance or extent for the material and data used; instead, an alphabetical order is chosen. 
 
Financial data 
 
The financial data gathered for the study was harvested in the late phase of the research period in 
order to get an extensive amount of financial data to ensure an adequate sample size. In the end, the 
researcher managed to gather financial results from 2008 to 2014. All of the data collected for the 
eight stores, one HQ unit and FiRe Ltd. company figures were downloaded from a SAP-based 
accounting system, in which the company booked the financial data according to the Finnish 
accounting act.  
 
Four of the stores were grocery stores and four DIY stores. The main idea for the HQ unit was 
primarily that costs should be allocated to the stores according to allocation drivers such as sales 
  
 
 
 83 
proportions, number of personnel, gross margin proportions and sales area in square meters. Units 
that were operating in the HQ premises but that were directly in touch with the stores and business 
actions were allocated to the stores whereas some HQ costs were not allocated to divisions. 
Representative of such costs were general management and some of the supporting functions, e.g. 
Finance department’s costs. Hence the stores would show only the EBIT level that the store 
manager and employees could contribute to more or less directly. 
 
The concrete financial figures consisted of yearly data of different items down till operating profit: 
sales, gross margin, other operating income, personnel costs, rent expenses, IT costs, marketing 
expenses, maintenance costs, other operating costs, depreciations and impairments followed by the 
operating profit itself. For each year, actual outcomes and four financial plans were put to a 
spreadsheet for all ten entity levels, i.e. eight stores, one HQ unit and the FiRe Ltd. as one company. 
This meant the total amount of financial data had ten units times five scenarios times eleven income 
statement items times seven years which equals 3 850 separate figures (10*5*11*7 = 3 850). To put 
it differently, 770 actual outcomes for financial figures had 3080 matching planning figures. Each 
year had 110 actual outcomes that had 440 matching planning figures. These calculations are only 
derived from the fact that each separate actual figure had four matching planning scenario figures. 
 
It goes without saying that macroeconomic environments have changed during these years, which 
makes it difficult to come to all-embracing conclusions. However, there might be observations of 
some systematic under or over performances in some stores more than in others and concerning 
some income statement items more than others. Also, differences between divisions within these 
dimensions might be obvious, mild or indifferent. 
 
Internal material 
 
There were multiple sources of internal material available for use. They ranged from initial 
presentations of the ideology of rolling forecasting to system specific instructions and to practical 
instructions on how the company has aligned the work of planning financial figures. Naturally the 
background work of empirical part of the study consisted also of organization charts. The key final 
products of rolling forecasting, the action and financial plans for the stores and the whole company, 
were also accessible. 
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Entirely another type of internal material which could provide the research a different viewing angle 
was the report FiRe Ltd. had ordered from a consultancy firm in order to examine and develop 
rolling forecasting. This order was placed in 2010 when the firm had already many years of 
experience with practicing the concrete reality of rolling forecasting. 
 
It is fair and necessary to emphasize that the researcher has had a role within many types of internal 
material. First of all, he has belonged to the FiRe Ltd.’s organization. Secondly, he has had a part in 
some of the work instructions developed for some FiRe Ltd.’s units. Thirdly, he has been part of the 
process in crystallizing the FiRe Ltd.’s action and financial plans as presentations. Lastly, the 
consultancy company reviewed the researcher for its rolling forecasting report. These 
interdependencies are surely problematic from the study’s autonomy perspective. However, these 
kinds of circular references may not be highly problematic due to the fact that FiRe Ltd. was a fairly 
big company in Finland and therefore one subordinate level’s employee could not affect reports or 
other outcomes to great extents. Alternatively, this relationship has logically many upsides as well, 
the most obvious being naturally close to the field and having access to ambiguous research data.  
 
Interviews 
 
Interviews for the study were accomplished in two different phases. Both of the interview rounds 
followed a semi-structured theme interview method with open-ended questions delivered to 
interviewees in advance. In the first phase during the implementation of rolling forecasting in 2006, 
five accounting professionals ranging from assistant controller to chief financial officer were 
interviewed (see appendix 1). This round of interviews concerned only the grocery division in FiRe 
Ltd. whereas the second round of interviews (see appendix 2), eight pieces, consisted of personnel 
from grocery division, DIY division, HQ department and also the consultant that made a rolling 
forecasting status report for FiRe Ltd.’s HQ department. Apart from the consultant, all second 
round interviews were recorded and transcribed, totaling 595 minutes of voice recordings and 70 
pages of transcriptions.   
 
Some of the interviews suffered from interruptions that are common in nowadays’ business world. 
All of the interviews were budgeted for one hour calendar time, which did not hold very well since 
the shortest interview (38 min) lasted roughly only a third of the time taken by the lengthiest 
interview (128 min). Another thing that varied throughout the interviews was that people were quite 
differently interested in the topic; some spoke their mind and heart till the last drop and some 
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clearly needed guidance and answered only briefly to questions posed by the researcher. In addition, 
some of the interviewees were clearly sensitive about their comments when they realized the 
interview would be recorded and transcribed whereas some did not shy at all. One of the biggest 
findings about the researcher himself was the inability to recognize the freshness of rolling 
forecasting in the company during the first round of interviews in 2006. Of course there was the fact 
of only two accomplished rounds of rolling forecasting but still at that time it was very hard to put 
that into the big picture and framework within which the company was operating; what was the 
company culture, former practices and plans for the future. 
 
Customer satisfaction data from FiRe Ltd.’s HQ department 
 
The HQ department of FiRe Ltd. realized a yearly customer satisfaction survey and the researcher 
managed to get his hands on years from 2009 to 2013, except years 2010 and 2011, which were 
unfortunately missing. To be specific, it has to be emphasized that the customers in this survey were 
actually accounting professionals within the divisions. In addition to structured questions, in which 
answer choices were totally agreeing, partly agreeing, half agreeing or disagreeing, partly 
disagreeing and totally disagreeing the survey also had the possibility for the replier to leave open 
comments as feedback. Examples of such surveys, years 2012-2013, are presented in appendix three. 
 
The following table depicts the yearly sample size of answerers and number of questions and open 
comments concerning rolling forecasting. 
Year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
N 18 N/A N/A 23 27 
Questions 7 N/A N/A 1 1 
Open answers 6 N/A N/A 3 N/A 
Table 6: Customer satisfaction surveys by FiRe Ltd.’s HQ department 
 
Formulation of the survey changed from year 2009, which had an extensive amount of questions 
about rolling forecasting and many open comment responses to the fairly new budgeting process, to 
years 2012 and 2013, which had the same single question for rolling forecasting and remarkably 
lower amount of open comments. All in all, year 2009 could be analyzed as results after the 
implementation phase (chapter 7.4) of rolling forecasting and 2012 and 2013 as results for 
continuous usage phase (chapter 7.5). As such survey data would be of course totally insufficient 
but relevancy of such survey data is quite high from complementary point of view; accounting 
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personnel was assured total protection of anonymity which is always important in assuring 
employees having the opportunity to speak their minds entirely. 
 
Working experience 
 
From 2008 to 2010 the researcher worked as an accounting specialist in FiRe Ltd.’s grocery 
division. During 2008 the work consisted of several stand-in tasks suitable for gathering wide 
knowledge of the organization and grocery branch. In 2009, the researcher was appointed team 
leader in finance department’s business support function, which had multitude of rolling forecasting 
related assignments. 
 
From 2011 to the publication date of this thesis the researcher possessed two different positions in 
FiRe Ltd.’s DIY division; first being a controller more on the financial controlling side of the 
controller profession’s continuum for the first two years, after which the success in that position led 
to a promotion to business controller which comprised of job tasks much closer to business people 
who are thirsty for support and guidance. Again, both of these duties were executed in the finance 
department.  
 
After the seven years working experience in FiRe Ltd. it was inevitable that the researcher had 
established tight cooperation links with HQ department’s and both divisions’ accounting 
departments accounting personnel, which led to honest and straightforward unofficial discussions 
about rolling forecasting. Therein also lies the risk of this study; it is worth remembering that the 
researcher’s experiences are heavily accounting department weighted. With unofficial discussions 
there is also the danger of giving too much weight to charismatic opinion leaders. This might lead to 
biased conclusions which do not take into account real business units’ perceptions about rolling 
forecasting. In order to foster the validity of the paper and to assure as genuine opinions and real 
situations as possible, the researcher did not market the ongoing research to anyone during this 
work experience. Apart from the ones who were interviewed for the research, only few superiors 
and colleagues knew about the study until 2014 when the researcher revealed the intentions of 
publishing such a report with relation to the whole working history in FiRe Ltd. 
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7. Case Finnish Retail Ltd. (FiRe Ltd.) 
 
This chapter evaluates the case company, its environment and shift from traditional budgeting 
methods to a system that includes rolling forecasting. Theoretical parts’ findings are actively 
mirrored to the observations made during the working and research period in the company. 
Conclusions, are not jumped into since that task is left for chapter eight, discussion and conclusions. 
 
The case company, Finnish Retail Ltd. (FiRe Ltd.), operates in two big markets inside Finland, both 
in the Finnish grocery trade as well as in the Finnish DIY (Do-It-Yourself) businesses. That is why 
this chapter begins with clarifying these two markets’ peculiarities, introducing market sizes, trends 
and market shares before moving on to the more detailed depiction of FiRe Ltd. and its operations. 
That is followed by examining the near history of budgeting in FiRe Ltd., reasoning the need for 
change and goals that the company set for rolling forecasting. The chapter naturally has the biggest 
weight on the planning process itself by describing the implementation phase of rolling forecasting, 
its daily and present usage and what kind of future related issues remain open for discussion.  
7.1 The Finnish Grocery and DIY Retail Markets 
 
The Finnish grocery trade market 
 
The definition for groceries, päivittäistavara (Finnish), literally “daily goods”, refers not only to 
food but also to other consumer goods and groceries used daily, and bought by the consumers 
together with their food. Thus the term ‘groceries’ includes food, beverages, techno-chemical 
products, tobacco products, household paper and tissue products, newspapers and magazines and 
daily cosmetics. (The Finnish Grocery Trade Association, 2009) 
 
In order to understand in what kind of environment the case company operates, it’s useful to take a 
look at the categorization of the Finnish grocery retail market. Following the above-mentioned 
definition of groceries, the total value of grocery trade in Finland was €23,5 billion in 2008. This 
figure follows EU statistics, which include also sales by catering wholesaler customers like daily 
meal services of public institutions (€1,2 billion) as well as restaurant, café and staff cafeteria sales 
(€4,8 billion) in the private sector. Also Alko (Finnish state governed alcohol monopoly) sales (€1,4 
billion) belong to this number. All taken into account €16,1 billion is left for sales primarily through 
grocery sales by chains (€13,5 billion) and other grocery retail sales (€0,6 billion) kiosks, service 
stations, discount stores and outdoor sales (€2,0 billion). The following figure clarifies the situation. 
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Figure 19: Grocery trade market in 2008 according to EU statistics 
(The Finnish Grocery Trade Association, 2009) 
 
As for the trends and development paths of the Finnish grocery trade market there are several 
essential points that should not be bypassed. First of all there has been a long-standing discussion 
over some grocery market regulations. The Finnish Grocery Trade Association, in its publication 
for 2013, claims that Finland’s grocery trade regulation was the fourth strictest among all OECD 
countries, whereas just a few years ago, in 2008, Finland was halfway down the list. Concretely, 
this can be seen in grocery stores’ everyday life: they’re not permitted to sell any non-prescription 
medicines or alcohol beverages that have over 4,7% level of alcohol.  
 
Deregulation of the medicine issue is pressurized by the Finnish Competition and Consumer 
Authority, which published in 2012 a report, where non-prescription medicines are suggested to be 
freed for selling in grocery stores. It claimed that the medicine market in Finland is inefficient and 
that Finland was the only Nordic country where pharmacy stores kept such monopoly position. 
Association of Finnish Pharmacies and the legislators, so far, have been on the opposite side with 
their opinion, stating that such a monopoly ensures patients’ safety and protects the society.  
 
The alcohol issue, deregulation of the selling of mid- or high concentration levels of alcohol 
beverages or drinks (practically strong beers, wines and liquors), has not lured any real or 
authoritative pressure. Discussion has been circulating more around the alcohol tax rate, where 
Finland is, according to European Commission Excise Duty Tables for alcoholic beverages, one of 
the strictest countries in the EU (7/2014). This has led to issues in financing public services as also 
the Ministry of Finance admits in its press release 10.4.2014 that the tax-free importation of alcohol, 
growing 15,4% in 2013, amounting to 75,3 million liters, has stayed permanently at high levels.  
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As for other regulatory things, the research period of 2008-2014 also included the liberation of 
opening hours for grocery stores as of September 2009 and changes in the land use and building act, 
in force as of April 2011, when the lawmakers enacted major restrictions on large retail trade units, 
assuring services for city centers and stirring the ground plan market by discriminating against the 
so-called auto-shopping-parks around outlying districts. 
 
Looking at the trends of grocery trade in Finland there are many things worth mentioning. In 25 
years of time the number of market-size stores has gone down from approximately 10 000 stores to 
3 200 stores whereas in 20 years the selections have tripled. A more recent yearly statistics of all 
grocery stores show that urbanization and politics favoring the growth centers in the country have 
led to an even declining number of stores, which can be seen in the following table: 
 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
# 4325 4165 4163 4129 4192 4109 3942 3922 3904 3917 3923 3964 3981 4066 
Table 7, number of grocery stores in Finland, The Finnish Grocery Trade Association 
 
The structure of grocery trade in Finland has changed from 2000 to 2013 meaning bigger shopping 
centers as the number of stores has declined by 259 (-6%). During the same period sales has 
improved +69%. In 2013 stores considered from large-sized to hypermarkets accounted for two 
thirds (66%) of total sales whereas in the millennium year 2000 the same share was only a little bit 
over half (56%) of total sales. Another thing peculiar to the Finnish grocery trade market is the high 
level of concentration in the market, meaning two big players, namely S-Group and K-Group, 
dominated with accumulated share of 79,7% of the total market. Vice versa, competition level is 
quite low and this is majorly due to Finland being sparsely populated country in the North which 
leads to high transportation costs with low volumes. In terms of the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, 
the HHI index, the Finnish grocery retail trade market is considered “highly concentrated” if one 
approaches this issue through the United States Department of Justice and Federal Trade 
Commission’s interpretation of highly concentrated markets. Calculation formula and HHI 
categorizations in the US are described in the table eight below. 
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Organization S-
Group 
K-
Group 
Lidl Suomen 
Lähikauppa 
Stockmann Tokmanni M-
chain 
Minimani Others Total 
Market 
Share 
45,7% 34% 8,1% 7% 1,3% 1,3% 0,7% 0,6% 1,3% 100% 
HHI index 0,4572 
2088p 
0,342 
1156p 
0,0812 
66p 
0,072 
49p 
0,0132 
1,7p 
0,0132 
1,7p 
0,0072 
0,5p 
0,0062 
0,4p 
0,0132 
1,7p 
0,3365 
3365p 
 
Unconcentrated Markets Moderately Concentrated Markets Highly Concentrated Markets 
HHI < 1500p 1500pHHI 2500p HHI > 2500p 
Table 8: the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and the Finnish grocery market trade 2013 
 
Other tendencies characteristics of the Finnish grocery trade market are challenges with the 
weakening purchasing power of consumers. For sure the industry has reacted to this development 
by implementing an intensive strategy for private label product selection, share of which has risen 
from 18% in Q2 2011 to cover almost a quarter of total grocery sales (23% in Q1 2014) 
Traditionally the Trade industry has been the biggest employer in Finland and that has not changed 
with 300 000 employees in 2013, from which 65 000 worked for grocery trade, which has its 
traditional high season sales during Easter and Midsummer but especially during the weeks before 
Christmas while the rest part of the year provides quite constant and predictable supply-demand 
situations. As for future trends, it is evident that grocery web store operations will pick up pace as 
Finland is in this area quite an underdeveloped market. For example in France the grocery shopping 
is done to 4,5% extent online whereas in Finland it is under 2%. 
 
The Finnish DIY market 
 
FiRe Ltd. belongs to the RaSi ry. (Finnish Hardware Association, DIY), the parent organization 
which looks after the interest of its members. Practically this means that selling of construction 
materials is most often the main line of business for companies within this industry. Compared to 
the grocery trade market, DIY market is much more complicated from many perspectives.  
 
First of all, it is very difficult to draw a particular line in defining the markets: many players in 
Retail Trade operate partly inside some DIY product lines, for example florist stores compete 
against yard and garden departments, general stores sell HPAC, tools, decoration and furnishing 
related products. Also agricultural products are sold closely together with traditional DIY products, 
which make the market share calculations a loose field. 
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Secondly, customer segmentation is much more diverged. B2C customers, who have been suffering 
from a weakening purchase power, play certainly a big role also in DIY business but B2B 
customers provide often a need for structuring totally different service channels. Those B2B 
customers operate in the construction industry, which provide a remarkable driver for the DIY 
industry companies. Finnish Association of Civil Engineers estimates in its ROTI-report that 
infrastructures, structures and constructed land plots account for some 70% of national wealth, i.e. 
altogether 565 milliard euros. Related to this wealth, there has been a yearly rise of construction 
debt of three milliard euros in the Finnish economy during the 2000’s. This means that housing and 
other buildings have been repaired or reconstructed by 10 milliard euros while the estimated yearly 
erosion and usage of these structures amount to roughly 13 milliard euros (2,3% of total capital). In 
total, as of 2011, the construction debt is estimated to range between 30 to 50 milliard euros.  
 
All in all, even if the Finnish economy takes a drastic change for worse, leading to a smaller interest 
for B2C customers to establish new construction projects, big part of the demand will have this kind 
of support and defenses stemming from the construction debt, especially as housing and public 
buildings constructed in the 70s or 80s are famously known for their sluggish construction quality. 
Another important customer categorization to understand is the four-type model: professional 
constructors, small constructors, big repair project customers and small repair project customers.  
 
Other peculiarities for DIY business are surely to be found: distribution channels vary from agency 
business to warehouse distribution model, where the handling of slow-moving items remains a key 
factor in striving for competitiveness, along with commerce bonuses and well-function concepts for 
varied clientele. As for seasonality the DIY market is bipolarized, spring and summer being the 
high-season whereas Fall and Winter being the low-season. Number of stores has had another story 
than the grocery market in Finland: Finnish Hardware Association’s data shows that biggest players 
reached a peak in year 2009 when there were 607 DIY stores. More detailed data is presented below 
in table nine below. 
 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
# 590 588 582 587 N/A 602 597 595 607 598 590 571 561 
Table 9: number of DIY stores in Finland 
 
In terms of the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, the HHI index, the Finnish DIY market is considered 
“moderately concentrated” if one approaches this issue through the United States Department of 
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Justice and Federal Trade Commission’s interpretation of moderately concentrated markets. 
Calculation formula and HHI categorizations in the US are described in the table ten below. 
 
Organization K-
Group 
Starkki S-
Group 
Puukeskus Other Hartman Puumerkki RTV Bauhaus Värisilmä Total 
Market 
Share 
38,5% 14,2% 11,8% 6,9% 5,9% 5,4% 5,0% 4,3% 4,3% 3,7% 100% 
HHI index 0,385
2 
1482p 
0,1422 
202p 
0,1182 
139p 
0,0692 
48p 
0,0592 
35p 
0,0542 
29p 
0,052 
25p 
0,0432 
18p 
0,0432 
18p 
0,0372 
13p 
0,2009 
2009p 
 
Unconcentrated Markets Moderately Concentrated Markets Highly Concentrated Markets 
HHI < 1500p 1500pHHI 2500p HHI > 2500p 
Table 10: the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and the Finnish DIY Market 2013 
7.2 Case Company Description 
 
After the operational environment has been introduced, it is time for the case company, FiRe Ltd., 
to be given a brief and special attention. Things such as history and traditions, organization 
hierarchies, management models, market positions and strategy alignments are introduced. 
 
FiRe Ltd. is a traditional Finnish firm and has even a longer history than the Finnish Republic as an 
independent nation (1917). In fact, origins of FiRe Ltd. organizing retail operations stem back to the 
late 19th century, when Russian entrepreneurs ruled in the East and Swedish entrepreneurs in the 
West. Those were, however, few in number, and not able to serve the whole Finnish region. 
Especially in sparsely populated countryside regions people felt the need for change and thus 
several food associations grounded FiRe Ltd., whose aim was to centralize and empower 
purchasing of goods. In the beginning of 20th century the ownership spread strongly among 
population, main operations concentrated on being an efficient wholesale company, which had 
those kind of toppings that the company had own manufacturing of foods and other ware as well as 
energy business.  
 
After the Second World War the FiRe Ltd. took part in rebuilding the society, majorly through 
investing heavily on many, also distant, locations throughout Finland and supporting thus the rise of 
Finnish economy among many sectors.  From the 1960’s to 1980’s the company underwent many 
changes, reacting to strong urbanization of Finnish society, rebranding the company’s trademarks 
and widening operations to other, not so traditional, business areas. In the late 20th century the 
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company spent a lot of effort both in grocery and DIY businesses in creating efficient chain 
operations: new formats were launched and central warehouse operations initiated. At the turn of 
the millennium, FiRe Ltd. took also steps in international markets in more than one industry and is 
nowadays facing major challenges with foreign players attacking the Finnish market and the 
digitalization of the world, where groceries and DIY products continue to play big parts in people’s 
lives, whether through online shopping or footing stores. 
 
Through its long and prospering history, the FiRe Ltd. has reorganized its structures with several 
incorporations and many mergers in order to enter new market areas and exit old ones. Nowadays 
the FiRe Ltd.’s HQ operations are led by the CEO, who is directly managing several departments, 
namely Strategy and Research Unit, Finance and Accounting department, IT operations unit, HR 
and PR department, Internal Audit & Risk Management and Legal Unit. In addition, several 
divisions have division leaders, who have their own division organizations and who report directly 
to FiRe Ltd.’s CEO. Appendix four clarifies the general structure of FiRe Ltd. concerning different 
divisions and HQ support functions during the research period 2008-2014. 
 
From the figure above one might understand that the majority of personnel would be positioned in 
the FiRe Ltd.’s headquarters, which is located in Southern Finland, whereas the divisions would 
have quite flat organizations. The reality, however, proves to be pretty much vice versa. Only 
minority of the working staff are employed by these departments, the nature of which reveals to be 
much more guidance oriented than business solution oriented. The separate divisions have been 
traditionally given a lot of responsibility which means they have big organizations with many 
executive natured departments cooperating with their HQ counterparts. For example, the DIY 
division has its own accounting department and own CFO, who has gathered the most talented and 
solution-minded business controllers to execute financial business planning, reporting, support and 
control for business people and ad-hoc accounts for concerns of division the leader of DIY division. 
 
On the other hand, the firm saw that there simply was no use in keeping processes such as 
bookkeeping, accounts receivable or payable, financial controlling or other technical matters such 
as finance IT systems inside the division level and therefore those were located in the headquarters, 
from which they could cooperate and coordinate all divisions’ technical or system-oriented 
processes more than well enough, and in fact, more efficiently. Likewise, HR and PR operations 
functioned similarly, all technically weighted things, such as calculation of payrolls, were 
centralized but recruiting best professionals for certain business areas, on the other hand, remained 
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naturally in the hands of the division. In FiRe Ltd. there was no strict orientation towards a matrix 
organization or towards a division organization. It was the issue or matter, rather its technicality, 
which decided how the work was organized. Appendix four depicts this reality more from the eyes 
of the division (FiRe Ltd.’s relations both to DIY division and to grocery division). 
 
At first glance the figure might seem a little bit complicated but after a examining it a little while it 
all makes sense and crystallizes into one sentence:”All work that should and could be centralized 
will and shall be centralized”. The opposite version of this sentence is:” All work that creates added 
value for a particular division should be positioned inside the division”. FiRe Ltd. encountered the 
organizing of work through these glasses, ideologies and questions. In chapter 2.1, Theory of 
Diffusion (Adoption), the research brought the information and behavioral schools into the picture. 
For those, who rely more on the information school, this model seems very rational on paper but in 
reality it is the humans that do all the work eventually.  
 
Many change-minded young professionals, even though on paper it all made sense, often stated that 
FiRe Ltd. really had too few processes in place and that more experienced professional were 
accustomed to keeping tacit knowledge in order to promote their own indispensability, which led to 
too much work done from the ad-hoc point-of-view and to losing of the entrepreneur-mindset 
amongst personnel. To the researcher’s eyes this made all sense since during the interviews and 
research’s observation period inside all environments, to be precise in FiRe Ltd., DIY division and 
grocery division, there seemed to be quite a negative working atmosphere. This could be seen on 
many levels in everyday life; colleagues not greeting each other in the mornings, information not 
being shared, not contacting other professionals because they’re we’re not so nice persons, speaking 
of the bigger evil in top management, stabbing of superiors behind their backs and incapability of 
concentrating on important job tasks and doing only what was being told to do and forgetting the 
prioritizing of tasks that is needed to maximize payback for the company for devoted working time. 
 
One revealing and brief story about the atmosphere, this time in grocery division, was the 
following: a young controller inside the accounting department filled in some real estate figures into 
a template and sent a respective spreadsheet to an experienced person who was asking for it and 
who had been working for the company for 15 years. A short moment later, the young controller 
went to see the experienced person and asked: “Actually, why did you ask for that template?” As a 
short reply, the experienced controller answered:” You’re a strange and different accounting 
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professional since you ask for what the information was asked for. No one ever does that here. I’m 
just sending this to the headquarters of FiRe Ltd. and I don’t know their usage of it.”  
 
The reader might think at this point that such cases naturally happen every now and then in hurry 
situations, when private life is kicking hard, when youngsters get played around by veterans or 
simply because information keepers do not want to open causalities for their business know-how. 
Interestingly, case study evidence within FiRe Ltd. suggests otherwise: the company was really 
suffering from lack of horizontal level cooperation simply because the divisions’ independency 
rates and departments’ independency rates had grown, for historical reasons. It is no wonder every 
management model is, at least to some extent, somehow like a two-edged sword: FiRe Ltd. could 
implement and put new business ideas into effect very smoothly, as long as the division leader was 
backing up the idea, actively supporting it and following up the results. Same level directors inside 
the firm could not cooperate effectively and many brilliant ideas were put off. Subordinates 
commonly knew in the company that they had to add their superior or even superior’s superior in 
the carbon copy field in electronic mails if they were to collaborate with other departments by any 
means. Unofficially and verbally agreed subjects did not hold very often, which is why people were 
reluctant to communicate in an open and trustworthy manner. 
 
Citing the description above, it is fair to say that the company tried to promote matrix operations on 
paper, but it was unsuccessful in the practice in doing so, and the company remained in line-
management position. The FiRe Ltd.’s management realized that this is some kind of a problem in 
the 21st century as the world is becoming more liberal by many means, through free trade zones, 
improved human rights, fair trade issues, freedom of speech, spreading of internet et. Cetera. 
Therefore, the company initiated an efficiency program in 2011, which consisted of negotiations 
with the personnel according to the Finnish co-operation act, seeking for efficiencies within the 
operations and business cases and also changing the way the company was managed. As the Finnish 
economy was struggling, there was no other choice than to combine all these goals. Roughly 
speaking no managing can be changed if there are no real effects on personnel structures or real 
changes in how business cases are encountered. After some people were laid off and business 
initiatives were published, the company took very practical actions presented in the following list. 
 
- The CEO was changed and behavior of the new CEO was remarkably different than the 
former CEO’s, who was not really present at the company most of the time. The new CEO 
held positive speeches and actually took himself/herself to the streets and had lunch breaks 
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with ordinary employees along with the CEO constantly showing up at the workplace as 
early as 7 AM in the morning.  
- Also other changes in management were made, the biggest effect being negatively oriented 
directors being replaced by positive and track-record proven champions from either within 
or from outside of FiRe Ltd. The former CFO commented during his/her time that the 
company was so agile that no tight processes were needed at all, which is quite a 
representative comment for the change that happened. The new CFO launched systematic 
templates, timetables and processes and taught personnel about the reasons to love them. 
- Organization hierarchy was flattened in all places where possible, aiming at destroying too 
long vertical lines hindering information sharing. Also, at some roles, there were changes 
where a former subordinate would become a new boss for a former middle-management 
person. 
- Learning environment was established, where the personnel director pushed many business 
areas and departments to present their core ideas and operations as learning materials. 
Earlier there was only technical readiness to do this but no material what so ever was 
uploaded. 
- Workspace environments were launched to boost information sharing, not only for projects 
but also for common processes. The usage of personal folders was discouraged as well as 
the usage of department related network folders. 
- Store operations unit was forced to share real estate and store site knowledge through 
spreadsheets and a system specifically designed for such use. 
- Project organization was founded in order to prevent hidden projects from arising. 
- For superiors it became a necessity to make sure every subordinate had a written job 
description, which also had to be signed by superior’s superior. 
- Headquarters’ units were ordered to keep a big seminar at least once a year with their 
divisions’ counterparts, including unofficial dinners and get-togethers. 
- Trainings subject to a charge had to be attended by at least two persons in order to avoid 
information piling on one individual’s shoulders. Only in special cases one could attend 
training but in such cases training material was obligatory to be distributed among all 
personnel inside the department or unit. 
- Company’s risk management assured two things: firstly an up-to-date list of people who 
could have company-sensitive information in their possession was formulated and kept up to 
date and secondly list of investment approvers was formulated so that no breaches of rules 
could happen after such a list had been openly published. 
- Permanent travel permits were cut down heavily and one-time travel permit had to be 
accompanied by clear goals and topics. 
- Big project was initiated in order to write down the policies of FiRe Ltd. A policy means a 
framework that has to be followed in organizing the work done in departments, aligned to be 
suitable with the company’s strategy and feasible for developing detailed work instructions.  
- The company even established a bookkeeping account for wellbeing at work in order to 
follow how much was invested directly to personnel’s wellbeing. 
 
It is obvious that FiRe Ltd. has taken a lot of steps in liberating the way work is done, shifting 
towards a much more matrix oriented setting and thus trying to react to new challenges. Naturally 
the risks of such a move are evident for nowadays’ leaders in Finland as they know the rude fate of 
Nokia. In his book “Mahdoton Menestys”, Jorma Ollila, the former chairman of Nokia board, 
clearly states that he brought the strong matrix organization into the company and that was one of 
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the key success factors in the rise of Nokia in the 90’s. However, after time lapsed, the company 
had become helplessly bureaucratic and overly systematic in its moves, surely not least because of 
the monster matrix that was living a life of its own. Even though the management group of Nokia 
knew that it is essential to look into the future carefully, which is undeniably one of the key goals of 
rolling forecasting, Nokia collapsed with a pace not even the tech-analysts could not forecast. As 
for this thesis it is very important to sense the company’s information sharing culture since one 
might ask the following question: what is budgeting other than information sharing? Yes, it is 
consolidating financial numbers, crunching spreadsheets and making pretty presentations but more 
than anything, it is sharing knowledge of what the company has done and especially what it will 
definitely do in the future and what it is trying to do in order to take a step towards realizing the 
company’s strategy and reaching out for the vision it has set as an ultimate goal. 
 
7.3 Old Budgeting System and Need for Change and Goals for the New System 
 
In this chapter the old way of budgeting is given a short moment in the spotlight and emphasis is 
rather given to the need for change that preceded the implementation of rolling forecasting. The 
initial goals for the new system are also commented. 
 
The old budgeting system 
 
The grocery division’s director of finance mentioned during the research interview, that as he began 
working for FiRe Ltd. in the 1990’s the company had been using very traditional yearly budgeting 
as the basic cornerstone for financial planning and target setting. The business controller 
interviewed from the FiRe Ltd.’s HQ also stated that during his very long history at the company 
budgeting had been done on a yearly basis and it was very formal with loads of budgeting 
instructions. According to him, there was also a very tight link between bonus systems and the 
yearly budget. In the next sentence, he eagerly continued that that kind of rewarding system is 
nowadays behind the times and he would like to see much more timely bonuses and adjustable 
situations. Earlier, there were loads of cost units, which is quite analogical to the discussion about 
the company’s hierarchy. Remarkable amount of time was used for internal charges between 
support cost centers and business profit centers. The old budgeting system, according to these 
professionals in FiRe Ltd., was a process of pedantic, precise and burdensome nature, where people 
would plan themselves to exhaustion in the end months of the calendar year, then continue with 
lack of energy to take care of the company’s financial statements for the calendar year. Controller 
  
 
 
 98 
of the grocery division underlined that very tight and extensive instructions were given by HQ and 
those had to be followed precisely. The CFO of grocery division said “we used a very traditional 
yearly budget and the big problem in that era was that everything was done way too heavily”.  
 
Internal material dating to years before rolling forecasting revealed that characteristic of the old way 
of budgeting was the going through of the finalized budgeting during one day lasting budgeting 
days. In those days directors presented the plans and budgets of their responsibility areas. This tried 
to ensure the cooperation between the unit responsible for the grocery chain and the units 
responsible for commerce, marketing, store network, finance, IT, logistics and so on.   
 
System architecture designed for the old way of dealing with budgeting supported the meticulous 
working ways. Plans could be done for each cost center and account with the accuracy rate of 
decimal of the currency, namely the Finnish mark and later the euro. Before FiRe Ltd. implemented 
a major FiCo and ERP system project at the turn of the millennium, there had been several systems 
from plain spreadsheets to various stiff planning systems that did not import any figures from 
spreadsheets and everything had to be done manually. In those days personnel were not so 
accustomed to IT systems which led to the rise of a particular profession group in between the IT 
department and the traditional accounting department. A third interviewed person, grocery 
division’s business controller, implied that there was a desire to do rolling forecasting already in the 
90’s but due inadequate IT systems and stable economy that was more stable that did not realize. 
 
Updating the yearly budget and the emerging need for rolling forecasting 
 
Actually the company did forecasting naturally along the year by updating their insights for the rest 
of the year. That was, however, a very scarce and ad-hoc based process, i.e. with no process at all. 
The grocery division’s business controller underlined that nowadays the management demands and 
urges accounting department to develop processes, in which future periods are examined closely 
and in a reliable manner. According to him, business people have great ideas that are lacking basic 
cost-benefit analysis, which will be forced by giving accounting department the power and right to 
ask for them. At the end of the interview this professional whispered quietly followingly.  
 
“It is not important how we do it but this is what rolling forecasting is all about. It’s 
about challenging our business people to think through a cost-benefit framework so 
that they themselves see which ideas are worth pushing and which are practically 
rubbish”. Grocery division’s business controller 
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His hint was obvious, the real role of rolling forecasting is, or at least should be, assuring 
operational efficiency through validating business cases into figures. 
 
That operational efficiency could be improved through good communication between departments 
and that was what was indeed happening with the old way of doing things: budgeting summaries 
included sensitivity analysis of effects of several business occurrences, i.e. store opening delays’ 
and not accomplishable projects’ effects on financial outcomes were analyzed. Naturally 
investments, income statement and balance sheet were taken under the magnifying glass alongside 
with marketing budget, logistics budget and central costs’ budget but the key notation is that special 
attention was also given to product lines’ sales, gross profit, operational costs and operating profit 
in different retail chains. Example of this view is given in the following table 11. 
 
Budget
Budgeted 
EBIT
th € PL1 PL2 PL3 PL4 PL5 PL6 Total Total
Chain 1 1 3 4 2 1 1 12 12 Chain 1
Chain 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 9 9 Chain 2
Chain 3 2 2 2 1 2 2 11 11 Chain 3
Chain 4 3 1 1 3 1 4 13 13 Chain 4
Total 3 1 1 3 1 4 45 45 Total
1 Other Business 1
2 Other Business 2
1 Other Business 3
49 Grand Total
Stores EBIT
 
Table 11: Product lines’ and Chains’ operating profit Matrix of grocery division  
(In addition to sales, gross profit and cost matrices) 
 
The product lines’ and chains’ operating profit matrix of grocery division was practically trying to 
be activity based budgeting that was introduced in chapter 3.3. It tried to boost the cooperation 
between chain managers and product line managers in the matrix.  In accounting view, sales and 
gross margin was fairly easily distributed to chains and product lines along with some cost centers’ 
direct costs, pointing out the so-called “contribution ebit”. However, it fell short in driver 
information that was not being discussed to its very roots; way too often sales was the distribution 
driver to many types of fixed costs. For example, even though the grocery division had product line 
square meter data store by store, the rent costs and maintenance costs were still distributed by total 
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sales distribution. Also, when new departments were established, the grocery division chose to 
distribute its fixed costs by sales distribution instead of really discussing what the new department 
was all about, what resources it was really using and what were the outputs of such a unit. The end-
result was indeed, like stated as one of the danger zones of ABB in chapter 3.3, something the 
business nor accounting people really did not assimilate. For business people it was just a game of 
numbers and for overly careful accounting people it was just something that had to be done. Rolling 
forecasting was the master plan to change this culture and reorganize the matrix cooperation. 
 
FiRe Ltd.’s business controller, an experienced old fox, commented in his interview another very 
interesting point for the need for change and goal of the new budgeting process. He said that 
accounting department is responsible for forecasting and accounting people are careful in their 
nature which leads to accumulated carefulness in the planning process. Herein lays the need for 
change according to him: the company needed more business people to bring in their effort and 
accounting professionals that can really cooperate with them without diverting the forecasts too 
much, accounting people that are business minded and not bookkeeping minded. His bottom line 
was working closely with other humans instead of just putting figures together that match and that 
seem nice on reports. There lies the added value of rolling forecasting: more timely and constant 
cooperation that brings the realistic view to the management’s desk, which has the opportunity to 
really steer the ship by bullet-proofing launched strategies instead of arguing with two totally 
different views about the future with the personnel. The CFO of grocery division agreed with these 
views and stated followingly.  
 
“We hoped for combining of budgeting to real work shift planning, target setting and 
managing of the company with real issues. However, we soon saw the opportunity to 
put all things in one basket as an integrated network of this company’s real life 
situations and plans.”CFO of grocery division 
 
As one interprets those interviewees’ comments stated above, it is possible to see some answers for 
the question stated in chapter 4.1, which was the following: “Is rolling forecasting more of a 
technical or a humane change in the company’s budgeting process?”. Firstly, rolling forecasting, is 
definitely a humane change in the company’s environment and secondly it can only happen if 
supporting systems are at an adequate level, above the hygiene factor where too much time is not 
needed for using of cumbersome spreadsheets or accounting systems. 
 
The grocery division’s director of finance, similarly with DIY division’s and FiRe Ltd.’s colleagues, 
was surely aware of the IT systems’ deficiencies and saw that the targeted broad-minded and 
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straight-forward forecasting process was striving for filling the prerequisites from system point of 
view. Little by little, however, the budgeting related IT systems matured and the world kept 
changing more rapidly, which lead to the need for making right decisions more swiftly. Thus FiRe 
Ltd. decided to implement rolling forecasting in 2005 with high hopes. The FiRe Ltd. HQ’s CFO 
published the following list of targets and what will change compared to yearly budgeting. 
 
Targets set out for rolling forecasting 
- improving strategy based operations management 
o Vision  Strategy  Actions  Follow-up 
- improving results’ follow-up 
o target to improve all of the time 
o financial and non-financial (predicting) indicators 
- logical period for managing the company’s operations 
o units occupied with more flexible and predictable resource decisions 
- improving the financial forecasts’ reliability 
o rolling forecasts  best estimate of future’s financial development 
- a faster forecasting process than yearly budgeting 
o a weight on changes that bring added value for the company. 
 
As for managing the shift, the CFO of FiRe Ltd. HQ, analyzed and had discussions with personnel 
about what kind of changes the new model would bring. He made clear that yearly budgeting and 
unofficial ad-hoc based forecasts done throughout the year will be abolished and replaced by rolling 
forecasting, which would be done in a more efficient and faster manner. This would be realized 
through rationalizations, where irrelevant and static accounts would be forecasted with minimized 
time and changes that really deliver economic value would be given more weight. According to him, 
cost control would remain important but perspective is changed from budgeting’s allowances to 
cost-efficiency minded planning of business actions. All of these could be realized through common 
tools for forecasting, which would be stocked with reliefs for the user. 
7.4 Implementation of Rolling Forecasting 
 
Rolling forecasting was launched in FiRe Ltd. in 2005 with high hopes of management getting 
more timely information for decision making and with a lot of doubts on the personnel side that 
now the workload especially for accounting people will explode, expectedly quadruple. This 
chapter clarifies the story of the implementation phase of rolling forecasting in the company, the 
shed tears, moments of joy and especially, how management, middle-management and personnel 
perceived this change. For the sake of clarity and as elaboration, it is fair to state already at this 
point, that the implementation phase understands the time period from 2005 when the new process 
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was launched to 2007 when the firm stopped developing already the second technical solution 
tailored for rolling forecasting (called the BPS). 
Launch of rolling forecasting with statements and timetables 
As the starting point, the company wanted to make a brief statement of what rolling forecasting was 
all about. 
“FiRe Ltd. uses rolling forecasting as a tool for operative and financial controlling. Rolling plans 
are updated quarterly. In addition forecast is updated monthly to match the latest information about 
future economic development. Planning is based on strategy. FiRe Ltd.’s strategy is updated 
yearly.” 
 
It launched timetables, presentations and figures of the kind seen in figure 20. In practice, this 
meant forecasting fifteen months ahead. For instance, with RP1 2006 the period of October 2005 to 
December 2006 would have to be put into the rolling forecasting system. Then after three months 
had passed, the forecasting period would move three months onwards, i.e. with RP2 2006 the 
forecasting period would be January 2006 to March 2007. As the new approach was published, it 
was already fall 2006 and forecasting process of RP1 2006 began straight away. There was a major 
uprising in the opinions of accounting personnel, who would eventually spend most of the time 
gathering the figures and assuring the budget found its way to all systems, reports and presentations. 
 
Figure 20: General timetable for freshly implemented rolling forecasting in FiRe Ltd.  
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Grounds for implementation 
According to the theory part of this thesis, the implementation of rolling forecasting requires, above 
all, support from the director level of the organization, which succeeds best if the directors are well 
aware of the targets, goals and concrete benefits of rolling forecasting. Business controller of FiRe 
Ltd.’s grocery division, where the researcher studied the implementation phase of rolling 
forecasting, stated in 2006 that there really was great support from the top management level. He 
admitted, however, that middle-management was struggling with the change tremendously as they 
saw the benefits of the new idea and approach but they realized the stated goals and targets 
remained on a too high level for the accounting personnel, who weren’t convinced about what’s in 
it for them other than a stressful change. This resulted in middle-management realizing they would 
have to play the biggest role in this change as change champions with people, who were pretty 
much categorized as X type in the McGregor’s generation theory. Interestingly, it was not an age 
issue; there were also young professionals who questioned the meaning of rolling forecasting and 
made ultimatums of leaving the company and older professionals who actually pursued it actively. 
According to the business controller, accounting people, generally, were not quite change minded 
people and typical of the Finnish nature, not so positive minded either. It came down to the 
following comment of the business controller:  
”In general we understand what we are striving for but our personnel want to see 
real currency, euros, invoices and reports of past happenings and they simply cannot 
grasp to something that is not existing. They live their lives one day at a time, with 
limited commitment to work regarding sacrificing extra hours when needed. 
Practically we’re stuck with them and we cannot find ways in motivating them. 
Eventually we understand that these kinds of big changes will take years of time and 
we have to stay determined and patient in order to push this whole thing for better. It 
is not a project and will never be finished, sometimes it is hard to work with those 
kinds of characteristics when planning the financial future linked with planned 
actions.” Grocery division’s business controller 
In the early point of the implementation phase, management almost totally bypassed the reality that 
rolling forecasting did indeed cause extra work load among those who were responsible for 
gathering the figures and putting them into the system and analyzing them, mostly controllers and 
assistant controllers. However, after a while, the atmosphere in the company was tense but open 
enough for this reality to spring to the awareness of top management, who made the following 
counteraction: a project for working hours monitoring was launched in order to see what tasks took 
the majority of time. This confirmed that rolling forecasting was not understood correctly since 
analyzing those hours led to a conclusion that it really was budgeting almost four times a year. 
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Consequently all teams were obliged to list all reports they were producing and to whom they were 
sending those reports in order to see if all were necessary and if some of reporting could be 
abolished. That is to say, rolling forecasting can have an indirect effect on the finance function as a 
whole since it forces to prioritize the most important factors of business to the forefront and shakes 
up those chronic structures faced with traditional reporting and also with budgeting. 
 Hoped-for-results and rewarding system’s relationship to rolling forecasting 
The grocery division’s CFO, when asked about the concrete benefits of rolling forecasting, stated 
that the company would have a clearer picture about the future, a more reactive organization and 
that it could delete many occasions of repeating same business facts on ad-hoc basis. His view was 
also that it eases the work of refreshing the business status of the company for the CEO. One 
obvious, work atmospheric point lies in here: it was the director level and middle-management that 
were really interested in the theoretic idea of rolling forecasting and how it could help concretely in 
planning everyday’s business actions. These people were quite eager to discuss about the business 
in general as well and enjoyed the sketching of different what-would-happen-if scenarios.  
This might be one of the reasons that FiRe Ltd. did not link the rewarding system to rolling 
forecasting; rolling forecasting would have to be a part of systematic way of work and taking care 
of the company’s business actions. Therefore, according to the grocery division CFO, there would 
be no room for rewarding “games”. The reality was not, however, so black and white; rolling plan 
number 2, that was prepared in the place of the old yearly budget, was the starting point for target 
setting for employee reward systems. The CFO of grocery division commented as follows.    
“We think multidimensional rewarding system functions very well. That means 
having personal targets, non-financial KPIs, financial targets adjusted from last 
year’s actuals and freshly baked RP2 figures. RP2 cannot be taken as-it-is since we 
realize it might lead to sub optimization schemes by personnel or team leaders who 
are not playing the game according to the company’s values”. CFO of grocery 
division 
Once the target was set, there would have to be a very good reason for resetting it during the 
ongoing year. In another interview, the controller of grocery division stated that linking rolling 
forecasting to rewarding systems would be quite difficult in reality and would cause a lot of extra 
work, at least in the implementation phase when there were enough worries turning the routines 
around. All this pointed out that the big journey with rolling forecasting was in its early phase and 
that FiRe Ltd. did not want to change other controlling systems with the same sudden stroke. In the 
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interviews it became clear, that according to middle-management and subordinates, the small steps 
and active discussion is needed in order to achieve big goals. 
 Full-scale implementation preferred over piloting and the decisive factor of culture 
As for implementation phase’s decision, whether FiRe Ltd. should pilot rolling forecasting first at 
one division, the CFO of grocery division and business controller of FiRe Ltd.’s HQ commented 
that there were too many similarities between yearly budgeting and rolling forecasting for piloting 
to be a feasible solution. Divisions would have cooperative meetings anyway so there would have 
been misunderstandings of what is happening in one division and not at another division. That is 
why FiRe Ltd. launched rolling forecasting entirely for all financial figures at the same time.  
The bottom line is that the change is more linked to the way of thinking than to technical systems. 
The CFO and business controller specified their opinion that way of thinking should always be open 
for changes whereas future changes in rolling forecasting’s technical systems could be piloted first 
at some department or division before spreading to all places in FiRe Ltd. According to the CFO of 
grocery division, the timing of the implementation is vital; there should be as few distraction factors 
as possible from within the company and distraction factors from outside world that lure the 
company to take a better grasp on what’s occurring in the operational environment. This meant that 
the company was not having other major projects in their management controlling systems or other 
topics that would need full devotion of time from accounting professionals. In the retail industry, 
there is a saying that the industry will encounter more changes during the next 10 years than it has 
experienced during the last 100 years. It goes without saying that with this kind of atmosphere the 
ground for rolling forecasting was rock solid. 
 Instability of the IT environment concerning rolling forecasting 
Controller at the grocery division brought one interesting point to the discussion with emphasizing 
the company’s system architecture’s feasibility rate for rolling forecasting. Practically he meant that 
the FiRe Ltd. was using multiple systems, from which it was not so convenient to gather data for 
rolling forecasting, i.e. FiCo, payroll, store network information, marketing, agreement data, 
research, finance systems, let alone the business units’ action plans in PowerPoint and Excel 
formats. Concretely these systems had severe problems in not having joints to other systems or in 
importing data to spreadsheet form, where monthly data could be seen without manually processing 
the background data for the ultimate financial plan. 
  
 
 
 106 
The IT department worried mostly that the company’s ERP was integrated to other crucial systems 
to an extent where the core operations could be secured. It was, in reality, not in the IT department’s 
interest to take an active role in developing rolling forecasting’s system architecture. That had to do 
with the roles of accounting departments inside Fire Ltd; they were surely appreciated but not really 
walking hand-by-hand with the business units, which meant accounting department lacked support 
for IT system development projects, simply because, as units, the history had shown that accounting 
departments were just responsible for meeting legislative requirements as for financial statements 
and simple reporting followed by irregular and hazy ad-hoc culture.  
The grocery division controller underlined that, at least for now, the time was not mature enough to 
the actual forecasting system to be anywhere close integrated with other IT systems. The top 
management as well as the CFOs of HQ and the divisions, were determined, however, in unleashing 
the accounting department from this slavish role to a change agency role. Therefore, in the 
implementation phase of rolling forecasting, the power relationships inside the organization should 
be understood to maximized extent in order to realize with what muscles one is working the weighs. 
At the latter stage of the implementation phase, in 2006, FiRe Ltd. made a decision to shift from 
SAP based planning system to a system called BPS. SAP was seen as very stiff since there one had 
to forecast every single cost center and account by manually typing in the figures. This did not serve 
the meaning of concentrating on big issues since many entireties could only be built by these much 
smaller parts. In BPS, forecasting cost center groups and account groups was possible. In addition, 
BPS had more usable reports than SAP so there were ingredients that could serve the original 
purpose of rolling forecasting better.  
The reality with BPS, as the grocery division business controller stated, proved to be not so rosy: “It 
is not one round or two when we have had to boot and restart the whole system. It has been unstable 
and on the other hand the scarcity of accounts is not serving our business needs when for example 
we have 20 marketing accounts in actual reporting whereas BPS has only three.” So practically 
FiRe Ltd. went from one system to another, and both systems were not delivering what top 
management desired, as the business controller continued:” Our top management assumes that we 
do have an official and saved store-specific forecast. In reality we do not have, we have had a big 
master excel from which sum levels have been put into SAP or BPS, or we have had BPS where we 
have put in the figures with our tiny little fingers.”  
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Another controller who was part of the project team for BPS, commented that the system provider 
had horribly under resourced the support for the system, that was having only two and ultimately 
only one consultant available for developing and supporting the system. Stigmatizing many of the 
interviews in this thesis, many controllers really believed that excel could be abandoned at some 
point but the actual forecasting work, pre-forecasting as one controller put it, was done very often in 
excel. The grotesque reality was that FiRe Ltd. finally had to make the decision to abandon BPS, 
firstly by stopping its development in 2007, and later after two to three years in 2010 by shifting to 
Hyperion based system, the core of which was, no surprisingly doing almost all of the work in excel 
and uploading those forecasted figures into the system as saved official versions of forecasting 
rounds. For the researcher of this thesis, it was interesting to find out that daydreaming CFOs and 
some controllers might have such megalomaniac ideas of abandoning excel work or forecasting. 
After the first round of interviews, designed for the implementation phase of rolling forecasting, 
FiRe Ltd. was just having first demos of the new Hyperion based system, which has since stabilized 
its position in the company as the forecasting tool to be used now and in the future. 
Frustration in the subordinate level 
Assistant controller at the grocery division explained the fears the subordinates were having at the 
time of implementation of rolling forecasting in late 2005. At the time of his comments the 
company had finished two rounds of rolling forecasting and was having the third round ongoing. He 
argued that even though they trusted in top management’s competence, the new way of budgeting, 
i.e. rolling forecasting, would not be the right process for FiRe Ltd. at this point of time. The 
assistant controller elaborated the statement: ”This whole thing will make us blind”. He continued 
his lengthy outburst in the following way, which shows the passionate feelings of the subordinates. 
”Earlier we were concentrating on real things, calculating real business cases, 
answering reasonable questions from management or business people, we had the 
power to produce real top quality and gave our everything to a very thought-through 
yearly budget. That yearly plan had very good follow-ups and we could really 
discuss with business people why we’re succeeding or underachieving. We’re not 
dumb neither fools, we surely understand the idea behind rolling forecasting; it 
would be nice to be more reactive or even proactive. There’s no argument over that. 
The simple truth now is, that we’re doing bad quality plans, we do not have real or 
systematical follow-ups anymore, just monthly actuals versus some rolling plan 
figures, we’ve switched to survival mode where the only thing that’s important, is 
that we crush the figures into the sluggish planning system in time. Earlier we were 
thoughtful human beings whereas now they’re turning us into machines. I know a lot 
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of people are fed up with this and that many are thinking of leaving the company. 
Now they come to us and tell us we have to be more agile, as if they did not know 
what we were doing earlier in our vacancies. Therein lays the path to failures we are 
now having. Rolling forecasting is actually worsening the information flow inside the 
company. We have reacted in different ways: some of us bend to the limit and do 
yearly budgeting four times a year, some of us take the RP2 seriously and relax with 
the other rounds, some of us, like I said, are planning to leave, and some of us have 
been reluctant to express their feelings about this thing.” Assistant controller of 
grocery division 
The key point of the assistant controller was that the pyramid of directors and top management was 
too hyperactive in developing the business. This is a resemblance to those value destroyers 
mentioned in the summary of theory part in chapter five. He concluded as stated below. 
”Anyone of us can throw ideas around and pretend to be dynamic whereas very few 
of us can realize well-made plans. With rolling forecasting, we’re giving a signal of 
strategies and directions of the company changing with a blink of an eye, thus 
leading to a model where plans will be prepared too hastily. I’m afraid the company 
will end up being an inextricable tangle where top management has outsourced the 
managing of the company to a process called rolling planning. Nowadays some firms 
are even abolishing budgeting entirely. I cannot believe we’re giving it more 
emphasis than before since we’re not even doing this thing any lighter than before.” 
Assistant controller of grocery division 
Not all of the subordinates were so infuriated or skeptical about rolling forecasting as the assistant 
controller above: grocery division controller stated that it is only natural people are having change 
resistance since traditional yearly budgeting has been around for ages and it has been integrated to 
many processes in the company. He presented that rolling forecasting has ignited many good 
discussions on what is actually vital for the company. According to him, no matter what new 
process is established, there’s always a momentum in such situations to knock over those fences 
some employees were holding by keeping key information to themselves. This comment is an 
evidence that rolling forecasting implementation might lead to power shifts within the company. 
            Early on measures taken to boost the implementation of rolling forecasting 
In the late 2006, at the later phase of the implementation, FiRe Ltd. ignited a self-made 
development project for rolling forecasting in order to align the process with those targets 
mentioned in chapter 7.4. In the following figure the red parts point out which points of strategy 
process, rolling planning and monthly reporting were tweaked in order to improve those 
relationships. 
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Figure 21: Tweaked points of FiRe Ltd.’s strategy, rolling planning and result reporting 
For the project, the company published four key points presented in table 12.  
1. Financial planning and reporting processes need to be combined clearly 
2. Result planning supports result making 
3. Operation planning and financial planning need to be flexible 
4. Forecasting data need to be reliable 
Table 12: FiRe Ltd.’s four point list of targets for developing rolling forecasting 
 
For financial planning and reporting the company clarified that the strategy should offer the 
baseline for yearly targets, which function as stepping stones for rolling forecasting. This clarified 
the difference between targets and rolling forecasts. Targets were yearly figures whereas forecasts 
were seen as plans of actions and financial plans updated each quarter. Targets were mostly fixed 
and could only be bend in company merger or acquisition situations whereas rolling plans had a 
basis from the targets but they could and should be bent according to all information available. 
Another difference was that targets were really target-oriented whereas rolling forecasts should be 
embedded with strong realism. Also the top-bottom and bottom-top perspectives differed between 
targets and rolling forecasts; targets were set by the management whereas rolling forecasts and 
related action plans were crafted by the organization and accepted or declined by the management. 
As for targets, it was publicly announced that they would be set on challenging levels so that 
operations would be developed and efficiency improved. Timetables were adjusted in order to 
ensure flexibility in planning and reliability of those forecasts were emphasized so that internal 
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managing could be as efficient as possible external reporting would provide interest groups as 
accurate information as possible. Reporting of the deviations from forecasts was brought to the 
forefront, the idea being that if one reports those one would plan better in order to avoid shameful 
deviations from plans. The following figure explains further how this follow-up was organized. 
Sales development Q106 Q206 Q306 Q406 Deviation between +/- 1%
Actual 1,6 % -0,5 % -4,5 % 2,0 % Deviation between +/- 3%
RP4 2016 - deviation 2,1 % 3,2 % Deviation over 3%
RP3 2016 - deviation 4,2 % 1,6 % 0,5 %
RP2 2016 - deviation -5,8 % -1,9 % -7,6 % -1,8 %
RP1 2016 - deviation -6,4 % -2,9 % -8,5 % -3,1 %
Figure 22: Reporting of deviation of rolling plans  
Other changes carried out were that strategy related yearly targets were really uploaded into the 
system in order to save those targets into some more official place than spreadsheets and 
presentations, timetables for rolling forecasting were tightened in order to force more analysis time 
and also that monthly result packages abolished deviations from rolling forecasts entirely and 
concentrated only on differences between calendar years; the forecast was visible only in one 
column which was the updated forecast for the whole year. 
All in all, FiRe Ltd. recognized that many things were not providing those results that were desired 
and reacted in ways described in this subsection so that processes would have better 
interrelationships. As for rolling forecasting, at this point, it was clear that it was categorized as a 
tool for tactics, i.e. the catalyst between short term business activities and long-term strategy. What 
can be said, is that at least rolling forecasting did not mess up the company’s core processes in the 
retail business since FiRe Ltd. showed constant improvement in the operating profit during the 
research period of 2008-2014 and also during the implementation years of 2005-2007. 
            Concluding the key points of the implementation phase of rolling forecasting 
As a repetition, the implementation phase of the company’s rolling forecasting process was colored 
by the following findings. 
- Earlier FiRe Ltd. relied on traditional yearly budgeting and reacted to changing environment 
based on case by case and ad-hoc methods. 
- Business minded accounting professionals were seen as vital members for the success of the 
company; rolling forecasting tried to turn the way of thinking, i.e. culture, around. 
- Budget was a word that did not die and harmed the understanding of rolling forecasting. 
- Rolling plan number 2 was the basis for rewarding systems but not taken as such in order to 
avoid budgeting games. 
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- At first, the top management did not supervise how much time was used for forecasting and 
at first the middle management failed in delivering that message to directors. 
- New account hierarchies were established and each division could bend them according to 
most suitable use, which lead to account ledgers that did not match with reports and thus 
harmed the understanding of income statement. 
- The company understood that they needed to recruit, more than ever and not least because of 
the very unstable IT environment concerning rolling forecasting, accounting professionals 
that were keen on IT systems as well as excels, interested in developing new ways of 
working and attracted to the idea of concentrating on big issues and their financial solutions 
rather than matching irrelevant things to the last decimal. 
- Rolling forecasting succeeded in shaking present ways of encountering business cases, 
according to some, and failed by creating a shallow process which in itself dampened the 
feeling of entrepreneurship in the company, according to some others. 
- Development project tried to clarify the processes, definitions and uses of different tools. 
- Most importantly, during the implementation 2005-2007 rolling forecasting did not lead to 
noteworthy downfalls of FiRe Ltd.’s profitability. The financial crisis hit the business 
environment starting in fall 2007 and had more impact on the following years. 
7.5 Daily Operations of Rolling Forecasting 
 
Around 2009, once the implementation phase had stabilized to a somewhat stable state of running 
the forecast process throughout the year, FiRe Ltd.’s top management decided it was the right time 
for some outside partner to take a look at forecasting practices and see what a consulting firm would 
conclude about the process in general. It concentrated on business units’ and subordinates’ activities 
during the process to become more familiar to the CEO and other members of top management. 
 
 Consulting company report on running the rolling forecasting process in FiRe Ltd. 
 
The report found out that there are upsides and downsides of the diversity of rolling forecasting: on 
the one hand forecasting could be used in a versatile way and some people felt it released some 
employees from older submissive structures but on the other hand subordinate level did not have 
understanding of what rolling forecasting was all about. There was lack of commitment to the new 
way of managing the company as job descriptions had not been updated to match the targets of 
rolling forecasting. That was an interesting finding because it is a clear sign that change 
management had bypassed one of the key elements: things had not been agreed between different 
levels of the organization, instead there was more of a tell-to-do culture surrounding rolling 
forecasting. How can one achieve the more agile and dynamic company culture? 
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The consultant report underlined that top management support for rolling forecasting was of utmost 
importance as for what kind of position it gains within the company. Finance function on its own 
cannot be the process owner, instead it should be the business entities that should be process owners 
and finance should be there to help get things done. Of course timetables, reporting and analysis are 
on the shoulders of finance department but the business process in itself should be on the highest 
podium position. Still in 2009, the report concluded that communication on what rolling forecasting 
was all about, was far from finished: it had so many interfaces with many other processes that 
managing the whole forecasting process seemed to be a challenging task.  
 
The consulting firm suggested establishing workshops around different parts of rolling forecasting 
in order to boost cross-unit communication. Another finding of the report was that too few 
documents were to be found concerning the basic forecasting assumptions present at each rolling 
forecasting round. For example, there were no consistent lists of store network, no assumptions for 
gross domestic product growth or for different cost indices. There were big changes between 
sequential rounds but unfortunately the reasons for those changes were too hidden. Ultimately, the 
consulting company presented a five point list of improvable issues in FiRe Ltd.’s rolling 
forecasting process. This can be seen in the following table. 
 
1. More discussion and communication for rolling forecasting’s meaning in the company 
2. Flow-through of one round, especially for RP1, RP3 and RP4 needs to be shortened 
3. Determining the concrete differences between rounds need to be clarified 
4. Job descriptions and related responsibilities in forecasting process need to be sorted out 
5. Key assumptions used for forecasting need to be more open and visible for all processes 
Table 13: Five point list of improvable issues for FiRe Ltd.’s rolling forecasting process provided 
by the consulting company hired for examining rolling forecasting 
 
Practical organizing of the forecasting work 
 
The practical work could be categorized in three parts: preliminary work, actual forecasting work 
and finally reporting work. In this subpart those are elaborated further. 
 
Preliminary work 
 
One of the starting points for each rolling forecast round was, of course, the timetable for the whole 
process including main points’ deadlines. Firstly FiRe Ltd. reviewed ongoing projects, their 
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assumptions and effects for forecasted figures. These included the store network plan and other 
major projects. After those cornerstones were analyzed, the management group gathered and 
reviewed what kind of preliminary targets could be set in order to steer the process proficiently. 
Preliminary work included also dates for launching many kinds of templates; e.g. for investments, 
many types of reporting formats, operating expenses and gross margin forecasting.  
 
The timetable did not set any dates for the actual forecasting phase but set of course the dates for 
finalizing the figures in the system and providing respective report templates and presentations. All 
in all, the whole process, according to the timetable, would last almost two months, which is quite 
remarkable amount of time considering that some of the key assumptions made early in the process 
could change and have major effects on the final financial outcomes of the company. Basic 
mathematics also sums up that four rounds of rolling forecasting would mean having 8 months of 
forecasting throughout the year. Adding approximately two months personal vacation and national 
holidays it would mean having only two months of the year without rolling forecasting process 
ongoing. The following figure depicts how the timetable was presented. 
 
Figure 23: Example of a rolling forecasting timetable 
 
Surely, as the process owner of rolling forecasting, concerning the actual forecasting work, the 
accounting function of FiRe Ltd. tried to create responsibility areas for accounting personnel. One 
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of the key problems in forecasting was the ever changing organization. One controller put it in the 
following way.  
 
“We’re having nowadays organizational changes in less than two years cycle and 
people that have continued working in the company are accustomed to it. The only 
ghoulishness in this setting is that sometimes people are not learning their new 
positions and are sticking to the old tasks they used to have. This problem might have 
several background reasons in my opinion; an employee that is allergic to changes, 
scarce resources for training, unwillingness of management to change things due to 
changes that happened against their will or because they knew themselves they 
would not be there for a long time anymore, differences in people’s skills and 
sometimes also real business changes that caused new units and cost centers to be 
established.” Controller of DIY division 
 
Earlier FiRe Ltd. did not have that kind of an assisting position in the accounting department that 
would take care of the intactness of the entity hierarchy, account hierarchies, cost center 
establishment and system feasibilities. In 2012 this kind of position was established to be alongside 
in the accounting department with business control, financial control and other teams. According to 
many opinions, this proved to be a successful tactical move because now business controllers and 
financial controllers could work with their full expertise in those tasks for which they often had a 
higher academic degree. In figure 24 the basic idea of a responsibility table is represented. 
Comment Unit
Business 
responsible
Accounting 
responsible Template ready?
Template sent 
8.12.2010?
Discussed with 
business 
responsible? 
8-15.2010?
Template 
returned
at latest 
11.12.2010
Figures uploaded 
14.12.2010
Comment here Accounting Name 1 Name 1 YES YES YES NO NO
Comment here HR and Legal Name 1 Name 1 YES YES YES NO NO
Comment here Abolished Unit Name 2 Name 2 Unit not in use Unit not in use Unit not in use Unit not in use Unit not in use
Comment here Management Name 1 Name 1 YES YES YES NO NO
Comment here Commerce 1 Name 2 Name 2 YES YES YES YES YES
Comment here Commerce 2 Name 2 Name 2 YES YES YES YES YES
Comment here Commerce 3 Name 2 Name 2 YES YES YES YES YES
Comment here Chain 1 Name 3 Name 3 YES YES YES NO NO
Comment here Chain 2 Name 4 Name 4 YES YES NO NO NO
Comment here Chain 3 Name 5 Name 5 YES YES YES NO NO
Comment here Marketing Name 6 Name 6 YES YES NO NO NO
Comment here IT Name 7 Name 7 YES YES NO NO NO  
Figure 24: Example of a responsibility table 
 
In this figure one can see that many columns were embedded in this kind of spreadsheet. There was 
comment field which no one ever used in any of the examined rounds, then units and respective 
business responsible and accounting responsible persons. A deleted unit was overwritten so that 
everyone could see it had to be nullified from the systems. Then there were binary columns stating 
yes or no for different phases of the process of updating each unit’s figures; template ready, 
template sent, discussion with business responsible, template return date and uploading of figures.  
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These kind of follow-up files were quite usual in the company for other processes as well and as it 
can be seen in figure 24’s example, very often the template was not filled according to process 
owning business controller’s wishes, leaving many cells empty or prefilled no as end-state after 
each rolling forecast round. In this example names 4, 6 and 7 totally bypassed filling yesses to 
desired places. This is not an argument that these kind of tables were not useful, this is just an 
argument that the process owner lacked the expertise, desire and or time to supervise the sufficient 
flow of the process. In addition, if one misses supervising processes once, the subordinates become 
accustomed to this kind of slack in the processes. As for the preliminary work, it can be said that the 
prepared templates changed each and every forecasting round the researcher encountered, which 
distorted the analyzing work of the template receivers. Preparing phase included also publishing 
foreign exchange rates to be used for purchases made by the commerce department.  
 
Actual forecasting 
 
Even though timetables could describe the rolling forecasting as a process with a starting point and 
ending point with several milestones, the beginning point for realizing the actual forecasting work, 
is understanding what kind of different roles and groups were playing their part in building an intact 
forecast. It was not just a task of one CFO and some controller who would crunch the numbers. An 
intact forecast was built through tight cooperation between business people, business controllers, 
financial controllers, CFOs, the CEO and the board. One could not state it would have clearly been 
a top-bottom or bottom-top process. Instead, it was more of a complex network with some natural 
chaos concerning all interest groups. There were group and individual information flows, interests, 
power relationships, different experience and skill backgrounds, opinions and lastly a whole lot of 
reporting perspectives that enjoyed varying levels of attention each round. Figure 25, which totally 
on purpose seems to be like an inextricable tangle, depicts this reality. 
 
Merely within the accounting function in itself, the following things varied between teams and 
individuals: some were system-wise advanced and saw the possibilities in systems’ development, 
some very social and business intuitive, some talented in financial accounting and thus in finalizing 
rolling forecasting’s final balance sheet items, some good in coordinating the whole process, some 
skilled in handling loads of spreadsheet data and some interested more in some business 
perspectives presented in figure 25 than others. 
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Figure 25: Complexity of rolling forecasting process related perspectives and information flows 
 
The board of FiRe Ltd. set strategic alignments for the top management, who guided the business 
directors and accounting function CFO in coordinating the forecasting process. This led to business 
controllers harvesting for quantified business knowledge and rolling forecasting coordinating 
controller to cooperate in putting in the financial figures into the system, which was finalized by 
financial controllers who had the best knowledge in finalizing the companies entire income 
statement and balance sheet. The bottom line with figure 25 and this paragraph is that taking into 
account all of the business perspectives, the limited time and team specific and individuals’ specific 
characteristics it is clear that compromises have to be made and the real challenge lies in finding the 
good balance between information that is ultimately wanted and information that is possible to be 
delivered, i.e. maximizing the benefits of rolling forecasting with the correct, reasonable and cost-
efficient amount of resources. 
 
Once majority of the forecasting templates had been launched, there were usually two weeks’ time 
until figures had to be ready in the forecasting system and several reports returned to each division’s 
CFO who would examine the end results of regional results and also prepare the consolidated 
package with his or her accounting professionals in order to deliver the message both to 
management groups inside the division and to management group of the HQ. One of the major 
  
 
 
 117 
complaints about this timetable was not that two weeks would not be enough. Instead, it was more 
the timing of this two weeks’ time. Many of those subordinates, i.e. controllers and assistant 
controllers, were tightly occupied by the month end process for the last month before the rolling 
forecasting period and approximately one week time out of those two weeks reserved for 
forecasting was totally parallel with month end process. 
 
Based on many rounds’ experience and unofficial discussions, it can be said that different levels of 
the company were using their time quite differently concerning the actual forecasting work. For the 
accounting subordinates that were playing the executor role and who were responsible for preparing 
the templates, putting in the figures and making sure details were according to what business people 
had told or given as assumptions, the working time grew intensely during those two weeks. One of 
the subordinates stated his opinion about that time: “in itself, I do like reporting and taking care of 
analyzing each month’s results because they are so called real euros, and in itself, I do like 
forecasting because during that process I get to learn more about the company’s future and I can 
help the business people’s view on the near future by quantifying their ideas. However, these two 
combined to happen in the same time leads to insufficient quality in both processes, in my opinion.” 
Major finding here, though, was that many of the tasks subordinates claimed to be within this two 
weeks, were, however, tasks that they could accomplish fully or partly already earlier before the 
forecasting round officially had begun. 
 
Team leaders and business controllers had an active role in the forecasting process. Their time-span 
began earlier than that of the subordinates’ with preparing meetings beforehand and lessons-learned 
type of meetings after each round. One can say, for them the forecasting process lasted 
approximately for two months, out of which 2 weeks could be categorized as full working days. 
Their role also included readiness for giving answers to top management during off-work time. 
Another major finding was that team leaders and business controllers could have pushed and 
motivated subordinates to preparing work much more eagerly and also let top management know of 
the realistic burden, of which the process was made of instead of giving almost unlimited promises 
to top management. Motivation building had become almost extinct since no positive feedback was 
almost ever given when forecasting deviations were small, instead nagging ruled the playground 
about the budget differences versus actuals instead of building a learning and self-correcting culture. 
According to many subordinates and also team leaders, this was because of the fear spreading from 
the highest levels of the organization. Even though FiRe Ltd. had ignited change actions mentioned 
in chapter 7.2, the culture was changing slowly and still suffering from the past. 
  
 
 
 118 
 
As for the top management, which was responsible for adapting the company’s operations 
according to aligned strategy directions, the rolling forecasting process can be understood as an 
always ongoing process with a lot of off-work time. That means the time-span for each forecasting 
round lasted whole three months, during which actively spent forecasting related working days 
could be somewhere near five working days, consisting of guiding meetings with team leaders and 
target setting meetings with members of different management teams. Major findings concerning 
the work of top management summed up to three things: firstly there were too many last moment 
changes concerning some rolling forecasting assumptions which led to earlier work done by 
subordinates being either rubbish or misleading. Secondly trying to guide the rolling forecasting 
process to be lighter than before, management would have to start by determining what end 
questions they wanted answers for. Now the atmosphere was that management encouraged 
forecasting to be eased until the moment came when they wanted answers for specific things such 
as store by store data, like for like calculations and precisely answered what-if scenarios. Thirdly, 
management made alignments and also management level eliminations to the actual forecasting 
system, which were not documented either at all or too vaguely so that when the time for the next 
forecasting round came, nobody remembered what special moves were made last time. 
 
After the figures had been finalized to the system within two weeks’ time, there were several 
reporting requirements for different levels and perspectives. Some of those reports had to be 
returned at the same time as the finalization of the figures and division level end final report 
packages had to be returned to the HQ in the middle of the first forecasting month. That practically 
meant that all units had the chance and responsibility to update their rolling forecast if the view had 
changed drastically way or the other. This, in practice, caused a lot of hassle both for business 
people and accounting people. Some accounting people asked: “Why are we refreshing our whole 
plan once we get the actuals in for the last month before the forecasting period? Of course our view 
has changed since we even know how the first forecasting month has started compared to our earlier 
thoughts. Business people will get exhausted if we now start asking the same questions.”  
 
The researcher’s grasp on things underlined this fact: business people were quite allergic on getting 
near future questions almost every month. They emphasized that working time is a scarce resource 
and that during that time they will do everything to realize deals and to make real business changes 
which would eventually lead to beating the view they themselves were building during the rolling 
forecast process. Top management and CFO levels encouraged that “refreshing our view, if we 
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know essential changes to the plan we have just finished, is vital since we do need to have an up-to-
date view on our future in order to steer the company in desired directions”. Anyway it might be, 
for the researcher it became clear that considering adapting the right mindset for rolling forecasting 
related work there were definitely some imbalances with the following issues. 
 
- What is the correct release point for forecasting background data? E.g. store network plan, 
exchange rates, projects and how remarkable changes can be left for last minute changes? 
- How remarkable changes would have to be corrected in the forecast? 
- What changes will end up in all reports made concerning rolling forecast round and what 
changes are adequate only in the system? 
- What is the optimal timing for making changes? 
- Could the correction be made in an inconsistent way preferring quick-and-dirty method? 
- What were the cornerstones of consistency of the figures in the system, i.e. which rules 
could not be bent even in hasty quick-and-dirty situations? 
- In what situations do the business people need to be bothered, i.e. how much of the view 
could the controller correct on his or her own? 
- With so many deadlines in the timetable,what deadlines are considered hard and which soft? 
- In what situations would it be even preferable to pressurize business people to respond? 
- What would be the optimal way to handle those business people, and sometimes colleague 
controllers, that do not obey the forecasting deadlines, assumptions, principles or rules? 
- In what business operations should rolling forecasting play an active role and in what 
operations would it not play an active role in the day-to-day perspective? 
 
For these questions there are of course no perfect answers but more communication between 
different levels of the organization and at least principle alignments could boost the understanding 
and coherence of the whole forecasting process.  
 
Reporting 
 
The reports made during the process crystallized the major points of the forecast in spreadsheet 
templates and PowerPoint presentations. This subpart clarifies reporting more precisely. 
 
Investments, to begin with, had three major areas; acquisitions, store site investments and IT 
investments. First report of the whole process was the store site network list for both divisions and 
their areas. The regional operations filled in a more precise template for their store site and also 
other investments and returned it to a controller responsible for investments, which was the latter 
phase of investment reporting. IT investments had a totally different process; it followed projects 
determined to be realized by the management and the IT director fit the reality into a spreadsheet 
template. Divisions both had to report investments as couple of summarizing slides in a presentation, 
which included often also eliminations if the investment outlook in the forecast exceeded the 
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investment framework set by the HQ top management. Acquisitions, if there were any, were totally 
excluded from the forecasting process since they were considered as too sensitive data to be 
included in the forecasts. FiRe Ltd. had a yearly strategy process, in which only the CFO and a 
couple of key controllers determined the effects of some near future acquisitions. 
 
Risk reports were crafted by each division’s risk manager, who set up a risk map with two axis’s, y-
axis representing the probability for the risk and x-axis representing the impact on division’s result 
within the next 12 months. The quantification of these risks did not include any calculations and 
also there were no extensive analysis of what actions would be possible to dampen these risks and 
how much these actions would cost the company and no binary based integers or similar that would 
have showed if these actions are included in the rolling forecast or not. Example of such a risk map 
is presented in the following figure. 
 
Figure 26: Example of a risk map 
 
As to operating profit reporting, sales and gross margin enjoyed naturally high levels of interest, 
followed by some cost analysis and ultimately leading to the story told about the division’s or FiRe 
Ltd.’s operating profit development. No surprisingly many tables were presented with full of figures 
and deviations. Special weight on the presentation material was given to the so called bridge 
calculations, which were bar chart figures that show changes from last year or from previous rolling 
forecast version. Example of such a bridge calculation, in which the entity is improving gross 
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margin by 5 and having a net change of costs by -2, which ultimately leads to improving the 
operating profit by 3 from 100 to 103. This is presented in the following figure. 
 
Figure 27: Example of a bridge calculation 
 
Other reports included store sites reports, which concentrated on sales reports for different regions 
and top-bottom lists of best or worst developing stores and analysis comments on why this was 
happening. Additionally, the IT director received a table of biggest projects’ operating expenses and 
capital expenditure effects during the forecasting period. System-wise, the company could get many 
types of reports out of the system: one account and all costs centers, one cost center and all accounts, 
monthly views and also one huge report for accumulated figures for all cost centers and all accounts. 
Additionally, controllers could build their own reports by importing data from the system directly to 
spreadsheets. One of those reports was the cost center income statement view, the figures of which 
were planned in cooperation with the cost center responsible who was always tagged with an 
accounting professional. Respecting the salary intimacy, the CFO had an own separate process for 
salary forecasting in cooperation with HR department. Once all the cost center plans were ready, 
product lines and retail chains perspective based reports followed since they were calculated in a 
separate system with allocation drivers for presumed fixed costs. 
 
Reporting in total suffered severely from the ever-changing account and cost center hierarchy up 
until 2012 when the assisting position was established that would take ownership of these changes. 
Of course one of the key points for reporting is of course the fact that every month’s result package 
and other operating reports contained interconnections and deviations either to last RP2 or to last 
built rolling plan. There the focus relied heavily on one month’s figures and interestingly, FiRe 
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Ltd.’s divisions had lessons learned meetings, in which process issues were discussed but they did 
not include any kind systematical way of measuring previous’ rounds hitting accuracies, the thing 
FiRe Ltd. had accomplished during the implementation phase stated and mentioned important in 
chapter 7.4. No explicit reason for abandoning separate forecasting deviation analysis was found. 
This thesis gathered such data extensively, the brief analysis of which will follow shortly. 
 
Worth noticing was that the reports concentrated no further than operating profit, leaving profit of 
the division or company pretty much unnoticed. The same applied also for the balance sheet items, 
which no one really analyzed except for the finance department in the HQ which was responsible 
for making financial arrangements according to money requirements in each division. In FiRe 
Ltd.’s rolling forecast process there was present only one scenario, i.e. no systematically built best 
case or worst case scenarios. That was one of the big issues FiRe Ltd. was having since this one 
scenario was guided by HQ to be the realistic view on the company’s future financial outcomes. 
Practice showed that for some it was like the budget in which business people ask for money to be 
spent and for some it was a very careful scenario, a kind of promise made that shall not be broken.  
 
Concerning reporting, the CFO of DIY division often encouraged or complained followingly.  
 
“We should move from reporting mode to analyzing mode. Now we’re reporting a lot 
of tables and figures without real analysis, sensitivity analysis or discussion of what 
was happening. On the one hand it’s because our change actions are too new and on 
the other hand it’s because our average controller is being too humble and thus 
incapable to challenge business people especially in situations which have initially a 
negative vibe.” CFO of DIY division 
 
The end products of a rolling forecast round 
 
Discussing the research question “how does it bring the aimed results” concerning rolling 
forecasting, it’s also good to go briefly through rolling forecasting’s actual end-products. 
 
Apart from those reports, partly discussed earlier in this chapter, that would give views on many 
perspectives like product lines, stores, B2B and B2C business, retail chains, company, accounts, 
projects, e-store and traditional retail business, real estates and cost centers, rolling forecasting 
surely achieved further results that were desired by FiRe Ltd. as a company. One very concrete 
benefit for FiRe Ltd. was that it had controllers examining the near history actuals in order to 
forecast the near future. For example, this meant that more than often controllers found costs that 
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could be avoided, criticized or reorganized. Examples of such found costs during the rolling 
forecasting process were the ordering of a very expensive weather service which was replaced by a 
free-to-use service with same quality and a video conference service which was ordered only for 
four distant workers, a setting which could be replaced also by free Skype connections. In other 
words, rolling forecasting was not giving only the broad picture for the company’s future, it was 
giving real euro findings up for crabs. 
 
Rolling forecasting released FiRe Ltd. partly from the calendar year by providing always the view 
on how the figures would develop in the coming next 12 months versus last 12 months. In practice 
rolling forecasting agitated the arranging of business relevant meetings and thus bringing 
accounting people closer to giving support or challenging business people. It promoted stronger 
information flows and in other words, rolling forecasting gave the accounting people an official 
permission to ask for business actions’ progress and therefore tools for FiRe Ltd.’s management to 
ask also those awkward questions to those business people, whose projects or promises were not 
moving forward, just because “it belonged to the rolling forecasting round’s routine tasks”. There 
was no longer the same risk as with budgeting, when the accounting person devoted a lot of 
working time during the last quarter of the year for next year’s budget and then the accounting 
person would be left to rot for the rest of the year to play solely the role of a reporting machine. 
 
The finance function organizing the out payments and in payments of FiRe Ltd. benefitted a lot 
from rolling forecasting since the financial markets were much more dynamics nowadays and deals 
and positions would have to be closed in shorter cycles than before. That benefit was preceded by 
strategy related alignments meaning the determination of the investment framework given for both 
divisions. The strategy process taking place once a year benefitted also from rolling forecasting 
since the first year of strategy outlook was, by rule, determined by the latest rolling forecast. 
 
Last point to be emphasized as one of the rolling forecasting’s end products, is the documentation 
of financial and business plans made along the process. Written documentation is usually taken 
seriously and the saving of financial planning figures into the planning systems enables the 
possibility to measure budget or rolling plan deviations afterwards in order to find systematic 
forecasting errors or other points to be learned from. The learning factor is also relevant for 
individual employees since through documents and facts it is possible to learn more efficiently than 
through the word on the street so to speak.  
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In the next part an extensive amount of budget deviations was skimmed through and the learning 
from that material is brought into the light. 
 
Retrospective analysis of the consolidated results of FiRe Ltd.’s rolling forecast 
versions throughout 2008-2014 in grocery and DIY divisions’ regional areas as well as 
the HQ operating costs 
 
The enticing fact in this thesis is that the researcher had the access not only to the 13 interviews, to 
extensive amount of unofficial dialogues due to the work relationship the researcher had with the 
company, not only to consulting company report and other company inside material, but also to raw 
financial data in both grocery and DIY divisions as well as for HQ costs and the whole consolidated 
view of FiRe Ltd. as a company. For the sake of interpreting the results not too extensively, this 
research concentrated on items belonging to the operating profit; sales, gross margin, other 
operating income, personnel expenses, rent expenses, IT costs, marketing expenses, maintenance 
expenses, other operating costs and depreciations. Also the balance sheet items with investments et 
cetera were forecasted but that area did not enjoy a lot of interest among top management except for 
investments’ direct influence on operational profit and that is why it is bypassed in this examination. 
 
Both divisions’ regional areas, the stores of which were combined to regional results since it was 
the regional manager in both divisions that was responsible for forecasting. In the DIY division 
there was no categorization for west and east since those were combined to represent central part of 
Finland. The following table presents what level results were available for years 2008-2014. 
FiRe Ltd. as a company (all the figures below combined) 
Grocery/South DIY/South 
Grocery/East 
DIY/Central 
Grocery/West 
Grocery/North DIY/North 
HQ (Operating Expenses) Other Divisions 
Table 14: Measured levels of FiRe Ltd. concerning rolling forecasting rounds and actuals  
Even though all of these regions were examined in the same way, appendix 5 presents the financial 
data only for Finnish Retail Ltd. company level actuals and forecast rounds in the following angles. 
 
1) Calendar year deviations for each four rolling forecast round  
(First called first RP1, second RP2, third RP3, fourth RP4 and fifth second RP1) 
2) Consecutive months’ and quarters’ deviations for each rolling forecast round  
(Except for first RP1) 
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On assumption, calendar year deviations would diminish when with latter forecasting rounds there 
are already some actual months present. The interesting question is to know, how close FiRe Ltd. 
could hit with different account groups and ultimately with operating profit. Also, on assumption 
concerning above points two and three, consecutive months’ or quarters’ accuracy would be better 
with nearer future months than with further away months. The interesting question is to know, 
whether this assumption proved right and if yes, by how much. 
 
1) Calendar year deviations for each four rolling forecast round  
(First called first RP1, second RP2, third RP3, fourth RP4 and fifth second RP1) 
 
In figure 28 one can see year by year the absolute operating profit deviation % between rolling 
forecast rounds and the actual for FiRe Ltd. Most often the later forecasting rounds seem to be 
closer to 0% than the first rounds, except for year 2009, when for second RP1 there was only the 
time period from October to December left to be forecasted. Obviously something unexpected 
happened and FiRe Ltd.’s second RP1 was almost worse than the first RP1 done one year earlier.  
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Figure 28: FiRe Ltd. absolute operating profit deviation % between forecasting rounds and actuals 
 
Other than that, figure 29 shows the statistical averages, standard deviations, ranges, minimums and 
maximums of these deviations for different forecast rounds in units and in percentages. It can be 
stated that the turning point for forecasting the calendar year happens in the middle of the year 
when shifting from RP3 to RP4. With RP3, there’s still a time period of 9 months from April to 
December to be forecasted whereas RP4 has only 6 months from July to December. With RP3 
there’s still almost half the deviation from the final results to be awaited while with RP4 and second 
RP1 the deviation from the final results of the year is expected to be around one third.  
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Full year accuracy Full year accuracy Full year accuracy Full year accuracy Full year accuracy
2009-2014* 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014
1st RP1 (12mths) RP2 (12 mths) RP3 (9mths) RP4 (6 mths) 2nd RP1 (3 mths)  
Operating Profit Deviations in units
On Average -13,7 -13,0 -7,8 -2,2 -1,2
On Average (with absolute values) 27,9 22,2 18,8 11,4 8,8
Standard Deviation 31,8 29,3 25,5 14,7 11,3
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 17,4 21,9 17,6 8,3 6,3
Range 89,1 92,6 75,2 42,9 32,7
Maximum 29,6 22,9 19,7 15,1 12,4
Minimum -59,5 -69,6 -55,5 -27,8 -20,3
Operating Profit Deviations in %
On Average 75,6 % 49,5 % 47,0 % 35,5 % 33,1 %
On Average (with absolute values) 75,6 % 49,5 % 47,0 % 35,5 % 33,1 %
Standard Deviation 32,7 % 19,8 % 19,4 % 16,1 % 22,4 %
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 32,7 % 19,8 % 19,4 % 16,1 % 22,4 %
Range 87,0 % 53,9 % 55,8 % 51,6 % 67,5 %
Maximum 116,9 % 66,1 % 64,3 % 59,2 % 77,3 %
Minimum 29,9 % 12,2 % 8,5 % 7,6 % 9,8 %  
Figure 29: Averages, standard deviations, ranges, minimums and maximums of these deviations in 
units and in percentages for FiRe Ltd.’s operating profit 
 
Figure 30 shows all account groups and all fully examined years with all the forecasting rounds and 
their deviations in units. It describes well how the story has changed along each year. The red 
figures state that the deviation has represented a negative surprise for FiRe Ltd. and green figures 
vice versa. The traffic light next to the figure shows whether the deviation from the final actual 
figure had diminished measured in absolute values when comparing the previous forecasting round 
to the round under examination. For example, the traffic light for year 2012 marketing expenses for 
RP3 is red since with earlier RP2 the absolute deviation in units was 1,4 units whereas with RP3 the 
same deviation was 2,3. The deviation mentioned in this chapter and also otherwise is always 
measured against the final actual outcome for FiRe Ltd. 
 
Looking closer to the traffic light results, counting 6 years and 10 account groups and 4 forecasting 
rounds from RP2 to second RP1 which tried to improve from previous forecast, we’re having 240 
combinations, out of which 153 (64%) times FiRe Ltd. succeeded in getting smaller absolute 
deviations and 87 (36%) times when the deviation proved to be bigger than with previous round. 
Concretely said, if the CEO would ask the CFO about fresh new forecasting figures: “are you sure 
this account groups’ figures will come closer to final actuals than last time’s figures?” there would 
be a 64% chance of success for the average account group and forecast round for this to be realized. 
Again here the RP2 and RP3 were much less likely to be relied on than RP4 and second RP1 since 
RP2 had a success rate of 52%, RP3 57%, RP4 73% and second RP1 73%. 
  
 
 
 127 
First RP1 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
GM2 -171,6 -7,7 -23,4 -34,2 -44,7 11,8
Other Operating Income -5,4 2,1 7,7 7,0 -1,8 8,1
Personnel Expenses 70,5 1,7 -3,5 -0,1 4,5 -5,1
Rent Expenses 2,7 -0,4 1,6 -6,3 -0,8 -5,8
IT Costs 1,3 0,9 1,2 -0,3 2,8 1,5
Marketing Expenses 16,1 0,0 -2,0 -4,2 6,1 2,5
Maintenance Costs 13,4 1,3 1,9 3,6 0,7 5,6
Other Operating Costs 16,9 15,1 3,4 10,4 2,7 4,6
Depreciations and Impairments 5,3 1,7 1,9 -1,7 0,1 1,1
Other operating Expenses -0,9 -2,1 -0,4 -1,0 -0,2 -0,7
Operating Profit excluding non-recurring items-59,5 12,9 -11,4 -25,0 -28,9 29,6
RP2
GM2 -66,5 1 -9,6 0 -27,1 0 -24,9 1 -22,9 1 3,1 1
Other Operating Income 8,5 0 6,3 0 4,6 1 6,9 1 -0,7 1 8,9 0
Personnel Expenses 25,4 1 1,7 1 -0,8 1 0,2 0 2,2 1 -0,5 1
Rent Expenses -2,2 1 0,4 1 -2,4 0 -1,9 1 0,1 1 -6,3 0
IT Costs -0,1 1 0,5 1 2,6 0 -0,3 0 3,7 0 1,7 0
Marketing Expenses 5,0 1 -4,8 0 -0,9 1 -1,4 1 3,4 1 -0,9 1
Maintenance Costs 10,6 1 0,8 1 2,5 0 2,1 1 3,0 0 5,9 0
Other Operating Costs 7,7 1 16,3 0 6,4 0 3,0 1 5,9 0 5,0 0
Depreciations and Impairments 1,0 1 -0,5 1 2,4 0 -2,5 0 0,3 0 0,7 1
Other operating Expenses -0,9 0 -2,1 0 -0,4 0 -1,0 0 -0,2 0 -0,7 0
Operating Profit excluding non-recurring items-19,3 1 9,1 1 -12,8 0 -18,0 1 -3,6 1 22,9 1
8 pcs 1 5 pcs 1 3 pcs 1 6 pcs 1 5 pcs 1 4 pcs 1
2 pcs -1 5 pcs -1 7 pcs -1 4 pcs -1 5 pcs -1 6 pcs -1
RP3
GM2 -33,3 1 -7,2 1 -36,8 0 -46,4 0 -14,0 1 8,4 0
Other Operating Income 9,5 0 6,7 0 -0,3 1 1,5 1 -3,9 0 11,1 0
Personnel Expenses 15,6 1 -0,2 1 6,4 0 8,5 0 5,5 0 -4,9 0
Rent Expenses 1,2 1 1,2 0 0,6 1 0,7 1 1,4 0 -4,0 1
IT Costs -2,9 0 0,7 0 1,9 1 0,5 0 5,4 0 1,6 1
Marketing Expenses 2,1 1 -3,6 1 1,4 0 2,3 0 1,3 1 -3,4 0
Maintenance Costs 4,7 1 0,0 1 2,4 1 3,5 0 3,9 0 3,9 1
Other Operating Costs 6,1 1 13,5 1 8,8 0 6,9 0 7,4 0 3,2 1
Depreciations and Impairments 0,3 1 0,3 1 0,9 1 1,9 1 0,3 1 -2,1 0
Other operating Expenses -0,8 1 -2,1 1 -0,4 1 -1,0 1 -0,2 1 -0,7 1
Operating Profit excluding non-recurring items-1,1 1 9,4 0 -14,8 0 -21,7 0 9,3 0 19,7 1
8 pcs 1 7 pcs 1 6 pcs 1 4 pcs 1 4 pcs 1 5 pcs 1
2 pcs -1 3 pcs -1 4 pcs -1 6 pcs -1 6 pcs -1 5 pcs -1
RP4
GM2 -23,2 1 -5,9 1 -16,4 1 -61,2 0 -4,3 1 -3,0 1
Other Operating Income 9,7 0 3,8 1 0,5 0 0,1 1 -3,6 1 8,3 1
Personnel Expenses 8,9 1 -0,8 0 4,5 1 24,9 0 5,4 1 1,3 1
Rent Expenses 0,2 1 1,0 1 -0,4 1 9,4 0 0,6 1 -2,8 1
IT Costs -2,0 1 0,8 0 1,4 1 2,8 0 2,9 1 0,7 1
Marketing Expenses 1,7 1 -0,9 1 0,3 1 3,5 0 3,5 0 -1,4 1
Maintenance Costs 3,1 1 0,1 0 0,4 1 4,3 0 2,8 1 2,7 1
Other Operating Costs 5,0 1 11,1 1 -0,4 1 5,4 1 1,2 1 2,9 1
Depreciations and Impairments 0,1 1 0,2 1 0,3 1 2,4 0 0,7 0 -1,5 1
Other operating Expenses -0,8 0 -1,6 1 -0,4 1 -1,0 1 -0,2 1 -0,7 0
Operating Profit excluding non-recurring items-1,0 1 7,5 1 -9,7 1 -9,4 1 9,6 0 15,1 1
8 pcs 1 7 pcs 1 9 pcs 1 3 pcs 1 8 pcs 1 9 pcs 1
2 pcs -1 3 pcs -1 1 pcs -1 7 pcs -1 2 pcs -1 1 pcs -1
Second RP1
GM2 -2,5 1 4,2 1 -0,7 1 -11,0 1 -5,7 0 -0,6 1
Other Operating Income 5,1 1 0,6 1 1,8 0 -1,4 0 -7,6 0 7,7 1
Personnel Expenses 2,6 1 -1,3 0 -0,1 1 0,1 1 5,1 1 1,7 0
Rent Expenses -0,2 0 0,1 1 -1,0 0 -1,2 1 4,1 0 -1,7 1
IT Costs -0,6 1 0,7 1 0,1 1 0,4 1 0,4 1 0,3 1
Marketing Expenses 0,6 1 -0,3 1 -1,5 0 1,6 1 3,1 1 0,1 1
Maintenance Costs 1,4 1 -0,1 0 -0,1 1 0,8 1 2,4 1 1,5 1
Other Operating Costs 4,1 1 1,6 1 -1,1 0 -0,4 1 0,6 1 2,9 1
Depreciations and Impairments -0,7 0 0,2 1 0,2 1 0,3 1 2,3 0 -1,4 1
Other operating Expenses -0,7 1 -1,5 1 -0,4 0 -1,0 1 -0,2 1 -0,7 0
Operating Profit excluding non-recurring items5,2 0 4,2 1 -2,9 1 -11,7 0 4,8 1 12,4 1
8 pcs 1 8 pcs 1 5 pcs 1 9 pcs 1 6 pcs 1 8 pcs 1
2 pcs -1 2 pcs -1 5 pcs -1 1 pcs -1 4 pcs -1 2 pcs -1  
Figure 30: All forecasting rounds for all years from 2009 to 2014 by account groups,        
deviations in units 
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If there was a clear difference between forecasting rounds for the success rate, years and account 
groups proved to be differently difficult in this traffic light logic as well. Naturally, the number of 
rounds with which one could improve the hitting rate, four is the maximum value for each cell in 
figure 31 where these results are presented. E.g. in 2009 FiRe Ltd. succeeded to improve 
consecutive rounds forecasting with many account groups, totaling a score of 32 times, improving 
with each account group and forecasting round with a success rate of 80%, much more often than 
during the worst year of 2012, when it hit only 22 times closer the final target if measured in 
different accounts groups, which in success rate % reached only 55%. Account groups did not show 
that much difference since many groups’ success rate approached approximately 70% rate, many 
having 67% and GM and marketing expenses being the easiest to improve with 71% hit rate. Other 
operating income was closer final results on 50% of the improving attempts resembling rather coin 
toss. 
Account Groups\Years 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total Success rate %
GM2 4 3 2 2 3 3 17 71 %
Other Operating Income 1 2 2 3 2 2 12 50 %
Personnel Expenses 4 2 3 1 3 2 15 63 %
Rent Expenses 3 3 2 3 2 3 16 67 %
IT Costs 3 2 3 1 2 3 14 58 %
Marketing Expenses 4 3 2 2 3 3 17 71 %
Maintenance Costs 4 2 3 2 2 3 16 67 %
Other Operating Costs 4 3 1 3 2 3 16 67 %
Depreciations and Impairments 3 4 3 2 1 3 16 67 %
Other operating Expenses 2 3 2 3 3 1 14 58 %
Total 32 27 23 22 23 26 153 64 %
Success rate% 80 % 68 % 58 % 55 % 58 % 65 % 64 %  
Figure 31: Success frequency of improving forecasting accuracy between forecasting rounds 
(RP2,RP3,RP4 and 2nd RP1), measuring each round throughout the years by account groups 
 
Table 15 clarifies the findings when examining all the regions in grocery and DIY divisions and HQ 
operating expenses through these same figures (29 to 31).It is good to bear in mind that the first 
three columns of table 15 do not represent the size of the deviations in any way; they represent only 
if the division and region combination was able to improve finding the final actual levels along the 
financial year. It might be for example that Grocery/South and DIY/North with 58% success rate 
had more unexpected business environment changes on average during the examined years of 2009-
2014 than Grocery/North with 65% success rate. More interesting for FiRe Ltd. as a whole, 
accounting all years and all account groups, only 64% was the average success rate of finding 
figures closer to the final actuals even though one had always three months more actual figures 
compared to last forecasting round.  
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        Success rate for improving between     Operating profit deviations 
        consecutive rounds for 2009-2014    for RP2 in % and units for 2009-2014 
 
Topic 
Division&Region 
Success 
rate % 
Best Year 
Worst Year 
Best Account 
Group 
Worst Account 
Group (excl. 
other op. items) 
Average 
units 
Average 
units and % 
(absolute) 
SD units 
SD units 
and % 
(absolute) 
Range units  
Range % 
(absolute) 
Max units 
Max % 
(absolute) 
Min units 
Min % 
(absolute) 
Grocery/South 58% 
09&10 (65%) 
11&12 (50%) 
Other op. income 
(71%) 
Marketing 
expenses (50%) 
2,1 units 
5,8 units 
32,1% 
8,5 units 
6,2 units 
48,2% 
27,2 units 
134,3% 
18,9 units 
140,8% 
-8,4 units 
6,4% 
Grocery/East 63% 
2014 (73%) 
2012 (53%) 
Personnel 
expenses (75%) 
Rent expenses 
(63%) 
-10,3 units 
10,3 units 
76748,3% 
7,1 units 
7,1 units 
202467,6% 
19,8 units 
5358904,1% 
-0,7 units 
5359009,9% 
-20,6 units 
105,8% 
Grocery/West 62% 
2009 (73%) 
2010 (55%) 
GM2,Other op. 
income & 
personnel 
expenses and rent 
expenses (75%) 
IT costs (63%) 
-2,7 units 
7,1 units 
311,9% 
9,4 units 
6,2 units 
516,1% 
31,0 units 
1431,6% 
13,6 units 
1445,0% 
-17,4 units 
13,3% 
Grocery/North 65% 
2009 (78%) 
2010 (58%) 
Rent expenses 
(83%) 
Marketing 
expenses (54%) 
-1,1 units 
1,6 units 
60,4% 
1,9 units 
1,4 units 
34,2% 
5,0 units 
97,0% 
1,0 units 
123,0% 
-4,0 units 
26,0% 
DIY/South 59% 
2009 (70%) 
2012 (40%) 
Depreciations and 
impairments 
(75%) 
IT Costs (46%) 
-2,3 units 
7,7 units 
58,2% 
11,1 units 
7,8 units 
61,3% 
31,6 units 
177,8% 
7,1 units 
187,9% 
-24,5 units 
10,1% 
DIY/Central 64% 
2009 (73%) 
2011 (53%) 
Depreciations and 
impairments 
(92%) 
Personnel 
expenses (54%) 
-2,0 units 
2,3 units 
107,1% 
3,8 units 
3,5 units 
233,7% 
11,3 units 
626,5% 
1,0 units 
637,0% 
-10,3 units 
10,5% 
DIY/North 58% 
2009 (63%) 
2014 (53%) 
Depreciations and 
impairments 
(79%) 
IT Costs (42%) 
2,6 units 
2,6 units 
49,3% 
2,3 units 
2,3 units 
44,5% 
6,3 units 
106,4% 
7,2 units 
119,3% 
0,9 units 
12,9% 
HQ (Operating 
Expenses) 
59% 
10&11 (63%) 
2013 (53%) 
Rent expenses 
(75%) 
Other operating 
income (54%) 
-0,6 units 
2,0 units 
10,2% 
2,8 units 
1,9 units 
10,6% 
9,1 units 
28,8% 
4,2 units 
31,0% 
-4,9 units 
2,3% 
FiRe Ltd. 64% 
2009 (80%) 
2012 (55%) 
Personnel & 
marketing costs 
(71%) 
Other op. income 
(50%) 
-13 units 
22,2 units 
49,5% 
29,3 units 
21,9 units 
19,8% 
92,6 units 
53,9% 
22,9 units 
66,1% 
-69.6 units 
12,2% 
Table 15: Success rate of improving the forecast between rounds and statistical data of RP2 rounds 
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The best year and worst year show that for many regions the year 2009 was the best in improving 
between rounds. The worst year, during which failures happened the most often in improving the 
forecast accuracy, varied a lot between division and region combinations; all years were represented 
except 2009. For FiRe Ltd. year 2012 turned out to be the most difficult in improving the forecast. 
 
As for the best and worst account groups it was decided that when measuring the worst account 
groups the other operating costs and other operating expenses were not taken into consideration 
since they would have been easily the worst account group category winners because of their 
natural nature; unexpected events’ costs were booked often to those categories. For Fire Ltd. it was 
quite surprising that personnel costs and marketing costs were the ones, whose accuracy could be 
improved most often. One could assume that personnel costs would have been quite presumable 
already for first RP1 and RP2 as well, whereas marketing most often had a set yearly budget.  
 
The deeper analysis digs deeper and finds out that Grocery/West and Grocery/East most often 
underperformed against first RP1 and RP2 sales forecast, which led to cost cutting in personnel 
expenses which is why the personnel expenses forecast accuracy improved the easiest. As for the 
marketing expenses, the reason remains a mystery and cannot be argued from the statistical data. 
The DIY division had best improvement rates for the depreciations which could be argued by the 
unexpected nature of investment opportunities in the market. Other major findings are that many 
regions had difficulties in improving the accuracy on IT costs for the financial year between 
consecutive forecasting rounds and that results varied a lot between different division and region 
combinations. Examining the regional differences might be a lucrative field to study further. 
 
The results for operating profit deviations for RP2 in % and units for 2009-2014 is present in table 
15’s right side. RP2 was chosen to be brought into the light since RP2 was unilaterally considered 
as the most important forecasting round through its closest resemblance to the traditional yearly 
budget. For statistical measurements the columns represent averages, standard deviations (SD) and 
range with its maximum and minimum. Figure 32 shows all the average RP2 deviations in units 
split in all division and region combinations for all account groups. Other D in the figure represents 
FiRe Ltd.’s all other businesses except Grocery, DIY and HQ costs allocated to these divisions, 
entities which were under the loop in this thesis. 
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GM totaling -35 units: 
  
Other operating income and operating expenses totaling +22 units: 
 
Operating profit totaling -13 units (-35 from GM plus other op. income and OPEX +22): 
 
Figure 32: Average RP2 round during 2009-2014 split into division and region combinations 
 
The big picture with figure 32 is obvious: both GM levels and operating expenses seemed to be 
overstated in the RP2 forecasting round, which led to disappointments in GM and positive 
“savings” in the cost side. The net effect of these two would remain on the negative side. There’s no 
explicit proof of it but maybe FiRe Ltd. was using forecasting as a target setting tool in the end. 
There were no remarkable differences between forecast rounds concerning the big picture. 
 
On average, FiRe Ltd. performed -13 units worse than what RP2 would “promise”. Looking at the 
division and region combinations the guilty one is easily found: Grocery/East underperformed by    
-10,3 units on average whereas all other combinations deviated from the final actual operating 
profits approximately from -2 units to +2 units. In absolute values, Grocery/East combination’s 
average was exactly the same -10,3 units which must be interpreted so that the deviation has always 
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been a negative one within the population of years from 2009 to 2014. Another good example of a 
very difficult region proved to be Grocery/West, where average deviation was underperforming by  
-2,4 units which is not so bad but absolute deviation was 7,1 units, an average 311,9% deviation 
from what was promised. That means the combination Grocery/West hit on average quite close but 
usually every now and then remarkably over and then again remarkably under. Additionally, 
DIY/Central did not enjoy high certainty level with its RP2 operating profit accuracy since absolute 
average of 2,3 units (107,1%) shows the final actuals were more than double of what was expected. 
 
At the other end as quite forecastable entities, HQ’s operating expenses and thus operating profit 
was the most constant and reliable also on percentage terms, assumedly due to its easier 
forecastable nature, better business people or better controllers. Also luckily for FiRe Ltd., the 
forecasting of its biggest business, the Grocery/South, seemed to be in quite good control having 
second smallest average deviation in relative perspective, being 32,1%, and third smallest standard 
deviation in relative perspective, being 48,2%. Maybe because of the location and perhaps a more 
stable market environment, both Grocery/North and DIY/North combinations proved to have higher 
expectability by having absolute averages of 1,6 units (60,4%) and 2,6 units (49,3%) and absolute 
standard deviations of 1,4 (34,2%) and 2,3 units (44,4%). 
 
In appendix five the different account groups can be examined closer for FiRe Ltd. The results 
show that different account groups have very different natures; e.g. maintenance costs were clearly 
and systematically constantly over budgeted so that the final actual costs were always lower than 
forecasted levels. Examining this further revealed that the director for store sites, under whom the 
maintenance manager responsible for the maintenance budget operated, had instructed the real work 
followingly: “what is forecasted in the budget or other rolling plan versions, can be accomplished in 
the real world operations as well without having to ask the permission for it”. In practice, the 
maintenance manager had a very busy time handling the maintenance invoices and making the big 
maintenance process go around smoothly. This led to the natural consequence that the maintenance 
manager had the personal incentive to over budget these costs. There were two reasons: 1) firstly at 
the end of the year the manager could be seen as a big hero once again cutting costs below the 
original “promised” level and 2) secondly the everyday routine ran smoother if the manager 
succeeded pushing all the ideas into the latest forecast version. In reality, by rule the rise of 
maintenance costs was an uncomfortable account group when measured against last year’s actuals 
and the top management obviously did not put great pressure on the respective store site director 
since over budgeting continued year by year.  
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Another account group finding was that within the other operating expenses, under which very 
surprising and unexpected costs were booked, FiRe Ltd. never forecasted any kind of expenses even 
though such costs occurred every year, causing a deviation of -0,9 units on average, which as a 
share accounts for 6,9% of the total deviation FiRe Ltd. was having. One easily would suggest that 
such a management reservation on the company level would be beneficial for the total forecast 
accuracy. These kind of findings mentioned concerning the maintenance costs and other operating 
expenses, i.e. digging deeper with the analysis and finding more behind reasons from the business 
operations’ daily work, could turn out to be a fruitful topic for further studies. 
 
2) Consecutive months’ and quarter’s deviations for each rolling forecast round  
(Except for first RP1) 
 
After examining the typical story of RP2 and different forecasting rounds’ accuracy on the calendar 
year, one takes a brief look on another very interesting question: “did rolling forecasting provide 
FiRe Ltd. with a better grasp on the nearer future than the further future?”. A common claim in the 
company, especially when people was frustrated with the planning work, was that “no one can 
know the future even for the shorter period of time so what’s the use in guestimating?”. What one 
knows for sure is that the company knew near future related issues for sure better than the distant 
future; store network was quite cemented and certain levels of expenses followed for example 
marketing plans, resource planning, IT contracts and licenses and other similar contracts. In theory, 
all known data, should have been included in the forecasted figures. On assumption the nearer 
future months and quarters would have smaller deviations than the more distant ones. 
 
Analysis for ordinal months shall begin with the final target FiRe Ltd. was trying to hit, the 
operating profit, which is presented in figure 33 below. Worth noticing with all the following 
analysis figures is that the first three months had all of the forecasting rounds, months four to six 
did not have second RP1 since for the calendar year that forecast version was not forecasting other 
than the last three months of the year, months seven to nine had only RP2 and RP3 following the 
same logic and months ten to twelve included only RP2. The examination could have been done by 
calculating all rounds’ consecutive twelve months but in this thesis the calendar year was preferred. 
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Figure 33: Ordinal months’ accuracy for FiRe Ltd.’s operating profit 
 
Surprisingly, the earlier months, when measured as sole months, performed only mildly better than 
the later months. For example, the first month deviated by +0,8 units on average and the second 
month by -0,5 units. First four months seemed to under control remarkably better than months from 
five to eleven, which all had more than -1 unit deviation from the final actual. Also, worth a 
comment, the twelfth month was an exception by having exactly 0,0 units deviation. In short, it can 
be said that on average FiRe Ltd. could forecast better the first four months, which also differed 
from each other, and after that there would be unpleasant surprises on the basic case.  
 
The absolute average deviations’ outcome looked somewhat bizarre since the first six forecast 
months seemed to have deviations of around 2 units and after that from months seven to twelve 
around 1 unit. This is, actually, strong evidence that sole months could not be seen easier to forecast 
the closer one was the forecasting moment. That is quite much a result against what was assumed. 
The interpretation of averages’ and absolute averages’ deviations is that it was at least as hard or 
even harder to minimize deviations of closer months than distant months but by rule FiRe Ltd. was 
overstating the promised operating profit level more with distant months than with closer months. 
 
Bunching the months into quarters showed a little bit other kind of results. This can be seen in 
figure 34, in which also the cumulative results for quarters are to be seen. Here the power of rolling 
forecasting can be seen. For the first quarter the average deviation was -0,1 units, for second quarter 
-2,4 units, for third quarter -5,1 units and surprisingly for fourth quarter -3,3 units. The surprise 
from the last quarter vanishes and can be explained by looking at the absolute average deviations in 
units, which shows that the size of the deviation grows the further one forecasts. Measuring the 
same cumulatively, the further away one moved from the forecasting moment the bigger the 
average operating profit deviation grew. The same goes for absolute deviations cumulatively. 
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Figure 34: Ordinal quarters’ accuracy and cumulative accuracy for FiRe Ltd.’s operating profit 
 
Standard deviation, standard deviation with absolute values and ranges support all the above made 
conclusions about figures 33 and 34. Combining the ordinary months and quarters and cumulative 
quarters analysis for FiRe Ltd.’s operating profit, one can summarize and suggest that FiRe Ltd. 
was more realistic with closer months than distant months but deviation size did not grow as time 
passed by which is a very interesting finding from this statistical population. In addition, bunching 
sole months into four quarters provided much better results that were much closer to the original 
assumption that “the nearer future quarters would have smaller deviations than the more distant 
ones” than when measuring sole months. Thus it is justifiable to debate that “no one can know the 
future even for the shorter period of time so what’s the use in guestimating?” if one is answering a 
question from controller that is wondering some deviation concerning one sole month. However, it 
is not a justifiable counterargument with cumulative time periods or quarters.  
 
7.6 Future Prospects 
 
Rolling forecasting’s end products for FiRe Ltd. were introduced in this chapter. Still clarifying to 
all interest groups in an open way, what rolling forecasting was all about and what is really the 
value rolling forecasting is adding to Fire Ltd, had an acute order inside the company. FiRe Ltd. had 
a company policy description with many processes and respective working instructions. However 
rolling forecasting did not have such a policy and generally people would look down on accounting 
people in the company when talking about rolling forecasting, the objective of which an average 
controller could not sell very efficiently to business operations’ people. Now, as CEOs and CFOs 
changed over time, each and every of them had their own principles and thus time after time FiRe 
Ltd. failed in creating some withstanding cornerstones for rolling forecasting. 
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Another thing for the future prospects would be the learning from forecasting deviations and 
creating a systematic way of improving the process and understanding of budget deviations 
concerning different division and region combinations as well as for different account groups. Now 
FiRe Ltd. seemed to create a forecast, then report it in the monthly actual reporting package usually 
as one column deviation and then completely forget the latest forecast round as a new one was 
created. It neither analyzed nor had constructive discussions or consequences afterwards on 
systematic failures that were proven to exist in chapter 7.5 with the retrospective analysis of the 
consolidated results of FiRe Ltd.’s rolling forecast versions throughout 2008-2014 in grocery and 
DIY divisions’ regional areas as well as the HQ operating costs. 
 
The length of the whole process would have to be somehow shortened. FiRe Ltd. management 
should ask: “how can we claim that our rolling forecasting is future oriented when the forecasting 
assumptions concerning the economy, network plans et cetera are almost two months old when the 
forecasting reporting packages are crafted.” The whole forecasting process would need rethinking 
for example by launching different deadlines for different division and region combinations so that 
the accounting function could process and analyze the work more efficiently through reorganization 
of the whole process according to the lean thinking ideology. Another way would be forecasting a 
couple of years forwards, and giving the responsibility to change the forecast entirely to the division 
and region combination responsible manager in cooperation with a named accounting professional. 
That would save a lot of working time in those situations where the outlook really had not changed 
and give focus more on analyzing the deviations and having real business related dealings. 
 
One issue on hand at the time of the research was the waging war between excel purists and 
forecasting system fans. There were two things in this relation to be solved: what technical solution 
for forecasting could be most efficient and value adding and how one could make these parties, 
excel purists and forecasting system fans, cooperate. 
 
Anyhow FiRe Ltd. encounters its future, it has to make decisions, whether to continue with rolling 
forecasting or not. Presented in chapter 3.3, the beyond budgeting model has rolling forecasting 
embedded but examining the model closer might lead to groundbreaking changes in how rolling 
forecasting is used in different parts of the company. 
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8. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
The deepest desire in this thesis has been to give answers both to academic field’s yearning for 
knowledge and case company’s practical challenges. This chapter is divided into two subsections. 
Firstly the discussion part considers the study in relationship with the present theory of diffusion of 
management control systems, budgeting and rolling forecasting presented in chapters from two to 
five. Secondly the conclusion part summarizes with the most important findings theory-wise as well 
as in practice, which will be followed by some suggestible directions for further studies. 
 
 Discussion 
 
This study was designed to narrow the gap between the rhetoric and the reality by examining first 
diffusion of management control systems, then clarifying the ongoing budgeting debate and lastly 
explaining the papers concerning rolling forecasting, which was followed by study methodology 
and related case of case company FiRe Ltd. The researcher of this thesis presumes that in 2016, 
Anno Domini, as the world business cycles are rapid, as robots and pieces of coding are replacing 
traditional accounting professions and as the changing role of management accountants has 
gathered a lot of attention, the demand for this type of studies has perhaps never been bigger. 
 
The case of rolling forecasting in the Finnish Retail Ltd. (FiRe Ltd.) mirrored to the existing theory 
has been beneficial since there has been an urgent need in the academic field for rolling forecasting 
studies, and especially case studies, which to date are nowhere to be found. Rolling forecasting has 
been underlined as the tool to overcome those disadvantages that the traditional budgeting methods 
possess (Myers 2001; Arterian 1998). As late as in 2010 Libby and Lindsay stated that there’s very 
little evidence regarding on whether and how firms are adapting their budgeting system, even 
though, as stated in chapter 2.1, Kimberly found out already in 1981 that it has been the studies on 
technological innovations that have attracted much more research than the managerial innovations. 
 
Budgeting studies traditionally answer questions such as “what is the accounting system trying to 
do” and “what are the disadvantages and advantages of the accounting system” rather than 
answering questions such as “how was this accounting system implemented and used” and “how 
people perceive the accounting innovation”. The accounting scholars surely welcome studies that 
respect the humane nature of budgeting and studies that consider sociological, anthropological, 
psychological knowledge and aspects important as for its relationship with budgeting. Kimberly 
(1981) noted that there is often a considerable gap between the rhetoric and the reality and that 
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relatively little research has been done on the spread of innovation inside organizations, which 
applies for budgeting studies as well. Even though budgeting games, biases and mental accounting 
is rhetoric commonly used, budgeting studies are too often encapsulated from the other real world 
processes and misfire when it comes to depicting the complex reality. Luckily, there are already 
some models and extensive research around that can be used in analyzing accounting systems. 
 
As for the diffusion studies, this thesis adopted the diffusion definition of Webster (1971) that 
“diffusion is the social process by which an innovation spreads through a social system over time”. 
FiRe Ltd.’s case of implementing and continuous use of rolling forecasting was exactly that: as the 
research progressed it was clear that the change from traditional budgeting to rolling forecasting 
was much more company culture related change than some technical change. Analyzing Webster’s 
three diffusion elements, decision maker, degree of risk and rate of adoption revealed that Fire Ltd., 
at the time of this study, had still a long way to travel with rolling forecasting since on individual 
level there can be a lot of rocks on the road, e.g. individuals not understanding the whole idea, 
individuals still talking only about yearly budget and individuals not understanding the practice of 
forecasting work required to answer management’s yearning for information.  
 
Rogers’ (2003) five characteristics of innovation diffusion determine how fast the innovation is 
likely to diffuse. In this thesis rolling forecasting was found hard to be analyzed whether it had 
relative advantage over other budgeting methods, easily compatible technically with the existing 
culture of doing things but difficult in humane aspects, complex in reality since the social networks 
delivered business info very strongly over rolling forecasting process, available for trial even 
though not trialed in Fire Ltd.’s case and somewhat observable as for the results rolling forecasting 
was providing. Rogers (2002) presented also five different strategies to boost the speed of 
innovation diffusion process, namely changing attributes, utilizing champions, changing norms 
through peer support, using entertainment and activating peer networks. Fire Ltd. used many actions 
and strategies, elaborated in chapter 7.2, to adjust the environment to be suitable for desired changes.  
 
Best (2006) depicted the difference of diffusion and fads in figure three, with a diffusion achieving 
a permanent state and a fad fading out as time passes by. The reality in this thesis suggests that 
innovations can have a variable curve and thus gather pace at times and suffer from drawbacks at 
times. Traditionally this has been the problem with many studies belonging to the pre-Kimberly 
(1981) era; they take innovations as quite binary and provisionally positive subjects. 
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Gallivan (2001) moved a step further by speaking about primary, which stands for the organization, 
and secondary, which stands for individuals, adoption of an innovation. The latter proved to be 
often the more problematic one in Gallivan’s study and that applies for FiRe Ltd. as well. As an 
addition suggestion to Gallivan’s definitions, there could be a group of people in between primary 
and secondary adoption. In FiRe Ltd.’s case it was evident that different groups, business people 
versus accounting people and comparing top management to team leaders and to subordinates, had 
different views of and effects from rolling forecasting. Examining the micro-level through the 
diffusion S-curve it seemed that top management was already on the upper parts of the curve, 
having adopted the ideas of rolling forecasting, and some of the subordinates laying along the curve 
somewhere from starting point to mid-areas of the curve. 
 
Fortunately the studies concerning the diffusion of management controlling systems have awakened 
to the different starting points as well as outcomes innovations might have. Kimberly (1981) 
considered that the innovation can be narrowly or widely used and it can survive well or die soon 
and young. Abrahamson (1991) continues building the complexity and flexibility by emphasizing 
that it is also possible for organizations to diffuse technically inefficient innovations or on the 
contrary reject technically efficient innovations. To the moment of writing the last letter of this 
thesis, it was obvious that there were many opinions on whether FiRe Ltd. had benefitted from 
rolling forecasting or not. That is why it would be interesting to read more about bold cases, in 
which organization abandons an accounting method. Ekholm et al. (2003), Bartram (2006) and 
Schmidt (1992) pondered the possibility of budgeting being an outdated tool and Bogsnes (2009) 
presented a couple of successful cases, Handelsbanken and Borealis, in which budgeting was indeed 
abandoned. Bogsnes is the advocate for the beyond budgeting model, which is dealing more with 
the cultural change on how the company is managed rather than dealing with a technical accounting 
solution used for controlling. 
 
Kimberly (1981) pointed out that forgetting the possibility of “doing the wrong choices” is the same 
as having proinnovation biases in the studies. Similarly, it can be thought, for management 
accounting change, budgeting and rolling forecasting related studies that it would be healthy to 
reserve the possibility for accounting method or innovation to have adverse effects or those 
background situations, in which the company have unclear goals and high uncertainty situations. It 
is good to bear in mind that many fashionable accounting methods, such as rolling forecasting, have 
a lot of managerial studies which present to-do lists, step-by-step processes and that many outside-
groups like consultants are eager to sell these ideas. 
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Abrahamson (1991) presented a typology for the diffusion and rejection of innovations, which had 
four different perspectives: efficient-choice, forced-selection, fad and fashion. It would be very 
enticing to see management accounting and budgeting studies examine the origin of the accounting 
innovation more carefully. This thesis tackled this challenge by clarifying carefully the case 
company background and by looking closely into the need for changing from traditional budgeting 
to rolling forecasting. The case of Fire Ltd. revealed that for some within the organization, rolling 
forecasting could be the efficient-choice, for some a totally forced selection accomplished by a fiat 
from the management, for some a reasoned fake-like fad with no reasonable grounding and for 
some an imitated fashion from another organization.  
 
There is not a single theory or a practical thing in this world that two people would understand in 
the same way. Maybe accounting innovation and implementation studies would need a measure, 
through which could be analyzed if the personnel, team leaders and top management understood the 
innovation very differently or in a similar way. For example, Rappeport (2008) reminded that 
rolling forecasting is the remedy for CFOs who do not like surprises through faulty forecasts since 
they might end up being fired. In the case study, the subordinate level accused the management 
exactly of the same matter; the management played too safe, avoided real business responsibility 
and spent a lot of resources building the forecast, which according to the subordinate level was not 
anymore as thought-through as the traditional yearly budget and thus destroyed value within the 
company as the accounting function could not serve the business people sufficiently anymore with 
real issues. That might be one of the biggest pitfalls of rolling forecasting; the forecasting in itself 
becomes a repetitive task that does not serve the company’s needs for making high quality real life 
changes by business people who should be supported by accounting personnel. 
 
Speaking of quality, astonishingly, in the researcher’s opinion, both the academic discussion within 
management accounting change research as well as Fire Ltd.’s processes lacked severely the quality 
perspectives concerning the innovation itself. For example, surely the balanced scorecard studies 
concern learning, processes, customers and financial measurements but where are the measurements 
for the management accounting systems itself concerning whether it is well or badly implemented 
or used? Similarly, FiRe Ltd. did not have systematized follow-up procedures for rolling forecasting 
as a method; only forecast deviations within monthly reporting and occasional lessons learned 
meetings were weak signs of it. What is the dipstick, with which management accountant could 
measure if the management accounting innovation is functioning as it is supposed to function? 
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Quality of accounting change is very often the big topic missing in the accounting studies 
concerning the accounting phenomenon under interest itself. What are the quality levels the 
company is trying to achieve? How could it be measured? For example accounts receivable related 
accounting change can be measured by reviewing payments on the due side and how much there are 
bad debts. Rolling forecasting could be measured through the end products that are desired and 
those effects it is originally trying to effect, for example giving better support for business people, 
and also through forecasting deviations which could show if the company had a better grasp on the 
future or not. In Fire Ltd.’s case those targets that were published for the system were quite high 
level statements without concreteness. Looking afterwards the forecasting deviations in chapter 7.5, 
even after many years after the implementation of rolling forecasting it can be stated that there were 
systematical forecasting errors that continued to persist, giving signal that no follow-up was used. 
 
The real life complexity has not been overlooked by all of the management accounting studies. 
Because many contradictions emerge in accounting change situations, instead of step-by-step 
realizations, accounting change models of Cobb et al. (1995) and Kasurinen (2002) presented a 
proper conceptualized way of encountering accounting change process situations. Kasurinen’s 
model, as it is presented in figure five and in Kasurinen’s studies, however, puts great intrinsic 
value on the change itself. Kasurinen stated that “the learning process taking place during the 
change will often become at least equally important as the outcome” and that “accordingly, in the 
future it may not anymore be appropriate to investigate management accounting change in terms of 
projects. Instead, accounting practices could be considered to be in a continuous state of change.”  
 
These statements are well in line with Bogsnes’ (2009) beyond budgeting model, in which learning 
and ongoing process are given weight and in which rolling forecasting is playing a role by updating 
quarterly views on the future. In FiRe Ltd. different organization levels surely understood what 
rolling forecasting was trying to do technically and during the research period of 2008-2014 the 
company tried to learn and improve all of the time the process of rolling forecasting. Nevertheless, 
rolling forecasting’s role in the company was understood quite differently or not understood at all. 
Ultimately the question on many lips was: “For what are we really using rolling forecasting?”. In 
addition, a systematized way of improving the process seemed to nonsexist and the benefits from 
rolling forecasting relied on individual accounting and business people’s ingeniousness. 
 
To end the discussion part, it has to be stated that there are clear signs that management accounting 
is becoming an even more humane phenomenon in its nature than ever before, not least due to the 
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changing operating environment, in which democracy, independency of individuals, liberalism, 
multichannel trading, continuing of the IT revolution, uncertainty and competition has risen. 
Laitinen (2001) predicted that employees will become the most important production factor. That is 
not hard to believe in these times when the energy revolution is behind the corner and when IT 
companies become huge success stories over night because of ingenious business ideas with low-
cost production information technology equipment. 
 
There are different improvement steps and innovations in budgeting to encounter the future, each 
suffering from different cons and enjoying from different pros. Also that research thematic is 
moving more towards innovations like the beyond budgeting model that have more to do with the 
managing culture of the organization than with budgeting techniques, views or perspectives. The 
beyond budgeting model also puts people as the most valuable asset to the forefront with the 
ultimate goal being liberation from dictatorship, micromanagement, number worshipping, calendar 
periods, hierarchies, secrecy, sticks and carrots, and all the other management myths about what is 
the best for achieving great performance in teams and organizations.  
 
As stated in the theory part of this thesis, rolling forecasting can be used as a stepping stone in 
improving investor communication and operational efficiency, getting rid of budgeting, realizing 
strategy and staying on the right track. Good managing, right mind-set of staff and suitable IT 
systems are needed and all of these were analyzed in the empirical part which clarified the case of 
rolling forecasting FiRe Ltd. The research findings did not contradict with these nowadays’ rather 
managerial research based statements of rolling forecasting. As additive findings for rolling 
forecasting’s requirements can be stated topics such as positioning and role-setting of rolling 
forecasting, creating a systematic way of improving the process and understanding forecasting 
deviations, building constructive causal relationships between real business and the forecasting 
process and having the ability to push the timely forecast through with good quality and speed 
combination. Additionally, of course, the contribution to present research is presenting a practical 
case on how rolling forecasting was implemented and used and what kind of positive results and 
successes as well as negative challenges or failures were to be found. Brief guidance for 
encountering these matters are given next in the conclusions of this study. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 143 
Conclusions 
 
The conclusions in this thesis can be categorized as pure theoretical findings, as findings and 
guidance stemming from FiRe Ltd.’s rolling forecasting case, as admitted limitations of the study 
and in that way as alignments and directions for future studies. 
 
Based on the theory framework and empirical findings, a new accounting change model presented 
in figure 35 below has grown as a distinction from earlier research. It is fitting the quite hard 
existing models from both ends, the step-by-step models and the broad accounting change model, 
into the same picture. It is evident that an accounting change model only to analyze and gaze at the 
accounting change at hand is insufficient nowadays, if accountants are to make the cultural shift 
from bean counters to business partners happen. Analyzing the operating environment is not enough, 
one has to suit and balance the levels of expectation for quality, speed and cost of accounting 
change to be contingent with the organization’s leaders, i.e. individuals, characteristics in order to 
create the potential for change. At that point zero change has happened and one only begins the 
journey towards the expected quality level with the granted time and costs.  
 
Figure 35: Proposed accounting change model and model process 
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This thesis claims that the model of Kasurinen can be developed further by introducing the nexuses 
between quality, speed and cost craving into the model, i.e. itemizing the momentum part of that 
model. Now the model can be used to analyze an accounting change situation but the model is a 
little bit rigid since it is not giving proper weight on the trade-off aspect of quality, speed and costs, 
i.e. resources. It is bypassing what innovation diffusion researchers noticed already in the late 
1970’s according to Kimblerly (1981); the research field had awakened to the myth of unlimited 
resources. When analyzing an organization’s portfolio of projects, business environment and 
accounting methods, supposedly some accounting changes could be preferably very hastily 
accomplished with left hand realization, e.g. a piloting project of new budgeting method concerning 
strategic outcomes for coming years or company inside project follow-up process, whereas some 
accounting changes might need very careful consideration with full quality realization, e.g. new 
investment accounting model, accounts payable or receivable processes. The developed model of 
Innes and Mitchell (1990), Cobb et al. (1995) and Kasurinen (2002) can be seen in figure 35 above. 
 
Kasurinen’s (2002) model has been presented in chapter 2.3 and the white not colored parts in the 
figure above include those factors that have not changed in the proposed model. The yellow parts 
include the changes whereas the orange boxes introduce a step-by-step method into the model by 
clarifying how the model can be encountered in practice. These changes are needed so that there 
would be a model somewhere in between clear-cut step-by-step procedures which overlook life’s 
complexity and the existing accounting change models which interlineally assume that change in 
itself is beneficial. Changes compared to Kasurinen’s model, i.e. breaking the momentum into 
pieces and showing the different value paths from the potential for change are elaborated next. 
 
Momentum stands for the state of expectation for continuing change. This thesis suggests that 
defining the momentum would give answers for example for rolling forecasting’s role in the 
company. Naturally expectations concerning the accounting change could also be adjusted and split 
into subcategories, namely quality expectation, speed expectation and cost expectation. These 
expectation categories are without a doubt strongly linked with each other. Of course sometimes 
there could be exceptions like keeping up the optimal pace with the change will lead to better 
quality since then issues are not forgotten and like spending more costs for consultants in the 
beginning might prove to be less expensive than doing those things with own resources. In general, 
however, it can be assumed that the correlations between quality, speed and costs can be seen as 
listed below. 
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- the more quality, the less speed and the more costs (and vice versa) 
- the more speed, the less quality and the more costs (and vice versa)   
- the more costs, the more quality and the more speed (and vice versa) 
 
Expected quality level for accounting change cannot be determined on its own. Laitinen (2001) 
mentioned that management accountant is dealing nowadays with many management tools such as 
just-in-time (JIT), flexible manufacturing systems (FMS), computer-integrated manufacture (CIM), 
total quality management (TQM), time-based management (TBM), business process re-engineering 
(BPR). According to him management accounting (MA) systems are followingly also under 
pressures to change, which has led to the rise of activity-based cost management (ABCM), life-
cycle accounting (LCA) and balanced scorecard (BC). In an ever-changing and complex world the 
accounting change has to bend to the environment. For example logistics innovations are regularly 
looked through the glasses of total quality management definitions such as the six sigma and so on.  
 
The accounting change has to be there to serve the company, not the other way around. According 
to Bogsnes (2009), the advocate for the beyond budgeting model presented in chapter 3.3, it is of 
utmost importance to determine, which control level we’re talking about: controlling the right 
picture of the present state of the business, controlling over what people shall do and what they shall 
not do or controlling the future. Precise quality and control, according to him, is needed more with 
the first one and less with the two latter ones. Malmi (2002) stated that first priority should be 
carrying out the strategy and achieving the set goals and it is really important already at the early 
stage of adoption of new systems to determine precisely what the desired end products are. That is 
determining the expected quality level. This thesis claims that the expected quality of accounting 
change should never be set without having looked at desired levels for speed and costs. 
 
Speed of accounting change on the other hand has indirectly the connotation that the speedier the 
change is the more valuable the change is. In nowadays’ business world pace is desired in many 
places, which is natural since many of us want to believe that once we have changed something we 
have earned our salary and changed the company for better. That kind of thinking guides personnel 
to change those biggest matters that are the easiest to change, not giving value to supervising or 
core activities which do not leave a track behind. Tackling this topic was one of the findings of this 
thesis, which found out that in FiRe Ltd. determining job descriptions and what rolling forecasting 
was all about in the practice and where its real value lay were accounting change topics that did not 
get sufficient answers even after many years of implementation.  
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Webster (1971) and Rogers (2003) provided one with some tools for analyzing the speed of 
innovation change. In accounting change, it would be suggestible for decision maker to make a 
proper analysis of those benefits, downsides, opportunities and threats of pushing the accounting 
change forwards. In practice, FiRe Ltd. rushed into implementation of rolling forecasting, maybe on 
purpose since the change might have not been seen as critical process in the company and maybe 
because the Finnish culture has always been so that the great victory is achieved through learning 
from many failures and maybe existing information flows needed a shook up.  
 
What FiRe Ltd. failed with, following the hasty implementation of rolling forecasting, was that it 
was unsuccessful in relaxing the team leader and subordinate levels concerning the change. There 
was a rather negative atmosphere in the company concerning rolling forecasting, many controllers 
saying ironically the statement “do work that has a purpose”. Feedback for the rolling forecasting 
process was asked every year through a survey, which was one of the rare signs of systematical tries 
to improve the process. However, the number of open comments were quite few and year after year 
they became fewer. The unrelaxed feeling in the company occurred in strong change resistance and 
in sacrificing support for business people who complained they needed assistance with other topics 
than that of rolling forecasting. Time-wise it looks like that FiRe Ltd. implemented rolling 
forecasting quite fast but it failed in developing the process since the whole process for each round 
lasted over two months. This thesis claims that the expected speed of accounting change should 
never be set without having looked at desired levels for quality and costs. 
 
Costs of accounting change have been absent in many management accounting studies so far. By 
rule no estimated implementation costs have been mentioned in currency or by stating those 
resources that are needed to accomplish the change. There have been only shallow statements such 
as Kaplan and Norton who agreed with the claim of BSC functioning best and most often in 
organizations that are driving the process of organizational change due to unprofitable and 
unsuccessful status of current situation and Dean and Cowen (1979) who concluded that in some 
situations corporations are using ZBB selectively when there is a special need for cost stabilization 
or budgeting process problems, however the tremendous resource craving sets the bar very high 
since in nowadays’ organizations training budgets and number of personnel in support functions are 
squeezed towards minimum levels.  
 
On practical level there could be such things listed as system costs, project team resource craving, 
consultant fees, training fees et cetera. It is good to bear in mind that in the accounting change 
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model by Innes and Mitchell (1990) the facilitators such as accounting staff and systems play a 
hygienic and not an executor role in management accounting changes.  That is not to be mixed with 
the updated model’s costs of accounting change, which are change specific dedicated resources and 
expectation level for costs that balance the whole momentum with the quality and speed aspects. As 
for the rolling forecasting case in FiRe Ltd., the different levels’ practical working time and nature 
was examined and that shall be presented in the conclusions part of this thesis. Also the empirical 
part of the thesis found out that the consultant support for FiRe Ltd.’s first separate forecasting 
system, BPS, was severely under resourced and had surely effects on the undesired results. In 
addition, wrongly understood idea of rolling forecasting led to subordinate level’s frustration and 
fear feelings, which definitely destroyed value in the company’s operations. 
 
In the accounting change model, it would be very interesting to examine the leaders’ part of the 
model more precisely. Concerning the diffusion of management control systems, Kimberly (1981) 
synthesized the studies examining the characteristics of administrators and other organizational 
members and found out wide research evidence that it cannot be ignored when analyzing diffusions. 
For example, if the decision maker in the organization represents the executive culture in 
Hope&Hope’s (1997) discussion about the behavioral school in knowledge management, 
accounting change might easily be under resourced and lead to those kind of changes, which 
automate tasks even at high costs and which make a lot of accounting personnel redundant. On the 
contrary, if the decision maker represents operator culture in behavioral school which believes in 
people’s power and in their collaboration, the accounting change might lead to over resourcing 
accounting change projects and to no development in automating routine tasks. This thesis claims 
that the expected costs of accounting change are strongly dependent on leaders’ characteristics and 
should never be set without having looked at desired levels for quality and speed. 
 
Having dealt with the first addition to Kasurinens’ (2002) revised accounting change model, the 
categorization of momentum into quality, speed and costs, it is suitable to present the second 
addition, which is dealing with the barriers that hinder the change, the confusers, the frustrators and 
the delayers, as Kasurinen expanded the Cobb et al.’s (1995) model. In figure 35 this is depicted as 
the yellow arrows pointing left and right from the potential for change, i.e. the value destroying path 
and value creating path in encountering these barriers. In the theory summary in chapter five the 
value destroyers were introduced as those who value change in itself and who drive change through 
with bad quality, no reasoning, insufficient resources, inadequate analysis and with no personal risk 
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embedded. On the contrary, value creator would be the one who is encountering the change 
challenges seriously and overcoming them efficiently and in good balance. 
 
The big beef of this second addition to the accounting change model is that the barriers of change 
categorized as frustrators, confusers and delayers could and should be seen often as positive things 
that have real background reasons. Along the way by wrestling with those issues the company is 
actually making the accounting change happen perhaps slower than what the momentum would be. 
However, the change would be on much firmer ground and as a matter of fact the company would 
be dealing with those issues that might be on the discomfort zone but once overcome, issues that 
would turn eventually into value-creating factors concerning the accounting innovation being 
implemented. Vice versa, too slow change might blow the whistle on examining the issues too 
meticulously and too hasty change might indicate that the hierarchical organization’s leaders are 
favoring changes at any cost and thus pushing them by downplaying the real issues concerning the 
accounting innovation’s successful implementation and development.  
 
As for rolling forecasting studies, Hansen (2011) found out that rolling forecasting generates a set 
of complex interactions between functions, which was similar to the case study findings in this 
thesis when examining the complex network of arranging the forecasting process and the end 
products rolling forecasting was providing. In other words, there are many leaders and barriers of 
change present in the accounting change situation. By setting correct levels for desired quality, 
speed of change and costs, i.e. resources to be used, the barriers can be encountered more efficiently 
and thus the company can be guided to a value creating path, along which the real issues are tackled 
and other interactive linkages between functions improved.  
 
All this wants to ground the fact that two additions, momentum categorization and value creating or 
destroying path of encountering barriers of change, are both needed since they’re so obviously 
intertwined with each other. One might believe that this would be the proper point for adding the 
counterarrow from accounting change to momentum in figure 35 in the same way as Cobb et al. 
(1995) did it and what Kasurinen (2002) surprisingly made disappear in his model. This research, in 
turn, suggests another way of ensuring the accounting change process is running around and that the 
actual change happening is in turn affecting the momentum and its subparts. It suggests the 
following five point process not only to conceptualize the accounting change model but to see the 
model constantly in motion. 
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1. Analyze environmental factors 
a. Motivators (business, competition and market environment) 
b. Facilitators (is change even possible with present staff and systems) 
c. Catalysts (company financial performance) 
2. Determine and adjust expectation level of momentum 
a. Desired level of quality of accounting change (minimum level, what as indicators) 
b. Desired level of speed of accounting change (delay and avoid risk or vice versa) 
c. Desired level of costs of accounting change (project follow-up, direct costs etc.) 
3. Analyze barriers of change and make action and project plans for overcoming those 
a. Confusers (e.g. dealing with change resistance and promoting learning) 
b. Frustrators (e.g. cultural adaptability and reporting suitability) 
c. Delayers (e.g. strategy matching and documentation requirements) 
4. Measure accounting change through set expectation levels for quality, speed and costs 
5. Observe accounting change through broad level perspective 
a. Strategy relationship 
b. Other functions’ needs and goals and how the change is serving those 
c. Feedback received from other functions 
d. Risk maps, strategy maps, other accounting systems, SWOT-analysis 
Reanalyze points 1-5 at frequent intervals, constantly improve and reset weight areas 
 
At this point, one has to realize that the accounting change can lead to consequences which either 
destroy or create value by answering those challenges the barriers of different nature are bringing 
up. In order to avoid situations, in which accounting projects either proceed to goal no matter what 
or stop permanently because of the pedantic desire for turning every stone on the way, a follow-up 
is needed in respect of measuring the change’s quality, speed and cost. That happens along the way, 
whether the project has a starting point and end point or whether the accounting change is of 
permanent kind. Once the status of accounting change has been analyzed, the accounting change 
cannot be isolated from what has happened in other frameworks of the organization and it cannot 
deny the feedback and guidance it is getting because accounting function is there to serve the 
organization, not the other way around. Once this broader picture has been clarified, the model’s 
process can restart and adjust every detail or alignment to better match the ultimate goal of this 
model: either maximize the value created by the accounting change or stop changes in time that 
would destroy value. 
 
Counted as one of the conclusions of this thesis are naturally the answers provided concerning 
rolling forecasting in relationship with the research question stated in chapter 1.2: “How does 
rolling forecasting function in everyday operations, how does it bring the aimed results, and how 
are the results viewed in different levels of an organization?” These answers presented in table 16 
below represent in their part the distinction from earlier research which did not include such 
implementation or continuous usage studies of rolling forecasting.  
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Management represented the macro-level understanding of rolling forecasting due to its 
responsibility to make sure that the organization matched with strategy and other broader picture 
topics. Subordinates stood for the micro-level and knew stories from the details and how they 
affected the big picture delivered by rolling forecasting. Middle-management was responsible for 
making the rolling forecasting process roll around and deliver the results management desired with 
the subordinates’ skills and time. There is no need to repeat what is stated in table 16. Nevertheless, 
the most surprising observations are brought into the light. 
 
On the question how does rolling forecasting function it was surprising to find out that the 
subordinate level was really occasionally using the rolling forecasting process to evaluate the past. 
One of the key points in rolling forecasting is the emphasis on the future. John F. Kennedy’s 
famous quote said followingly: “Change is the law of life. And those who look only to the past or 
present are certain to miss the future.” This sentence has so much meaning for rolling forecasting 
when thought carefully. Firstly, rolling forecasting was indeed used for learning the past. Secondly, 
it often failed to create new insights as the forecasting was so heavily based on near history actuals. 
FiRe Ltd., as learned in chapter 7.5, made continuously many systematic forecasting errors for some 
region and division combinations. That was a sign that rolling forecast was actually a bad quality 
plan that resembled the yearly traditional budgeting, at least from the eyes of the subordinates. 
 
On the question “everyday” the cost of having rolling forecasting around was measured through its 
resource craving on different levels. Surprisingly, it was revealing that the subordinate level had to 
accomplish those forecasts in the same time as month end process and reporting was going on. As 
surprising was that the management level was practically always somehow tied to rolling 
forecasting, always being forced to be aware of the latest budget, i.e. RP2, latest forecasting round 
and the coming forecasting round. As for the middle-management level, it was surprising that even 
though they spent two months every round, they did not devote their time a lot for improving the 
process nor systematically following the deviations. If they would have analyzed a longer time-span 
of account and region and division combinations, they would have found the results accomplished 
in this thesis, and surely they would have taken action in order to correct those systematic failures. 
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 In different levels of an organization? (Macro- vs. micro-level) 
 
 
  
 Management Middle-management Subordinates 
 (CEO, board & CFO) (Business controllers, (Business people, 
  team leaders) controllers) 
 
How does rolling 
forecasting function? 
(basics of rolling 
forecasting) 
 
 
Assuring an updated view 
on business environment, 
sensitivity analysis of 
business actions and the 
link to strategy 
 
Important tool in thinking 
things through, finding of 
causalities and pushing real 
business onwards with the 
help of rolling forecasting 
 
Budgeting four times a 
year. Sometimes finding 
real money actions when 
forecasting based on near 
history actuals 
 
Work during one round 
(on average) 
Everyday?  
(time-span of rolling 
forecasting and resource 
burden) 
 
3 months, guiding role,  
5 full work days,  
a lot of off-work time 
 
2 months, active role,  
2 weeks of full work days, 
moderately off-work time 
 
 
 
2 weeks, executor role, 
2 weeks of full work days, 
little off-work time 
 
 
 
 
Operations?  
(micro-level work) 
 
 
Work done mainly in 
meetings and all-alone 
 
Early phase meeting giving 
focus areas and targets and 
late phase meeting  
reviewing and 
summarizing 
Work done in mixed 
environments 
 
Managing the whole 
forecasting process, key 
role in understanding 
management’s ideas and 
making sure their inclusion 
Work done with spread-
sheets and systems 
 
Taking care of details in all 
respects, gathering 
graspable figures behind 
actions and putting in 
figures for cost centers 
 
Aimed results?  
(promised results, SWOT 
and their correspondence to 
the reality) 
 
 
+ Guidance guaranteed for 
board work and owners. 
Modernizing management. 
- Never-ending 
responsibility and stiff 
action-coincidence 
relationship 
 
+ Two-storey assurance of 
running business  
(actuals versus last year 
and versus rolling forecast) 
- Drowned in matching 
teamwork with chronically 
changing situations 
 
+ Observations of possible 
real business actions, clear-
cut responsibility areas 
- Distorted by repetition of 
same non-value producing 
tasks. Same big amount of 
work needed always 
Table 16: Research question posed in a table with summed up answers 
 
 
 
Macro-level      Micro-level 
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On the question “operations” which looked though a microscope the actual work done by different 
levels, it can be stated that even today the dominance of spreadsheets as the actual forecasting tool 
is quite overwhelming. The systems used were nowhere near what could be done in a versatile 
manner in spreadsheets. Often the forecasting IT solution was used only for storing and saving the 
forecasting figures and also for consolidating the results so that subparts would match with FiRe 
Ltd.’s company view. Even in reporting, figures were often imported straight to spreadsheets, 
through which presentations were prepared. Ready reports from the system were of quite bad 
quality suffering from unreadability, slow navigation tree and low level of flexibility. 
 
On the question “aimed results” FiRe Ltd. should seek for answers the most in the future. This can 
be best seen in the middle-management level who was drowned in the chronically changing 
situations concerning the process which had to be changed round after round. Fire Ltd. aimed for a 
12 months rolling outlook to inform board and owners, two-storey assurance for running the 
business and systematic and real planning of the future. In practice it got mixed results. 
 
As straightforward advice as the researcher dares to point to FiRe Ltd.’s decision makers 
concerning its management model and rolling forecasting, it can be formulated in the following way. 
In the future it’s time to seriously consider, whether the rolling forecast would be crafted four times 
a year. Almost every level of the organization showed signs of becoming numb with the whole 
process. Presumably devoting one round per year to process development, analyzing of 
accomplished rounds’ deviations or actuals or other business areas would be rewarding and would 
boost the quality of all the three rounds that would continue to exist. For example having a change 
log of forecasting principles and special guidance would be highly beneficial since now the 
subordinates forgot the made decisions round after round. 
 
Another thing is giving much more both freedom and responsibility to those who forecast the 
figures into the system and to those who organize the process from middle-management. An eager 
regional manager would have to be able to enter his or her figures into the system two years ahead. 
Then there would be the responsibility to update the figures every month if the view on the future 
had changed for some reason. If there were no changes on the outlook, the regional manager and the 
cooperative accounting professional would save a lot of working time and could use the time to run 
the business as efficiently as possible.  
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Different deadlines for different division and region combinations could easily be launched, 
copying the lean-thinking ideology from logistics in a sense so that the finalized figures and 
returned templates could be analyzed smoother instead of having a lot of bottle necks in the process. 
As for the owners and board, it would be surely enough to state that the outlook on the future has 
not changed for the rest of the calendar year or coming 12 months. Owners would steer FiRe Ltd.’s 
board surely otherwise if they knew how rolling forecasting was functioning inside the company, 
from that the researcher is sure of. They would guide the process towards less-is-more thinking and 
make people care for those figures they estimate. Now the reality proved two things: firstly the 
accounting personnel are that type of people who employ themselves when they are given a ledger 
and responsibility to forecast. Secondly figures did not matter on too many levels since there was 
only one month when the new rolling forecasting process began once the latest one had finished. 
 
For envisioning the future of rolling forecasting, the researcher suggests getting to know with the 
beyond budgeting model. If not implemented as such, it gives at least a lot of thinking tools to 
overcome those budgeting deficiencies that have followed FiRe Ltd. even though it has abandoned 
the traditional yearly budget. The finding here is that those weaknesses of the yearly budget can 
follow rolling forecasting and that shifting to rolling forecasting does not guarantee anything if not 
positioned and used with the correct mind-set owning accounting personnel. One sign of this is the 
target setting process that relies heavily on one of the rounds, the RP2, which is called the budget 
for some reason. This leads to a biased view on the future since business responsible managers are 
trying to lie their capability of bringing in results. Thus it is highly suggestible to detach the 
rewarding system from the rolling forecasting process as much as possible.  
 
Now rolling forecasting is playing a multitude of roles in FiRe Ltd. and often it is surrounded with 
mixed opinions depending on who one asks, whether it is used for rewarding, operational planning, 
realistic view on the future, performance evaluation, communication of goals or for strategy 
formation. Clarifying the aimed results would be the proper starting point in improving rolling 
forecasting in FiRe Ltd., after which of utmost importance would be to relax the atmosphere around 
the process, thus releasing people from the bane of being fed up with number crunching and 
irrelevant tiny deviations and giving them the possibility to concentrate on issues having the most 
value and to be real business partners whose work would be evaluated by the business unit directors 
whose functions could benefit from the services of the accounting professionals. 
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As for the limitations of this study, they are many. While getting access to extensive data, the 
researcher had a working relationship with the case company which might have had a blinding 
effect on the examined topic due to being too close on the research subject. Also, working as a 
subordinate possesses a risk of having diverged results to be favorable to the subordinate level and 
unfavorable to the middle-management and management levels. Also, threatening the external 
validity of the study, the research results consisted only of one case company, which was, however, 
studied in a deep and extensive manner. Additionally, only one industry, the retail business, was 
examined with only two different markets, the DIY market and the grocery market. 
 
Yet another limitation was that rolling forecasting related interviews, totaling 13 interviews, were 
heavily accounting personnel weighted with only two interviews that were held with non-
accounting people, the investment manager and the consultant ordered by the management to 
examine rolling forecasting. The scope of studied financial figures was extensive but not without 
limitations: only operating profit items were under the loop, leaving thus other results items, 
balance sheet items, e.g. investments, unnoticed. Another limitation of the study was that there were 
few academic studies concerning rolling forecasting and that no studies of this kind concerning 
rolling forecasting had taken place to date. 
 
The study accepted the contingency theory and admits that there might be different results with 
other kind of environments, organization structures and technological aspects. There is assumedly a 
weak possibility for replication to take place with this kind of a study, which is the prerequisite for a 
study to be of generalizable nature. For management accounting research field it is exactly the 
studies that can show how rolling forecasting function in different kinds of settings that are needed 
before there are better grounds for stating the right questions for statistical studies.  
 
This study, “Micro-level diffusion of management control systems: rolling forecasting in the 
Finnish Retail Ltd.”, challenges the upcoming studies to test the proposed accounting change model 
and model process both with accounting innovations and ongoing accounting change situations. It 
would be very interesting to gather more knowledge on how successful and unsuccessful 
accounting changes are managed. In what components would the differences, if any, be found: 
motivators, facilitators, catalysts, momentum – i.e. quality, speed and cost – leaders, and barriers of 
change – i.e. frustrators, confusers and delayers. The quantification of at least some of these 
components would enable further opportunities for studying accounting change. More concretely, it 
might be fruitful to find out how accounting change differs, if it differs, in wealthy versus suffering 
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companies, with men versus women and elderly versus young leaders, in speedy vs calm 
realizations, in small versus big accounting departments or organizations, in clear-cut versus 
impenetrable strategy companies and in European versus American companies. The questions that 
arise are almost limitless.  
 
In the information wave’s era businesses have more data available than ever and businesses are 
constantly under turbulent changes. Thus more agile accounting models are needed so the change 
could be steered and relevant data could be distinct from irrelevant data. The beyond budgeting 
model tries to provide answers for these issues and suggests that budgets are the “biggest roadblock 
to the future” that give focus too much on the short-term. Therefore, especially from rolling 
forecasting’s perspective, studying how rolling forecasting is used within the beyond budgeting 
model might be worth examining because of the different breeding ground for rolling forecasting 
compared to this thesis, in which the case company transformed from traditional yearly budgeting 
to rolling forecasting without having heard a single word of the beyond budgeting model. Could the 
beyond budgeting model perish those shadows of the traditional yearly budget that followed the 
case company in this thesis as it transformed to rolling forecasting? 
 
As a final note and recommendation for researching rolling forecasting even more, would be the 
chance to look into what other functions than accounting have to say about rolling forecasting. For 
which functions is it most worth of and for which is it only an occasional compulsory bad? Is it any 
good for store managing, strategy work, CEO level work, real estate operations, IT operations, 
treasury operations, PR work, marketing, risk management or internal audit? Interest groups, some 
as information vendors and some as customers, may have different views by possessing natural 
interest or disinterest and thus accounting function could handle them differently as for taking care 
of rolling forecasting’s process. For decades, the biggest pitfall traditionally for a management 
accountant has been self-employing encapsulation in the accounting function, beancounting oneself 
to exhaustion without any real value. Today, with vast amount of data available and management 
accountants already on the streets, the biggest pitfall for a management accountant is 
misinterpreting the data through not knowing the information vendor nor the customer. In 
nowadays’ organizations management accountants carry a huge responsibility of delivering timely, 
correct, relevant and understandable data in order to secure fact-based managing of the business. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 – Interview template 1 (implementation phase) 
 
The interview will last for maximum 2 hours. Interview method is theme interview, i.e. 
discussion about chosen topics which need extra information. 
 
 
The following questions and claims can be examined by the interviewee in order to be prepared. 
 
Questions: 
 
 
- What is your own position in realizing rolling forecasting in the company? 
 
- Who is the father of rolling forecasting in your company and with what groundings did the 
company entitle the implementation phase of such budgeting method? 
 
- Please name 3 essential advantages and 3 most difficult issues concerning rolling forecasting. 
 
- What kind of role does rolling forecasting have in your company? 
o Supporting management’s decisions or operational cause? 
o What is rolling forecasting’s position in relation with other information or 
controlling systems? 
 
- Does rolling forecasting bring also other changes to the budgeting process of the company? 
 
- Is rolling forecasting implemented through a pilot project in some certain department? 
Would it be advantageous to implemented it first through a pilot. 
 
- Has rolling forecasting already caused any concrete changes concerning business actions of 
FiRe Ltd.? 
 
- How should one measure the success of rolling forecasting as a budgeting method (what 
factors)? 
 
- Who are the responsible persons of running rolling forecasting? Should you broaden or 
narrow this responsibility? Whose absence (e.g. due to sick leave) would cause the most 
headache in accomplishing and how would he or she be replaced? 
 
- How does FiRe Ltd. conduct the actual forecasting? 
o With special cases (huge market distractions or occasions?) 
o With what kind of forecasting systems? 
o Who is doing the actual forecasting work? 
o Are the forecasts modified later on and who has this modification or alterion right? 
 
- Are you having other major projects than rolling forecasting ongoing in your department or 
in the company? 
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- Have you experienced rolling forecasting as extra burden? 
o if no, why not? 
o if yes, for what reason? 
 
- How is rolling forecasting resonating with other organization levels? How remarkable is 
their effect on forecasts and how the necessity of rolling forecasting has been justified? 
 
- Is rolling forecasting linked with some particular information system? Have the 
consequences of maintaining of such system been analyzed? How are you taking care of 
training employees? 
 
- What kind of rewarding system you’re having in your company and how do you think 
rolling forecasting is affecting it? 
 
- You have now accomplished rolling forecasting two times in FiRe Ltd. Have you 
recognized any learning or possibly any shortening in the completion process of rolling 
forecasting? 
 
 
Claims: 
 
- Rolling forecasting weakens the motivation level of lower organization levels because the 
sense of surveillance grows too much. In this relation creativity and sense for 
entrepreneurship suffer. 
 
- Rolling forecasting is aiming for success in too short a period of time and that leads to 
distraction of the company’s mission and the journey towards the vision becomes more 
difficult. 
 
- The ultimate meaning of rolling forecasting is to put all organization levels in one line as for 
understanding that information brings competitive advantage and that’s why fostering 
information advantages is important. 
 
- It is beneficial to time rolling forecasting to other time slots than financial statements for the 
financial year or quarters since then there is lack of time. Always when there’s time it is 
worth preparing the next round for rolling forecasting. 
 
- Management’s commitment to the project is the most vital factor in succeeding with rolling 
forecasting’s implementation and usage. 
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Appendix 2 – Interview template 2 (continuous usage phase) 
 
Contents of the interview: 
 
Introduction to the research and interview (about 5 min) 
 
Interview Questions (about 30 min) 
 
1. Basics of rolling forecasting: 
  
 What role  For what is it used and who is using it? 
 What outcomes  What does one get out of rolling forecasting and why is one using it? 
 What is rolling forecasting’s position in the organization ( financial administration / other 
departments)? 
 
2. Background of rolling forecasting 
 
 When was the implementation and with what forewords? 
 Wow has it developed along the years? 
 Have rolling forecasting’s methods stabilized or are things still changing a lot? 
 
3. The actual planning 
 
 What kind of a process/period is rolling forecasting? How do you see your own contribution 
to the forecast? What practical job tasks do you do during the process and how do you 
succeed? 
 
4. Rolling forecasting in other departments 
 
 What do other interest groups do in the forecasting process? What is the cooperation like?  
 What is your superiors/colleagues/subordinates doing in the forecasting process?  
 How do the interest groups or superiors/colleagues/subordinates take rolling forecasting?  
 
5. How could you improve the present system? What shortcomings do you see in the process or 
outcomes of rolling forecasting? 
 
 What kind of forecasting errors are there? 
 What were the reasons for errors or for the lacking forecasting process?  
 What opportunities are there still to take profit of? 
 How are you going to overcome shortcoming and errors and how are you going to take 
advantage of the still unfulfilled promises of rolling forecasting? 
 What would happen if rolling forecasting was abandoned and the business would be planned 
otherwise? 
 
Free discussion about rolling forecasting (about 15 min): 
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Appendix 3 – Customer satisfaction rate 
 
“Im satisfied with rolling forecasting instructions and reporting templates” 
 
2013          2012 
  
 
    
  
 
1 2 3 4 5 None 1 2 3 4 5 None 
Totally 
Agree 
Partly 
Agree 
Yes 
and No 
Partly 
disagree 
Totally 
disagree 
Have not 
used 
1 2 3 4 5 None 
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Appendix 4 – Finnish Retail Ltd. Organization charts 
 
Organization chart of the case company: 
 
FiRe Ltd. HQ
Other
Divisions
DIY
Division
Grocery
Division
Strategy and Research
Unit
Finance and Accounting
Department
IT Operations
Unit
Internal Audit and 
Risk Management
HR and PR
Department
Legal Unit
Store Site Operations, Concept
Unit and Warehousing
 
 
HQ functions fully controlling or supporting the divisions: 
 
FiRe Ltd. HQ
Stores
Grocery Division
Store Site Operations, Concept Unit,
Marketing and Warehousing
(Low control)
Finance Operations
(Fully controlled)
Legal Unit
(FiRe Ltd. level deals with law firms
IT Operations Unit 
(Fully controlled)
Internal Audit and Risk Management
(Internal Audit fully controlled)
Accounting 
(Financial Controlling and Guidelines)
Strategy and Research Unit
(Big alignments and common research)
Stores
Division
Leader
DIY Division
Division
Leader
Grocery Division
CEO
P
R
O
D
U
C
T 
LI
N
ES
C
H
A
IN
S
Accounting
Business Controlling
Store Site Operations, Concept Unit,
Marketing and Warehousing
Legal Unit 
for business specific needs
Risk Management
for division purpose
P
R
O
D
U
C
T 
LI
N
ES
Management Group’s duty to 
develop the division strategy
C
H
A
IN
S
Accounting
Business Controlling
Store Site Operations, Concept Unit,
Marketing and Warehousing
Legal Unit 
for business specific needs
Risk Management
for division purpose
Management Group’s duty to 
develop the division strategy
Store manager and
personnel
Store manager and
personnel
HQ services ”invoiced” through
internal accounting from Divisions.
HQ is a zero-profit unit and divisions
showing all of the P&L and capital 
employed
C
o
sts
Shopping
centers
Management model:
- Vertical Division 
hierarchy
- Horizontal Matrix
responsibilities
- Profitability
controls measured
For Chains
For Product Lines
For Stores
For Investments
For Business actions
For Fixed Costs
Management model:
- Vertical Division 
hierarchy
- Horizontal Matrix
responsibilities
- Profitability
controls measured
For Chains
For Product Lines
For Stores
For Investments
For Business actions
For Fixed Costs
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Appendix 5 – Finnish Retail Ltd. Rolling Forecast financial data  
 
FiRe Ltd. (Full year accuracy) 
Full year accuracy Full year accuracy Full year accuracy Full year accuracy Full year accuracy
2009-2014* 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014
1st RP1 (12mths) RP2 (12 mths) RP3 (9mths) RP4 (6 mths) 2nd RP1 (3 mths)
Sales Deviations in units
On Average -184,1 -118,0 -100,2 -73,6 -21,8
On Average (with absolute values) 239,7 155,4 140,4 87,1 39,4
Standard Deviation 376,8 187,4 173,6 97,4 53,4
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 337,1 152,3 137,2 83,3 39,8
Range 1 041,7 570,9 575,3 265,2 167,8
Maximum 133,1 130,9 140,8 47,4 44,7
Minimum -908,7 -440,0 -434,4 -217,8 -123,1
Sales Deviations in %
On Average -5,6 % -3,8 % -3,0 % -2,4 % -0,7 %
On Average (with absolute values) 7,8 % 5,3 % 4,7 % 2,9 % 1,4 %
Standard Deviation 11,8 % 6,1 % 5,5 % 3,1 % 1,8 %
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 10,2 % 4,6 % 3,9 % 2,5 % 1,2 %
Range 33,4 % 18,1 % 18,4 % 8,9 % 5,7 %
Maximum 5,5 % 5,4 % 5,8 % 1,9 % 1,8 %
Minimum -27,9 % -12,7 % -12,6 % -7,0 % -3,9 %  
 
Gross Margin Deviations in units
On Average -45,0 -34,9 -29,1 -21,6 -6,0
On Average (with absolute values) 48,9 35,8 31,5 21,6 7,2
Standard Deviation 65,2 34,6 27,6 21,4 9,8
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 61,7 33,5 24,3 21,4 8,8
Range 183,4 99,6 83,0 58,3 29,7
Maximum 11,8 3,1 8,4 -3,0 4,2
Minimum -171,6 -96,4 -74,6 -61,2 -25,5
Gross Margin Deviations in %
On Average -10,0 % -8,3 % -7,0 % -5,3 % -1,4 %
On Average (with absolute values) 11,0 % 8,5 % 7,6 % 5,3 % 1,8 %
Standard Deviation 13,6 % 7,5 % 6,1 % 4,8 % 2,3 %
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 12,6 % 7,2 % 5,1 % 4,8 % 2,0 %
Range 39,1 % 20,1 % 17,8 % 13,0 % 7,2 %
Maximum 3,1 % 0,8 % 2,2 % -0,8 % 1,3 %
Minimum -36,0 % -19,3 % -15,6 % -13,7 % -6,0 %  
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FiRe Ltd. (Full year accuracy) 
Full year accuracy Full year accuracy Full year accuracy Full year accuracy Full year accuracy
2009-2014* 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014
1st RP1 (12mths) RP2 (12 mths) RP3 (9mths) RP4 (6 mths) 2nd RP1 (3 mths)
Other Operating Income Deviations in units
On Average 3,0 3,9 2,6 2,6 0,9
On Average (with absolute values) 5,3 6,1 5,6 3,8 3,5
Standard Deviation 5,6 5,7 6,7 4,9 4,9
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 2,8 2,8 4,0 3,8 3,2
Range 13,5 15,8 17,6 13,3 15,3
Maximum 8,1 8,9 11,1 9,7 7,7
Minimum -5,4 -6,9 -6,5 -3,6 -7,6
Other Operating Income Deviations in %
On Average 2,8 % 4,0 % 2,8 % 2,6 % 0,9 %
On Average (with absolute values) 4,9 % 5,8 % 5,4 % 3,7 % 3,2 %
Standard Deviation 5,2 % 5,3 % 6,3 % 4,8 % 4,4 %
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 2,5 % 2,7 % 4,0 % 3,9 % 2,9 %
Range 12,3 % 14,5 % 15,6 % 13,4 % 13,4 %
Maximum 7,3 % 8,9 % 10,2 % 10,2 % 6,9 %
Minimum -4,9 % -5,6 % -5,3 % -3,2 % -6,5 %  
 
Personnel Expenses Deviations in units
On Average 11,3 7,6 7,6 8,6 2,5
On Average (with absolute values) 14,2 7,9 9,1 8,8 2,9
Standard Deviation 29,2 12,0 9,2 9,0 3,7
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 27,6 11,7 7,5 8,7 3,3
Range 75,5 26,2 27,3 25,7 10,6
Maximum 70,5 25,4 22,4 24,9 9,3
Minimum -5,1 -0,8 -4,9 -0,8 -1,3
Personnel Expenses Deviations in %
On Average -5,1 % -3,9 % -4,0 % -4,4 % -1,3 %
On Average (with absolute values) 6,7 % 4,1 % 4,8 % 4,5 % 1,6 %
Standard Deviation 13,3 % 6,2 % 4,7 % 4,3 % 1,9 %
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 12,4 % 6,1 % 3,7 % 4,1 % 1,6 %
Range 34,8 % 14,9 % 13,2 % 12,4 % 5,4 %
Maximum 2,9 % 0,5 % 2,8 % 0,5 % 0,8 %
Minimum -31,9 % -14,4 % -10,4 % -12,0 % -4,6 %  
 
  
 
 
 172 
FiRe Ltd. (Full year accuracy) 
Full year accuracy Full year accuracy Full year accuracy Full year accuracy Full year accuracy
2009-2014* 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014
1st RP1 (12mths) RP2 (12 mths) RP3 (9mths) RP4 (6 mths) 2nd RP1 (3 mths)
Rent Expenses Deviations in units
On Average -1,5 -2,1 -0,1 1,3 -0,4
On Average (with absolute values) 2,9 2,2 1,5 2,2 1,6
Standard Deviation 3,7 2,2 2,0 3,8 2,1
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 2,5 2,0 1,1 3,3 1,4
Range 8,9 6,7 5,4 12,3 6,6
Maximum 2,7 0,4 1,4 9,4 4,1
Minimum -6,3 -6,3 -4,0 -2,8 -2,5
Rent Expenses Deviations in %
On Average 1,8 % 2,6 % 0,1 % -1,3 % 0,5 %
On Average (with absolute values) 3,5 % 2,7 % 1,8 % 2,3 % 1,8 %
Standard Deviation 4,5 % 2,7 % 2,4 % 3,9 % 2,5 %
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 3,1 % 2,5 % 1,4 % 3,3 % 1,6 %
Range 10,7 % 8,2 % 6,3 % 12,7 % 7,8 %
Maximum 7,4 % 7,7 % 4,7 % 3,3 % 3,4 %
Minimum -3,3 % -0,4 % -1,6 % -9,4 % -4,4 %  
 
IT Costs Deviations in units
On Average 1,2 1,5 1,3 1,1 0,3
On Average (with absolute values) 1,3 1,7 2,1 1,7 0,4
Standard Deviation 1,0 1,5 2,4 1,6 0,4
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 0,9 1,4 1,6 0,9 0,2
Range 3,1 4,0 8,2 4,9 1,3
Maximum 2,8 3,7 5,4 2,9 0,7
Minimum -0,3 -0,3 -2,9 -2,0 -0,6
IT Costs Deviations in %
On Average -5,2 % -6,4 % -4,3 % -4,0 % -1,1 %
On Average (with absolute values) 5,5 % 7,0 % 9,3 % 7,3 % 2,0 %
Standard Deviation 3,8 % 6,4 % 11,0 % 7,5 % 2,1 %
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 3,2 % 5,7 % 6,5 % 3,5 % 1,1 %
Range 11,7 % 15,2 % 36,0 % 22,6 % 6,4 %
Maximum 1,0 % 1,3 % 17,4 % 11,7 % 3,2 %
Minimum -10,8 % -13,8 % -18,6 % -10,8 % -3,2 %  
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FiRe Ltd. (Full year accuracy) 
Full year accuracy Full year accuracy Full year accuracy Full year accuracy Full year accuracy
2009-2014* 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014
1st RP1 (12mths) RP2 (12 mths) RP3 (9mths) RP4 (6 mths) 2nd RP1 (3 mths)
Marketing Expenses Deviations in units
On Average 3,1 1,0 0,9 1,3 0,8
On Average (with absolute values) 5,2 3,3 2,9 2,0 1,3
Standard Deviation 7,3 4,1 3,4 2,0 1,5
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 5,7 2,3 1,7 1,2 1,0
Range 20,3 11,5 9,7 4,9 4,5
Maximum 16,1 6,7 6,1 3,5 3,1
Minimum -4,2 -4,8 -3,6 -1,4 -1,5
Marketing Expenses Deviations in %
On Average -6,1 % -1,8 % -1,5 % -3,0 % -1,8 %
On Average (with absolute values) 11,5 % 8,4 % 7,3 % 4,7 % 3,1 %
Standard Deviation 16,0 % 10,6 % 8,6 % 4,7 % 3,6 %
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 11,9 % 5,9 % 3,8 % 2,6 % 2,3 %
Range 44,7 % 29,3 % 24,0 % 11,3 % 10,9 %
Maximum 10,7 % 15,3 % 11,1 % 3,5 % 3,9 %
Minimum -33,9 % -14,0 % -12,9 % -7,8 % -7,0 %  
 
Maintenance Costs Deviations in units
On Average 4,4 4,7 2,8 2,2 1,1
On Average (with absolute values) 4,4 4,7 2,8 2,2 1,1
Standard Deviation 4,8 3,6 1,7 1,5 0,9
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 4,8 3,6 1,7 1,5 0,8
Range 12,8 9,7 4,7 4,2 2,5
Maximum 13,4 10,6 4,7 4,3 2,4
Minimum 0,7 0,8 0,0 0,1 -0,1
Maintenance Costs Deviations in %
On Average -10,5 % -11,6 % -7,3 % -5,7 % -2,9 %
On Average (with absolute values) 10,5 % 11,6 % 7,3 % 5,7 % 3,1 %
Standard Deviation 10,7 % 8,6 % 4,4 % 3,7 % 2,5 %
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 10,7 % 8,6 % 4,4 % 3,7 % 2,2 %
Range 28,6 % 23,1 % 13,3 % 9,4 % 6,3 %
Maximum -1,7 % -2,4 % 0,0 % -0,3 % 0,4 %
Minimum -30,3 % -25,5 % -13,3 % -9,8 % -5,8 %  
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FiRe Ltd. (Full year accuracy) 
Full year accuracy Full year accuracy Full year accuracy Full year accuracy Full year accuracy
2009-2014* 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014
1st RP1 (12mths) RP2 (12 mths) RP3 (9mths) RP4 (6 mths) 2nd RP1 (3 mths)
Other Operating Costs Deviations in units
On Average 8,9 5,4 5,6 2,3 0,2
On Average (with absolute values) 8,9 7,2 7,5 5,0 2,4
Standard Deviation 6,2 6,7 6,2 6,2 3,3
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 6,2 4,2 3,1 4,0 2,1
Range 14,2 22,5 20,2 20,1 10,2
Maximum 16,9 16,3 13,5 11,1 4,1
Minimum 2,7 -6,3 -6,7 -9,0 -6,1
Other Operating Costs Deviations in %
On Average -15,9 % -10,3 % -10,5 % -4,7 % -0,9 %
On Average (with absolute values) 15,9 % 13,6 % 14,1 % 10,0 % 5,0 %
Standard Deviation 10,9 % 12,5 % 11,8 % 12,5 % 6,8 %
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 10,9 % 7,9 % 6,0 % 8,0 % 4,1 %
Range 24,4 % 41,9 % 39,0 % 40,7 % 20,7 %
Maximum -5,2 % 11,8 % 12,6 % 17,9 % 11,5 %
Minimum -29,6 % -30,2 % -26,4 % -22,8 % -9,3 %  
 
Depreciations and Impairments Deviations in units
On Average 1,4 -6,1 -5,8 -5,8 0,4
On Average (with absolute values) 2,0 7,4 6,9 6,9 1,0
Standard Deviation 2,3 16,9 16,1 16,4 1,4
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 1,7 16,3 15,6 15,9 0,9
Range 7,0 46,8 44,1 45,2 3,6
Maximum 5,3 2,4 1,9 2,4 2,3
Minimum -1,7 -44,4 -42,2 -42,8 -1,4
Depreciations and Impairments Deviations in %
On Average -3,3 % 16,9 % 15,2 % 15,5 % -0,5 %
On Average (with absolute values) 4,4 % 19,7 % 17,4 % 17,6 % 1,9 %
Standard Deviation 5,3 % 46,4 % 41,6 % 42,9 % 2,6 %
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 4,2 % 45,0 % 40,6 % 41,9 % 1,6 %
Range 15,9 % 127,0 % 113,0 % 117,0 % 7,6 %
Maximum 3,4 % 121,7 % 109,4 % 112,6 % 3,1 %
Minimum -12,5 % -5,2 % -3,6 % -4,4 % -4,6 %  
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FiRe Ltd. (Full year accuracy) 
 
Full year accuracy Full year accuracy Full year accuracy Full year accuracy Full year accuracy
2009-2014* 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014
1st RP1 (12mths) RP2 (12 mths) RP3 (9mths) RP4 (6 mths) 2nd RP1 (3 mths)  
Operating Profit Deviations in units
On Average -13,7 -13,0 -7,8 -2,2 -1,2
On Average (with absolute values) 27,9 22,2 18,8 11,4 8,8
Standard Deviation 31,8 29,3 25,5 14,7 11,3
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 17,4 21,9 17,6 8,3 6,3
Range 89,1 92,6 75,2 42,9 32,7
Maximum 29,6 22,9 19,7 15,1 12,4
Minimum -59,5 -69,6 -55,5 -27,8 -20,3
Operating Profit Deviations in %
On Average 75,6 % 49,5 % 47,0 % 35,5 % 33,1 %
On Average (with absolute values) 75,6 % 49,5 % 47,0 % 35,5 % 33,1 %
Standard Deviation 32,7 % 19,8 % 19,4 % 16,1 % 22,4 %
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 32,7 % 19,8 % 19,4 % 16,1 % 22,4 %
Range 87,0 % 53,9 % 55,8 % 51,6 % 67,5 %
Maximum 116,9 % 66,1 % 64,3 % 59,2 % 77,3 %
Minimum 29,9 % 12,2 % 8,5 % 7,6 % 9,8 %  
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FiRe Ltd. (Consecutive months’ accuracy, periodic) 
 
RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3,RP4
and 2nd RP1 and 2nd RP1 and 2nd RP1 RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3 RP2,RP3 RP2,RP3 RP2 RP2 RP2
2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014
1st month 2nd month 3rd month 4th month 5th month 6th month 7th month 8th month 9th month 10th month 11th month 12th month
Sales Deviations in units
On Average -6,7 -5,2 -8,8 -7,2 -9,7 -14,2 -11,7 -12,9 -16,7 -13,4 -18,3 -22,5
On Average (with absolute values) 10,4 10,9 16,2 8,8 12,4 13,4 7,9 10,1 11,8 4,7 6,4 7,8
Standard Deviation 19,3 14,2 18,6 14,7 20,2 19,9 18,0 25,8 26,7 23,3 32,5 36,2
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 16,6 10,5 13,0 11,0 14,7 16,2 12,7 17,4 18,6 12,0 16,7 18,9
Range 107,2 66,7 81,5 54,0 81,2 73,9 76,5 105,0 115,1 75,7 104,0 115,9
Maximum 18,6 18,5 24,6 17,5 18,9 15,1 16,8 24,9 31,5 17,9 25,4 30,8
Minimum -88,5 -48,3 -56,9 -36,5 -62,3 -58,7 -59,7 -80,2 -83,6 -57,8 -78,6 -85,1
Sales Deviations in %
On Average -2,8 % -2,4 % -3,6 % -2,6 % -3,3 % -5,5 % -4,2 % -4,5 % -6,4 % -4,9 % -7,2 % -9,1 %
On Average (with absolute values) 4,1 % 4,4 % 6,6 % 3,4 % 4,8 % 5,4 % 3,0 % 3,9 % 5,2 % 1,8 % 2,7 % 3,7 %
Standard Deviation 6,3 % 5,5 % 7,5 % 5,6 % 7,7 % 7,9 % 6,3 % 9,8 % 11,9 % 8,2 % 12,5 % 17,1 %
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 5,1 % 4,0 % 5,2 % 4,1 % 5,3 % 6,2 % 4,3 % 6,3 % 7,8 % 4,2 % 6,4 % 8,5 %
Range 34,7 % 27,4 % 36,8 % 22,2 % 32,9 % 32,9 % 26,4 % 41,0 % 54,6 % 26,5 % 40,9 % 54,5 %
Maximum 8,7 % 8,2 % 11,1 % 8,1 % 9,4 % 6,6 % 7,8 % 12,7 % 20,9 % 8,4 % 13,0 % 20,4 %
Minimum -26,0 % -19,2 % -25,7 % -14,1 % -23,5 % -26,3 % -18,7 % -28,3 % -33,7 % -18,2 % -27,9 % -34,1 %  
 
Gross Margin Deviations in units
On Average -2,2 -2,2 -2,6 -2,4 -3,3 -3,5 -3,7 -3,9 -4,0 -4,2 -3,3 -3,1
On Average (with absolute values) 2,6 2,7 3,5 2,2 2,6 3,1 1,9 2,2 2,4 1,1 1,2 1,0
Standard Deviation 4,9 2,6 3,6 2,8 3,2 3,7 3,5 4,6 5,0 5,1 6,2 6,0
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 4,3 2,1 2,5 2,3 3,0 3,1 3,0 3,6 3,7 3,0 3,1 3,1
Range 26,7 12,3 14,7 13,3 10,9 14,9 12,6 16,7 16,9 13,2 17,2 18,2
Maximum 3,8 3,1 4,9 4,2 1,2 4,4 1,0 2,8 3,3 0,3 2,2 3,2
Minimum -22,9 -9,2 -9,8 -9,1 -9,7 -10,5 -11,6 -13,8 -13,6 -12,9 -15,0 -15,0
Gross Margin Deviations in %
On Average -5,4 % -6,7 % -7,5 % -6,6 % -8,8 % -9,6 % -9,7 % -10,1 % -10,7 % -13,0 % -11,3 % -9,1 %
On Average (with absolute values) 7,1 % 8,2 % 9,9 % 6,0 % 7,1 % 8,8 % 5,1 % 6,1 % 6,9 % 3,3 % 3,7 % 3,3 %
Standard Deviation 9,7 % 7,5 % 9,7 % 7,5 % 8,4 % 10,1 % 8,9 % 11,7 % 13,2 % 11,1 % 14,7 % 16,2 %
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 7,7 % 5,9 % 6,7 % 6,2 % 7,8 % 8,2 % 7,7 % 9,0 % 9,7 % 7,7 % 8,2 % 8,2 %
Range 49,3 % 38,0 % 42,9 % 35,0 % 29,7 % 40,1 % 29,5 % 44,0 % 46,1 % 29,4 % 43,5 % 48,0 %
Maximum 11,6 % 12,7 % 17,0 % 12,8 % 3,5 % 15,1 % 3,3 % 10,3 % 13,1 % 1,1 % 7,9 % 12,9 %
Minimum -37,8 % -25,3 % -25,9 % -22,2 % -26,3 % -25,1 % -26,2 % -33,8 % -32,9 % -28,3 % -35,6 % -35,2 %  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 177 
FiRe Ltd. (Consecutive months’ accuracy, periodic) 
 
RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3,RP4
and 2nd RP1 and 2nd RP1 and 2nd RP1 RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3 RP2,RP3 RP2,RP3 RP2 RP2 RP2
2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014
1st month 2nd month 3rd month 4th month 5th month 6th month 7th month 8th month 9th month 10th month 11th month 12th month
Other Operating Income Deviations in units
On Average -0,5 0,1 1,0 0,3 0,2 0,8 -0,2 0,1 1,2 0,3 0,5 1,4
On Average (with absolute values) 1,1 0,9 1,3 0,7 0,7 1,2 0,3 0,5 1,0 0,2 0,2 0,7
Standard Deviation 2,1 1,5 1,9 1,1 1,2 2,4 0,7 1,3 2,6 0,9 1,1 3,2
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 1,6 1,2 1,6 0,7 0,8 1,8 0,4 0,7 1,7 0,4 0,5 1,5
Range 10,6 8,4 10,0 4,8 5,4 11,8 2,9 4,1 10,8 2,4 3,0 9,9
Maximum 3,0 2,9 6,7 3,2 2,9 7,9 1,3 1,7 7,0 1,4 1,4 6,3
Minimum -7,6 -5,5 -3,4 -1,6 -2,4 -3,9 -1,6 -2,4 -3,8 -1,0 -1,5 -3,5
Other Operating Income Deviations in %
On Average -2,3 % 1,5 % 12,3 % 4,0 % 3,1 % 14,0 % -2,1 % 1,7 % 18,2 % 0,8 % 0,1 % 21,9 %
On Average (with absolute values) 10,1 % 10,0 % 16,3 % 7,2 % 7,9 % 16,5 % 2,8 % 6,3 % 13,2 % 1,4 % 3,0 % 9,4 %
Standard Deviation 16,1 % 14,7 % 28,3 % 12,1 % 13,5 % 42,6 % 7,3 % 14,6 % 40,4 % 7,7 % 15,0 % 47,1 %
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 11,0 % 10,9 % 25,0 % 8,1 % 8,9 % 34,8 % 4,4 % 8,0 % 27,9 % 3,4 % 6,4 % 22,9 %
Range 74,9 % 76,3 % 160,6 % 51,8 % 52,4 % 223,9 % 29,5 % 46,5 % 179,3 % 24,6 % 39,6 % 149,4 %
Maximum 32,1 % 28,2 % 118,0 % 35,5 % 27,4 % 177,6 % 13,7 % 22,0 % 133,8 % 14,0 % 16,4 % 105,4 %
Minimum -42,8 % -48,1 % -42,6 % -16,3 % -24,9 % -46,3 % -15,8 % -24,4 % -45,5 % -10,5 % -23,3 % -44,0 %  
 
Personnel Expenses Deviations in units
On Average 1,1 0,5 0,7 0,8 0,9 0,9 0,8 1,0 1,2 0,7 0,8 1,6
On Average (with absolute values) 1,0 0,7 0,9 0,6 0,8 1,0 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,3 0,4 0,5
Standard Deviation 2,5 0,8 1,3 0,8 1,1 1,5 1,2 1,6 1,9 1,4 2,2 3,1
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 2,4 0,7 1,0 0,8 0,9 1,2 0,9 1,1 1,3 0,7 1,1 1,6
Range 13,3 3,1 6,1 2,6 3,8 7,2 4,4 5,4 7,0 3,4 4,9 7,3
Maximum 13,1 2,6 5,1 2,4 3,2 5,4 3,4 3,8 5,9 3,0 4,0 6,4
Minimum -0,3 -0,5 -1,1 -0,2 -0,6 -1,8 -1,0 -1,6 -1,1 -0,4 -0,9 -0,9
Personnel Expenses Deviations in %
On Average -6,0 % -3,5 % -4,4 % -5,1 % -5,4 % -5,3 % -5,2 % -6,4 % -6,5 % -4,6 % -4,4 % -8,2 %
On Average (with absolute values) 5,6 % 4,5 % 5,9 % 4,1 % 5,0 % 6,0 % 3,5 % 4,7 % 4,6 % 1,5 % 2,2 % 3,1 %
Standard Deviation 9,7 % 4,7 % 7,1 % 5,1 % 6,7 % 9,2 % 7,4 % 10,0 % 10,7 % 8,0 % 12,9 % 17,2 %
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 9,2 % 3,9 % 5,7 % 4,7 % 5,5 % 6,9 % 5,2 % 6,9 % 7,5 % 4,2 % 6,1 % 8,6 %
Range 51,6 % 17,0 % 34,3 % 16,0 % 21,4 % 42,3 % 26,1 % 33,8 % 37,3 % 18,8 % 31,4 % 40,7 %
Maximum 2,0 % 2,6 % 7,9 % 1,7 % 4,4 % 14,7 % 7,3 % 11,8 % 7,7 % 2,4 % 5,9 % 6,8 %
Minimum -49,6 % -14,4 % -26,4 % -14,3 % -17,1 % -27,5 % -18,8 % -22,0 % -29,6 % -16,4 % -25,5 % -33,9 %  
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FiRe Ltd. (Consecutive months’ accuracy, periodic) 
 
RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3,RP4
and 2nd RP1 and 2nd RP1 and 2nd RP1 RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3 RP2,RP3 RP2,RP3 RP2 RP2 RP2
2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014
1st month 2nd month 3rd month 4th month 5th month 6th month 7th month 8th month 9th month 10th month 11th month 12th month  
Rent Expenses Deviations in units
On Average 0,3 -0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,1 0,0 -0,2 -0,2 -0,2 -0,5 -0,6
On Average (with absolute values) 0,5 0,4 0,4 0,2 0,3 0,3 0,1 0,2 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,2
Standard Deviation 1,5 0,7 0,6 0,3 0,6 0,6 0,2 0,7 0,6 0,3 0,8 1,2
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 1,2 0,6 0,5 0,2 0,4 0,4 0,1 0,5 0,4 0,1 0,4 0,6
Range 7,8 4,4 3,1 1,2 2,8 3,4 0,7 2,6 2,7 0,7 2,3 3,0
Maximum 6,2 1,0 1,2 0,7 1,0 1,4 0,4 0,3 0,8 0,3 0,0 0,7
Minimum -1,5 -3,4 -1,8 -0,4 -1,8 -1,9 -0,3 -2,3 -1,9 -0,4 -2,3 -2,2
Rent Expenses Deviations in %
On Average -2,4 % 1,4 % 0,9 % -0,3 % 0,7 % 1,8 % -0,2 % 3,2 % 3,4 % 2,0 % 7,1 % 6,7 %
On Average (with absolute values) 4,9 % 6,1 % 6,0 % 2,6 % 3,8 % 4,3 % 1,3 % 2,7 % 3,0 % 0,8 % 1,8 % 2,7 %
Standard Deviation 12,2 % 13,5 % 8,4 % 3,9 % 8,4 % 9,0 % 3,0 % 10,4 % 9,2 % 3,6 % 13,1 % 14,9 %
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 9,1 % 12,0 % 6,5 % 2,1 % 6,2 % 6,5 % 1,7 % 7,1 % 6,1 % 1,8 % 6,9 % 7,3 %
Range 68,1 % 80,8 % 42,0 % 13,9 % 42,9 % 48,4 % 10,3 % 40,2 % 40,5 % 9,8 % 36,4 % 46,2 %
Maximum 21,8 % 64,8 % 26,6 % 6,3 % 26,0 % 28,4 % 5,1 % 36,1 % 28,8 % 5,8 % 36,1 % 35,0 %
Minimum -46,3 % -16,0 % -15,4 % -7,6 % -16,9 % -20,0 % -5,2 % -4,1 % -11,7 % -4,0 % -0,3 % -11,1 %  
 
IT Costs Deviations in units
On Average 0,3 0,2 0,1 0,2 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,2 0,0 0,0 -0,1 -0,1
On Average (with absolute values) 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,2 0,0 0,1 0,1
Standard Deviation 0,3 0,2 0,3 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,2 0,3 0,3
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 0,3 0,2 0,2 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,1 0,2 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,1
Range 1,5 1,0 1,4 0,7 1,3 1,8 0,6 1,2 1,5 0,6 0,7 0,9
Maximum 1,3 0,8 1,0 0,5 0,9 1,1 0,4 0,8 0,7 0,3 0,3 0,5
Minimum -0,2 -0,3 -0,4 -0,2 -0,4 -0,7 -0,2 -0,4 -0,8 -0,3 -0,4 -0,4
IT Costs Deviations in %
On Average -13,4 % -8,0 % -6,2 % -7,8 % -6,3 % -1,5 % -6,5 % -6,9 % 2,9 % 0,9 % 1,6 % 7,1 %
On Average (with absolute values) 14,8 % 13,3 % 13,8 % 7,5 % 10,4 % 10,8 % 4,4 % 7,9 % 8,5 % 1,7 % 3,2 % 3,7 %
Standard Deviation 12,3 % 12,9 % 16,2 % 9,0 % 16,1 % 19,9 % 9,6 % 17,5 % 23,2 % 10,1 % 15,4 % 16,5 %
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 10,0 % 7,2 % 10,0 % 7,0 % 10,6 % 13,2 % 6,8 % 10,4 % 13,7 % 4,5 % 6,5 % 7,7 %
Range 51,8 % 55,2 % 67,5 % 35,4 % 67,9 % 91,8 % 33,5 % 61,6 % 85,1 % 32,4 % 38,1 % 46,7 %
Maximum 12,9 % 22,5 % 28,5 % 13,0 % 30,9 % 48,7 % 14,8 % 32,4 % 54,4 % 12,7 % 20,7 % 21,2 %
Minimum -38,8 % -32,7 % -39,0 % -22,4 % -37,0 % -43,0 % -18,7 % -29,2 % -30,7 % -19,8 % -17,3 % -25,4 %  
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FiRe Ltd. (Consecutive months’ accuracy, periodic) 
 
RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3,RP4
and 2nd RP1 and 2nd RP1 and 2nd RP1 RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3 RP2,RP3 RP2,RP3 RP2 RP2 RP2
2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014
1st month 2nd month 3rd month 4th month 5th month 6th month 7th month 8th month 9th month 10th month 11th month 12th month
Marketing Expenses Deviations in units
On Average 0,3 0,3 0,1 0,1 0,2 -0,1 0,4 0,2 -0,3 0,4 0,0 -0,5
On Average (with absolute values) 0,5 0,5 0,6 0,4 0,3 0,6 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,1 0,1 0,3
Standard Deviation 0,6 0,5 0,8 0,7 0,6 0,9 0,4 0,7 1,0 0,3 0,5 1,5
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,5 0,3 0,4 0,6 0,2 0,2 0,7
Range 2,4 2,1 3,6 2,4 2,6 3,2 1,5 2,8 3,2 0,8 1,5 4,1
Maximum 1,5 1,7 1,7 1,2 1,8 1,2 1,2 1,6 1,3 0,8 0,9 1,9
Minimum -0,9 -0,4 -1,9 -1,1 -0,9 -2,0 -0,3 -1,1 -1,9 0,0 -0,6 -2,2
Marketing Expenses Deviations in %
On Average -9,0 % -7,9 % -0,2 % -6,1 % -5,5 % 7,6 % -14,3 % -5,8 % 12,9 % -9,6 % -5,0 % 21,9 %
On Average (with absolute values) 17,6 % 12,5 % 18,3 % 13,9 % 9,1 % 18,2 % 8,2 % 8,0 % 13,5 % 2,4 % 3,6 % 10,0 %
Standard Deviation 20,4 % 13,5 % 23,0 % 23,1 % 16,1 % 29,6 % 18,2 % 20,9 % 31,9 % 9,7 % 18,1 % 46,4 %
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 12,4 % 9,6 % 13,4 % 14,9 % 11,4 % 18,8 % 14,0 % 12,7 % 19,7 % 6,2 % 8,1 % 22,3 %
Range 74,6 % 51,6 % 104,3 % 86,6 % 63,8 % 106,5 % 60,2 % 82,1 % 103,5 % 28,2 % 47,1 % 133,0 %
Maximum 24,3 % 14,9 % 70,6 % 35,4 % 27,8 % 77,7 % 13,5 % 37,6 % 71,7 % 0,6 % 18,9 % 93,1 %
Minimum -50,3 % -36,7 % -33,8 % -51,2 % -36,0 % -28,8 % -46,7 % -44,5 % -31,9 % -27,6 % -28,2 % -39,8 %  
 
Maintenance Costs Deviations in units
On Average 0,4 0,4 0,3 0,3 0,4 0,3 0,4 0,4 0,2 0,4 0,5 0,3
On Average (with absolute values) 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,3 0,3 0,4 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,2
Standard Deviation 0,5 0,3 0,4 0,3 0,3 0,4 0,4 0,3 0,5 0,3 0,4 0,8
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 0,4 0,2 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,2 0,3 0,4
Range 2,3 1,3 1,5 1,0 1,1 1,7 1,2 1,2 1,8 0,9 1,2 2,5
Maximum 2,1 0,8 0,8 0,7 1,1 1,0 1,1 1,1 0,9 1,0 1,2 1,7
Minimum -0,2 -0,5 -0,7 -0,3 0,0 -0,7 -0,2 -0,1 -0,8 0,0 0,0 -0,8
Maintenance Costs Deviations in %
On Average -11,8 % -11,2 % -8,9 % -9,1 % -13,8 % -9,8 % -12,1 % -13,4 % -6,8 % -12,6 % -13,7 % -4,9 %
On Average (with absolute values) 12,4 % 12,5 % 12,5 % 9,0 % 10,4 % 10,3 % 6,7 % 6,9 % 6,8 % 3,2 % 3,4 % 3,4 %
Standard Deviation 11,0 % 9,1 % 11,5 % 10,7 % 7,6 % 12,5 % 11,5 % 9,7 % 14,6 % 11,2 % 11,0 % 17,9 %
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 8,4 % 6,8 % 7,0 % 8,1 % 9,0 % 9,0 % 9,7 % 9,4 % 8,9 % 7,7 % 8,0 % 8,1 %
Range 49,2 % 40,7 % 40,2 % 30,3 % 30,9 % 45,3 % 38,3 % 37,3 % 49,9 % 29,9 % 32,5 % 57,2 %
Maximum 7,8 % 15,6 % 17,8 % 8,5 % -0,4 % 20,7 % 5,8 % 3,5 % 24,3 % -1,3 % -0,1 % 23,4 %
Minimum -41,5 % -25,1 % -22,4 % -21,7 % -31,3 % -24,6 % -32,4 % -33,8 % -25,6 % -31,2 % -32,6 % -33,8 %  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 180 
FiRe Ltd. (Consecutive months’ accuracy, periodic) 
 
RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3,RP4
and 2nd RP1 and 2nd RP1 and 2nd RP1 RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3 RP2,RP3 RP2,RP3 RP2 RP2 RP2
2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014
1st month 2nd month 3rd month 4th month 5th month 6th month 7th month 8th month 9th month 10th month 11th month 12th month
Other Operating Costs Deviations in units
On Average 0,6 0,2 0,4 0,7 0,4 0,4 0,5 0,1 0,3 0,6 0,1 1,4
On Average (with absolute values) 0,9 0,9 1,2 0,6 0,7 1,2 0,3 0,4 0,8 0,1 0,3 0,6
Standard Deviation 1,0 1,1 1,6 0,8 1,1 2,0 0,7 1,0 2,1 0,7 1,4 2,7
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 0,6 0,7 1,1 0,7 0,7 1,3 0,5 0,6 1,2 0,4 0,6 1,3
Range 5,0 5,1 7,3 2,8 5,3 7,7 2,7 3,9 7,5 2,1 4,1 7,5
Maximum 3,1 2,2 3,7 2,4 2,1 4,0 2,0 1,3 4,0 2,0 1,6 4,2
Minimum -1,8 -2,9 -3,6 -0,4 -3,2 -3,6 -0,7 -2,7 -3,5 -0,1 -2,5 -3,3
Other Operating Costs Deviations in %
On Average -12,4 % -5,9 % -8,9 % -15,1 % -7,4 % -7,4 % -11,9 % -3,1 % -5,9 % -11,5 % -2,9 % -19,7 %
On Average (with absolute values) 20,9 % 20,5 % 26,3 % 13,4 % 16,3 % 24,8 % 8,3 % 8,3 % 17,5 % 3,1 % 6,4 % 10,6 %
Standard Deviation 20,5 % 24,6 % 36,0 % 16,1 % 27,3 % 43,3 % 16,4 % 22,2 % 46,1 % 13,3 % 31,8 % 51,6 %
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 11,5 % 14,7 % 25,8 % 13,6 % 17,9 % 28,1 % 11,4 % 13,0 % 26,9 % 8,0 % 13,6 % 24,0 %
Range 97,8 % 118,0 % 184,3 % 54,2 % 128,9 % 185,4 % 55,8 % 88,0 % 180,3 % 38,2 % 92,6 % 163,6 %
Maximum 51,5 % 68,9 % 87,7 % 8,7 % 80,8 % 88,6 % 20,0 % 60,0 % 83,5 % 2,7 % 53,3 % 66,6 %
Minimum -46,3 % -49,1 % -96,6 % -45,6 % -48,1 % -96,8 % -35,8 % -28,0 % -96,8 % -35,6 % -39,3 % -97,0 %  
 
Depreciations and Impairments Deviations in units
On Average 0,2 0,1 -1,7 0,1 0,1 -2,3 0,2 0,2 -3,3 0,3 0,3 -0,1
On Average (with absolute values) 0,2 0,2 2,0 0,1 0,2 1,9 0,1 0,1 1,9 0,1 0,1 0,2
Standard Deviation 0,4 0,3 8,8 0,2 0,3 10,1 0,2 0,2 12,5 0,2 0,2 0,9
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 0,2 0,2 8,7 0,1 0,2 8,7 0,1 0,2 8,8 0,1 0,2 0,4
Range 2,2 1,6 47,8 0,6 1,8 48,1 0,6 1,0 48,2 0,5 0,6 2,5
Maximum 2,0 0,6 1,4 0,5 0,8 1,6 0,5 0,8 1,6 0,4 0,6 1,5
Minimum -0,2 -1,0 -46,4 -0,1 -1,0 -46,4 -0,1 -0,3 -46,6 0,0 0,0 -1,0
Depreciations and Impairments Deviations in %
On Average -5,1 % -1,8 % 51,8 % -4,0 % -2,5 % 68,4 % -5,4 % -4,1 % 107,1 % -6,1 % -6,5 % -2,4 %
On Average (with absolute values) 4,9 % 5,1 % 58,2 % 3,5 % 4,3 % 57,8 % 2,9 % 2,9 % 59,0 % 1,6 % 1,7 % 3,7 %
Standard Deviation 8,2 % 7,3 % 264,1 % 4,3 % 8,6 % 307,7 % 4,1 % 7,0 % 403,9 % 4,2 % 6,5 % 21,9 %
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 4,9 % 5,5 % 262,7 % 3,8 % 6,3 % 265,2 % 3,8 % 4,8 % 284,4 % 3,3 % 4,2 % 9,7 %
Range 41,7 % 42,3 % 1439,8 % 18,5 % 48,3 % 1455,8 % 16,8 % 30,2 % 1554,9 % 11,6 % 19,6 % 70,7 %
Maximum 6,4 % 24,8 % 1397,3 % 3,6 % 25,2 % 1409,6 % 2,5 % 7,9 % 1509,1 % 0,5 % 1,2 % 26,6 %
Minimum -35,3 % -17,5 % -42,5 % -14,9 % -23,0 % -46,2 % -14,3 % -22,3 % -45,9 % -11,2 % -18,4 % -44,1 %  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 181 
FiRe Ltd. (Consecutive months’ accuracy, periodic) 
 
 
RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3,RP4
and 2nd RP1 and 2nd RP1 and 2nd RP1 RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3 RP2,RP3 RP2,RP3 RP2 RP2 RP2
2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014
1st month 2nd month 3rd month 4th month 5th month 6th month 7th month 8th month 9th month 10th month 11th month 12th month  
Operating Profit Deviations in units
On Average 0,8 -0,5 -0,4 0,1 -1,1 -1,4 -1,5 -1,8 -1,8 -1,7 -1,6 0,0
On Average (with absolute values) 2,1 2,1 2,3 1,5 2,0 2,2 1,1 1,8 1,6 0,8 1,2 0,8
Standard Deviation 2,6 3,2 2,9 2,9 3,7 3,6 3,0 5,0 4,1 4,3 6,8 4,3
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 2,0 2,5 1,8 1,9 2,6 2,5 2,1 3,2 2,7 2,0 3,1 1,9
Range 13,3 17,5 11,1 13,7 16,2 15,0 11,6 19,1 14,5 12,4 19,4 12,8
Maximum 6,9 4,7 5,1 7,0 4,5 4,9 1,7 3,7 3,5 2,6 4,0 4,8
Minimum -6,4 -12,8 -6,1 -6,8 -11,7 -10,0 -9,9 -15,4 -11,1 -9,7 -15,4 -8,0
Operating Profit Deviations in %
On Average -20,9 % 8,8 % -69,2 % -125,8 % -144,1 % -485,1 % -27,7 % -157,7 % -96,9 % -44,2 % -225,9 % 28,9 %
On Average (with absolute values) 101,2 % 87,0 % 86,5 % 166,4 % 121,1 % 366,9 % 18,8 % 88,5 % 67,0 % 17,4 % 56,5 % 27,2 %
Standard Deviation 262,3 % 136,3 % 148,2 % 733,1 % 343,2 % 1967,2 % 51,3 % 272,7 % 266,3 % 75,7 % 158,2 % 130,1 %
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 243,6 % 126,6 % 139,1 % 617,8 % 296,9 % 1705,9 % 36,1 % 201,4 % 185,4 % 38,3 % 124,4 % 56,6 %
Range 1814,3 % 698,2 % 802,7 % 3905,5 % 1467,9 % 9081,8 % 211,5 % 843,5 % 1163,6 % 247,5 % 420,5 % 345,2 %
Maximum 618,1 % 384,6 % 89,7 % 650,5 % 109,6 % 17,6 % 42,7 % 64,2 % 187,9 % 88,8 % -68,6 % 190,4 %
Minimum -1196,2 % -313,7 % -712,9 % -3255,0 % -1358,3 % -9064,3 % -168,8 % -779,3 % -975,7 % -158,7 % -489,1 % -154,8 %  
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FiRe Ltd. (Consecutive quarters’ accuracy, periodic and cumulative) 
 
RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3,RP4
and 2nd RP1 RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3 RP2 and 2nd RP1 RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3 RP2
2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014
First 3 mths First 6 mths First 9 mths First 12 mths First 3 mths Second 3 mths Third 3 mths Last 3 mths
Sales Deviations in units
On Average -20,7 -51,4 -81,6 -117,2 -20,7 -31,0 -41,3 -54,2
On Average (with absolute values) 34,1 70,0 113,1 154,6 34,1 42,7 56,5 75,4
Standard Deviation 42,5 81,2 138,7 188,0 42,5 49,4 68,9 91,0
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 34,1 70,0 113,1 154,6 34,1 42,7 56,5 75,4
Range 180,1 285,5 575,3 570,9 180,1 203,1 296,6 295,7
Maximum 44,7 67,7 140,8 130,9 44,7 45,6 73,1 74,2
Minimum -135,4 -217,8 -434,4 -440,0 -135,4 -157,5 -223,4 -221,5
Sales Deviations in %
On Average -3,0 % -3,1 % -3,3 % -3,8 % -3,0 % -3,8 % -5,0 % -6,9 %
On Average (with absolute values) 4,6 % 4,5 % 4,9 % 5,3 % 4,6 % 5,6 % 7,6 % 10,7 %
Standard Deviation 5,2 % 5,0 % 5,6 % 6,1 % 5,2 % 6,3 % 8,8 % 12,1 %
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 4,6 % 4,5 % 4,9 % 5,3 % 4,6 % 5,6 % 7,6 % 10,7 %
Range 37,1 % 37,4 % 54,6 % 54,5 % 37,1 % 35,7 % 35,1 % 54,5 %
Maximum 11,1 % 11,1 % 20,9 % 20,4 % 11,1 % 9,4 % 9,4 % 20,4 %
Minimum -26,0 % -26,3 % -33,7 % -34,1 % -26,0 % -26,3 % -25,7 % -34,1 %  
 
Gross Margin Deviations in units
On Average -7,0 -16,6 -25,7 -32,7 -7,0 -9,2 -11,6 -10,5
On Average (with absolute values) 8,2 17,6 27,2 33,6 8,2 10,0 12,6 11,8
Standard Deviation 9,1 15,8 23,5 35,8 9,1 8,7 12,3 16,3
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 8,2 17,6 27,2 33,6 8,2 10,0 12,6 11,8
Range 45,1 68,1 83,0 99,6 45,1 30,9 43,5 46,5
Maximum 6,3 6,8 8,4 3,1 6,3 4,3 4,5 3,6
Minimum -38,8 -61,2 -74,6 -96,4 -38,8 -26,7 -39,0 -42,9
Gross Margin Deviations in %
On Average -6,8 % -7,7 % -7,9 % -8,3 % -6,8 % -8,4 % -10,2 % -11,3 %
On Average (with absolute values) 7,8 % 8,2 % 8,5 % 8,5 % 7,8 % 9,2 % 11,5 % 12,7 %
Standard Deviation 7,2 % 6,6 % 6,7 % 7,5 % 7,2 % 7,7 % 10,3 % 12,9 %
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 7,8 % 8,2 % 8,5 % 8,5 % 7,8 % 9,2 % 11,5 % 12,7 %
Range 54,8 % 52,8 % 46,9 % 48,4 % 54,8 % 41,3 % 43,3 % 48,4 %
Maximum 17,0 % 15,1 % 13,1 % 12,9 % 17,0 % 15,1 % 17,0 % 12,9 %
Minimum -37,8 % -37,8 % -33,8 % -35,6 % -37,8 % -26,3 % -26,3 % -35,6 %  
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FiRe Ltd. (Consecutive quarters’ accuracy, periodic and cumulative) 
RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3,RP4
and 2nd RP1 RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3 RP2 and 2nd RP1 RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3 RP2
2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014
First 3 mths First 6 mths First 9 mths First 12 mths First 3 mths Second 3 mths Third 3 mths Last 3 mths  
Other Operating Income Deviations in units
On Average 0,6 1,9 2,6 4,7 0,6 1,4 1,1 2,2
On Average (with absolute values) 2,4 3,3 4,6 6,9 2,4 2,4 2,6 4,1
Standard Deviation 3,6 3,8 5,0 6,6 3,6 3,1 3,4 4,3
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 2,4 3,3 4,6 6,9 2,4 2,4 2,6 4,1
Range 17,4 15,5 17,6 19,3 17,4 13,6 11,9 10,0
Maximum 7,7 9,7 11,1 12,5 7,7 9,6 8,3 6,5
Minimum -9,7 -5,9 -6,5 -6,9 -9,7 -4,1 -3,5 -3,5
Other Operating Income Deviations in %
On Average 3,0 % 3,9 % 3,5 % 4,0 % 3,0 % 5,8 % 5,0 % 6,4 %
On Average (with absolute values) 9,2 % 6,3 % 5,6 % 5,8 % 9,2 % 9,6 % 10,6 % 13,6 %
Standard Deviation 13,0 % 7,3 % 6,1 % 5,3 % 13,0 % 14,1 % 14,9 % 16,3 %
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 9,2 % 6,3 % 5,6 % 5,8 % 9,2 % 9,6 % 10,6 % 13,6 %
Range 166,1 % 225,7 % 181,9 % 153,5 % 166,1 % 223,9 % 160,6 % 149,4 %
Maximum 118,0 % 177,6 % 133,8 % 105,4 % 118,0 % 177,6 % 118,0 % 105,4 %
Minimum -48,1 % -48,1 % -48,1 % -48,1 % -48,1 % -46,3 % -42,6 % -44,0 %  
 
Personnel Expenses Deviations in units
On Average 2,3 4,8 6,0 7,4 2,3 2,6 3,0 3,1
On Average (with absolute values) 2,6 5,4 6,8 8,0 2,6 3,0 3,9 4,6
Standard Deviation 3,9 6,4 7,5 12,1 3,9 3,2 4,3 6,8
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 2,6 5,4 6,8 8,0 2,6 3,0 3,9 4,6
Range 19,4 28,1 27,3 26,2 19,4 13,2 16,0 15,3
Maximum 18,1 24,9 22,4 25,4 18,1 10,6 12,3 13,4
Minimum -1,3 -3,2 -4,9 -0,9 -1,3 -2,6 -3,7 -1,9
Personnel Expenses Deviations in %
On Average -4,8 % -4,9 % -4,2 % -3,9 % -4,8 % -5,3 % -6,1 % -5,9 %
On Average (with absolute values) 5,3 % 5,5 % 4,8 % 4,1 % 5,3 % 6,3 % 8,1 % 8,7 %
Standard Deviation 6,6 % 5,9 % 5,2 % 6,2 % 6,6 % 6,3 % 8,6 % 12,7 %
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 5,3 % 5,5 % 4,8 % 4,1 % 5,3 % 6,3 % 8,1 % 8,7 %
Range 57,5 % 64,3 % 44,3 % 48,6 % 57,5 % 42,3 % 34,3 % 40,7 %
Maximum 7,9 % 14,7 % 14,7 % 14,7 % 7,9 % 14,7 % 7,9 % 6,8 %
Minimum -49,6 % -49,6 % -29,6 % -33,9 % -49,6 % -27,5 % -26,4 % -33,9 %  
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FiRe Ltd. (Consecutive quarters’ accuracy, periodic and cumulative) 
 
RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3,RP4
and 2nd RP1 RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3 RP2 and 2nd RP1 RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3 RP2
2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014
First 3 mths First 6 mths First 9 mths First 12 mths First 3 mths Second 3 mths Third 3 mths Last 3 mths  
Rent Expenses Deviations in units
On Average 0,3 0,3 -0,5 -2,3 0,3 -0,1 -0,4 -1,3
On Average (with absolute values) 1,0 1,3 1,3 2,4 1,0 0,6 0,6 1,3
Standard Deviation 1,9 2,4 1,7 2,3 1,9 0,8 0,8 1,4
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 1,0 1,3 1,3 2,4 1,0 0,6 0,6 1,3
Range 10,5 12,3 5,4 6,7 10,5 3,5 2,5 3,2
Maximum 8,0 9,4 1,4 0,4 8,0 1,4 0,4 0,1
Minimum -2,5 -2,8 -4,0 -6,3 -2,5 -2,1 -2,1 -3,1
Rent Expenses Deviations in %
On Average -0,5 % -0,5 % 0,9 % 2,6 % -0,5 % 0,7 % 2,1 % 5,1 %
On Average (with absolute values) 4,4 % 2,9 % 2,2 % 2,7 % 4,4 % 2,9 % 3,0 % 5,2 %
Standard Deviation 7,2 % 4,7 % 2,7 % 2,7 % 7,2 % 3,9 % 4,1 % 5,8 %
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 4,4 % 2,9 % 2,2 % 2,7 % 4,4 % 2,9 % 3,0 % 5,2 %
Range 111,1 % 74,8 % 52,9 % 53,0 % 111,1 % 48,4 % 45,3 % 47,2 %
Maximum 64,8 % 28,4 % 36,1 % 36,1 % 64,8 % 28,4 % 28,4 % 36,1 %
Minimum -46,3 % -46,3 % -16,9 % -16,9 % -46,3 % -20,0 % -16,9 % -11,1 %  
 
IT Costs Deviations in units
On Average 0,6 1,2 1,5 1,5 0,6 0,4 0,3 -0,2
On Average (with absolute values) 0,8 1,5 1,9 1,7 0,8 0,7 0,7 0,6
Standard Deviation 0,7 1,3 1,9 1,6 0,7 0,8 0,8 0,7
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 0,8 1,5 1,9 1,7 0,8 0,7 0,7 0,6
Range 2,8 5,7 8,2 4,2 2,8 3,7 3,1 1,8
Maximum 2,0 3,7 5,4 3,7 2,0 2,4 1,7 1,1
Minimum -0,7 -2,0 -2,9 -0,5 -0,7 -1,3 -1,4 -0,7
IT Costs Deviations in %
On Average -9,5 % -8,5 % -7,4 % -6,4 % -9,5 % -5,3 % -3,6 % 3,1 %
On Average (with absolute values) 12,9 % 12,5 % 10,7 % 7,0 % 12,9 % 11,8 % 12,5 % 10,7 %
Standard Deviation 11,2 % 11,4 % 10,8 % 6,4 % 11,2 % 13,8 % 15,4 % 12,3 %
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 12,9 % 12,5 % 10,7 % 7,0 % 12,9 % 11,8 % 12,5 % 10,7 %
Range 67,5 % 91,8 % 97,4 % 76,2 % 67,5 % 91,8 % 69,9 % 46,7 %
Maximum 28,5 % 48,7 % 54,4 % 40,8 % 28,5 % 48,7 % 30,9 % 21,2 %
Minimum -39,0 % -43,0 % -43,0 % -35,3 % -39,0 % -43,0 % -39,0 % -25,4 %  
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FiRe Ltd. (Consecutive quarters’ accuracy, periodic and cumulative) 
 
RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3,RP4
and 2nd RP1 RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3 RP2 and 2nd RP1 RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3 RP2
2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014
First 3 mths First 6 mths First 9 mths First 12 mths First 3 mths Second 3 mths Third 3 mths Last 3 mths
Marketing Expenses Deviations in units
On Average 0,6 0,8 0,9 0,8 0,6 0,2 0,3 -0,1
On Average (with absolute values) 1,1 1,8 2,6 3,5 1,1 1,1 1,4 1,7
Standard Deviation 1,2 2,0 3,0 4,3 1,2 1,4 1,5 2,0
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 1,1 1,8 2,6 3,5 1,1 1,1 1,4 1,7
Range 5,1 7,1 9,7 11,5 5,1 5,2 4,1 5,4
Maximum 3,1 4,0 6,1 6,7 3,1 2,2 2,4 2,9
Minimum -2,1 -3,2 -3,6 -4,8 -2,1 -3,0 -1,8 -2,6
Marketing Expenses Deviations in %
On Average -6,1 % -3,3 % -2,2 % -1,8 % -6,1 % -1,6 % -2,8 % 0,6 %
On Average (with absolute values) 10,7 % 9,0 % 8,9 % 8,4 % 10,7 % 11,5 % 14,3 % 15,8 %
Standard Deviation 11,6 % 10,3 % 10,3 % 10,6 % 11,6 % 14,9 % 16,2 % 18,8 %
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 10,7 % 9,0 % 8,9 % 8,4 % 10,7 % 11,5 % 14,3 % 15,8 %
Range 120,9 % 128,9 % 122,9 % 139,8 % 120,9 % 128,9 % 121,8 % 133,0 %
Maximum 70,6 % 77,7 % 71,7 % 93,1 % 70,6 % 77,7 % 70,6 % 93,1 %
Minimum -50,3 % -51,2 % -51,2 % -46,7 % -50,3 % -51,2 % -51,2 % -39,8 %  
 
Maintenance Costs Deviations in units
On Average 1,1 2,2 3,2 4,8 1,1 1,1 1,0 1,2
On Average (with absolute values) 1,1 2,2 3,2 4,8 1,1 1,1 1,2 1,5
Standard Deviation 0,8 1,3 1,9 3,5 0,8 0,8 1,0 1,5
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 1,1 2,2 3,2 4,8 1,1 1,1 1,2 1,5
Range 3,8 4,2 6,7 9,7 3,8 3,2 4,1 4,6
Maximum 3,5 4,3 6,7 10,6 3,5 2,5 3,1 3,9
Minimum -0,3 0,1 0,0 0,8 -0,3 -0,7 -1,0 -0,8
Maintenance Costs Deviations in %
On Average -10,7 % -11,0 % -10,9 % -11,6 % -10,7 % -10,9 % -10,6 % -10,0 %
On Average (with absolute values) 11,1 % 11,0 % 10,9 % 11,6 % 11,1 % 11,7 % 12,2 % 12,5 %
Standard Deviation 7,8 % 6,1 % 6,5 % 8,6 % 7,8 % 7,8 % 10,6 % 13,0 %
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 11,1 % 11,0 % 10,9 % 11,6 % 11,1 % 11,7 % 12,2 % 12,5 %
Range 59,3 % 62,1 % 58,1 % 57,2 % 59,3 % 52,0 % 49,1 % 57,2 %
Maximum 17,8 % 20,7 % 24,3 % 23,4 % 17,8 % 20,7 % 17,8 % 23,4 %
Minimum -41,5 % -41,5 % -33,8 % -33,8 % -41,5 % -31,3 % -31,3 % -33,8 %  
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FiRe Ltd. (Consecutive quarters’ accuracy, periodic and cumulative) 
 
RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3,RP4
and 2nd RP1 RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3 RP2 and 2nd RP1 RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3 RP2
2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014
First 3 mths First 6 mths First 9 mths First 12 mths First 3 mths Second 3 mths Third 3 mths Last 3 mths
Other Operating Costs Deviations in units
On Average 1,2 3,1 4,5 5,8 1,2 1,4 0,9 2,1
On Average (with absolute values) 2,2 4,2 5,7 7,6 2,2 2,6 2,1 3,8
Standard Deviation 2,6 4,5 5,2 6,6 2,6 3,1 2,6 4,0
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 2,2 4,2 5,7 7,6 2,2 2,6 2,1 3,8
Range 12,9 20,4 19,0 22,5 12,9 14,9 9,9 10,9
Maximum 6,7 11,3 12,2 16,3 6,7 7,8 4,0 5,3
Minimum -6,2 -9,1 -6,7 -6,3 -6,2 -7,1 -5,9 -5,5
Other Operating Costs Deviations in %
On Average -9,5 % -10,9 % -11,2 % -10,3 % -9,5 % -10,1 % -7,1 % -11,6 %
On Average (with absolute values) 17,1 % 15,4 % 14,0 % 13,6 % 17,1 % 19,1 % 16,2 % 23,7 %
Standard Deviation 18,9 % 16,6 % 12,7 % 12,5 % 18,9 % 22,4 % 19,1 % 26,7 %
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 17,1 % 15,4 % 14,0 % 13,6 % 17,1 % 19,1 % 16,2 % 23,7 %
Range 184,3 % 185,4 % 185,4 % 180,5 % 184,3 % 185,4 % 185,4 % 163,6 %
Maximum 87,7 % 88,6 % 88,6 % 83,5 % 87,7 % 88,6 % 88,6 % 66,6 %
Minimum -96,6 % -96,8 % -96,8 % -97,0 % -96,6 % -96,8 % -96,8 % -97,0 %  
 
Depreciations and Impairments Deviations in units
On Average -1,5 -4,1 -6,2 -6,2 -1,5 -2,0 -2,9 0,5
On Average (with absolute values) 2,2 4,9 7,3 7,4 2,2 2,8 3,9 0,7
Standard Deviation 8,7 13,3 16,3 16,9 8,7 10,1 12,5 1,0
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 2,2 4,9 7,3 7,4 2,2 2,8 3,9 0,7
Range 48,0 47,5 48,7 46,8 48,0 48,7 49,2 2,7
Maximum 2,3 2,4 1,9 2,4 2,3 2,9 2,8 2,4
Minimum -45,7 -45,1 -46,8 -44,4 -45,7 -45,7 -46,3 -0,3
Depreciations and Impairments Deviations in %
On Average 14,9 % 20,7 % 22,2 % 16,9 % 14,9 % 20,6 % 32,6 % -5,0 %
On Average (with absolute values) 21,7 % 24,2 % 25,2 % 19,7 % 21,7 % 27,5 % 41,4 % 6,5 %
Standard Deviation 88,0 % 66,3 % 58,0 % 46,4 % 88,0 % 101,9 % 135,0 % 9,6 %
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 21,7 % 24,2 % 25,2 % 19,7 % 21,7 % 27,5 % 41,4 % 6,5 %
Range 1439,8 % 1455,8 % 1554,9 % 1553,1 % 1439,8 % 1455,8 % 1439,8 % 70,7 %
Maximum 1397,3 % 1409,6 % 1509,1 % 1509,1 % 1397,3 % 1409,6 % 1397,3 % 26,6 %
Minimum -42,5 % -46,2 % -45,9 % -44,1 % -42,5 % -46,2 % -42,5 % -44,1 %  
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FiRe Ltd. (Consecutive quarters’ accuracy, periodic and cumulative) 
 
RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3,RP4
and 2nd RP1 RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3 RP2 and 2nd RP1 RP2,RP3,RP4 RP2,RP3 RP2
2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008-2014
First 3 mths First 6 mths First 9 mths First 12 mths First 3 mths Second 3 mths Third 3 mths Last 3 mths  
Operating Profit Deviations in units
On Average -0,1 -2,2 -7,2 -10,0 -0,1 -2,4 -5,1 -3,3
On Average (with absolute values) 5,2 9,3 15,7 20,1 5,2 7,0 7,8 10,1
Standard Deviation 6,7 11,7 21,0 29,8 6,7 8,4 10,9 14,6
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 5,2 9,3 15,7 20,1 5,2 7,0 7,8 10,1
Range 32,7 42,9 75,2 92,6 32,7 34,0 42,2 41,2
Maximum 12,4 15,1 19,7 22,9 12,4 10,8 8,8 8,2
Minimum -20,3 -27,8 -55,5 -69,6 -20,3 -23,2 -33,4 -33,1
Operating Profit Deviations in %
On Average -135,6 % 22,1 % -5,9 % -13,1 % -135,6 % 85,0 % -5234,7 % -131,5 %
On Average (with absolute values) 172,9 % 56,0 % 31,5 % 49,5 % 172,9 % 161,2 % 5278,7 % 195,2 %
Standard Deviation 503,5 % 81,2 % 36,8 % 55,2 % 503,5 % 389,0 % 19483,2 % 222,1 %
Standard Deviation (with absolute values) 172,9 % 56,0 % 31,5 % 49,5 % 172,9 % 161,2 % 5278,7 % 195,2 %
Range 1814,3 % 9714,8 % 3905,5 % 3905,5 % 1814,3 % 9714,8 % 3378,3 % 679,6 %
Maximum 618,1 % 650,5 % 650,5 % 650,5 % 618,1 % 650,5 % 123,3 % 190,4 %
Minimum -1196,2 % -9064,3 % -3255,0 % -3255,0 % -1196,2 % -9064,3 % -3255,0 % -489,1 %  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Helsinki, Finland 20.5.2016 __________________  
 Signature 
 
